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ABSTRACT
THE RIGHT TO REFUGE, AND WHAT HAPPENS NEXT
Eilidh Beaton
Supervisor: Kok-Chor Tan

This dissertation concerns the rights of refugees. It is a project of two parts. Part One provides an
account of the scope of the right to refuge in international law. Here, I reject both the alienage and
persecution requirements for refugee-status-eligibility outlined in the 1951 Refugee Convention.
Instead, I defend a definition that extends the right to refuge to any individual whose human rights
are urgently threatened, who has no effective recourse to their home government, and whose
interests can only or best be satisfied by means of refuge. In Part Two, I turn to the question of
what refugee-hosting states and societies owe to refugees within their borders. Here, I provide a
refugee-specific framework for future discussion on the topic of integration, and outline some highlevel rights and responsibilities states, refugees, and members of the host society have to facilitate
integration between refugees and their host communities. I also provide an account of the scope and
nature of refugee family reunification rights, arguing that states have stronger, broader, and lessconditional duties to reunite refugees with their families, especially when those refugees are children.
I conclude with a summary of the arguments in this dissertation, and an outline of the primary
principles upon which those arguments depend.
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Introduction

Introduction
§1 Global Displacement in Context
Forced displacement is one of the greatest humanitarian and development issues in our world today.
Every year since 2014 has seen a new record-high in the total number of forcibly displaced people
worldwide.1 According to the most recent figures, less than one-third of these individuals are
refugees under the 1951 Refugee Convention. Over half are internally displaced, and around 5% are
awaiting a decision on their asylum application. These numbers are unlikely to decline any time
soon. In fact, as natural disasters and other environmental changes become more frequent,
displacement due to climate change alone could see these figures more than double.2
The majority of the individuals displaced by emerging migration challenges like climate
change, state fragility, and conflict will be ineligible for Convention refugee status. The harm they
are moving to escape is generalized – they are not directly targeted because of a particular feature of
their identity – and many will move internally, not across state borders. In light of this, policy
scholars and philosophers alike have suggested that the existing international refugee regime is no
longer fit for purpose.3 According to these scholars, the Refugee Convention of 1951 is a product of
its time, designed to protect individuals fleeing the harms of the Holocaust during World War II.4

From 2014-2018, the total number of forcibly displaced persons were as follows: 59.5 million, 65.3 million, 65.6
million, 68.5 million, 70.8 million. This is almost a 70% increase from just 10 years ago, when the world’s total displaced
population was 42 million. See UNHCR, 2008 Global Trends: Refugees, Asylum-seekers, Returnees, Internally Displaced and
Stateless Persons (2009); UNHCR, World at War: Global Trends, Forced Displacement in 2014 (2015); UNHCR, Global Trends:
Forced Displacement in 2015 (2016); UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2016 (2017); UNHCR, Global Trends:
Forced Displacement in 2017 (2018); and UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2018 (2019).
2 E.g. according to a widely-repeated prediction, there will be 200 million climate migrants by 2050 – three times the
total number of displaced individuals globally in 2018. See International Organization for Migration, Migration and Climate
Change (no. 31) (Geneva: International Organization for Migration, 2008), p. 9; and originally, Nicholas Stern (ed), The
Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 76.
3 See e.g. Alexander Betts and Paul Collier, Refuge: Rethinking Refugee Policy in a Changing World (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2017), pp. 34-61; and Andrew Shacknove, ‘Who is a Refugee?’, Ethics 95:2 (1985), pp. 274-284.
4 Betts and Collier, p. 34.
1
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Since discrimination-based persecution is no longer the primary cause of forced displacement in the
21st century, there is a significant gap between who is protected by the international refugee regime
and human needs on the ground. As such, these scholars insist that we must radically rethink our
global understandings of who is entitled to refugee status, and how the right to refuge should fit in
with other mechanisms of international protection.
Clearly, these discussions about the proper scope of the right to refuge are of urgent
importance in a world with unprecedented levels of global displacement. Still, for those engaged in
these discussions, it can be easy to assume that if a sufficiently robust system of international
protection – which ensured that every individual in need of asylum were entitled to it – were created
and effectively enforced, such that states could not shirk their responsibilities to admit refugees, then
the displacement crisis would be “solved”. In fact, however, from the perspective of an individual
recipient of asylum, arrival in a host state is not the end of the journey to safety, security, and full
rights protection. Even for the minority of refugees hosted in wealthy democratic states, it is entirely
reasonable to continue to feel unsettled after arriving in a country of asylum.5 Organizations tasked
with helping refugees settle in their new home are often overstretched and poorly funded; and state
policies themselves may create unnecessary obstacles to integration, making refugees feel unwelcome
and unable to move on with their lives. What’s more, in some countries, refugees’ feelings of
instability may be exacerbated by growing racism, xenophobia, and anti-refugee hostility among
sections of the host population; or by separation from close family members, and uncertainty about
whether reunification in the host state will ever be possible. Many refugees are forced to leave their
families and flee their own state out of a need to escape discrimination-based serious harm. How
intolerable, then, that they may find themselves continuing to experience discrimination in their

5
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country of asylum, and face institutional barriers to integration, all while separated from the support
of their family unit.
§2 The Structure of the Dissertation
The goal of this dissertation is to bring the tools of philosophical analysis to bear on these two
urgent political problems. It is a project of two parts.
In Part One, I offer an account of the proper scope of the right to refuge in international
law. Under the existing refugee regime, in order to be eligible for refugee status, an individual must
(a) be outside of her country of nationality or habitual residence, and (b) have a well-founded fear of
persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or
political opinion.6 In Chapter I, I argue that the first of these conditions should be eliminated from
the definition of refugeehood. It is unacceptable, I argue, to place the entire burden on asylum
seekers to exit the territory of their homeland when there are things the international community can
and should do to facilitate their exit. In Chapter II, I closely evaluate the persecution condition for
refugeehood, focusing in particular on how it is applied in practice, and evaluate some philosophical
defenses and critiques of this condition in light of its practical application. I conclude that this
requirement must also be replaced, and identify three key desiderata for an appropriate definition of
refugeehood for international law. These are: (1) that it eliminate protection gaps, (2) be feasible to
implement in a world like ours, and (3) preserve the existing understanding of refuge as a
distinctively political remedy. In Chapter III, I outline a new definition of refugeehood for
international law which satisfies these desiderata, and defend this definition against some possible
objections.

6

UNHCR, Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951 and 1967), p. 14.
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In Part Two, I turn to the question of what is owed to refugees hosted in affluent
democratic countries after confirmation of status. Chapter IV aims to provide conceptual and
normative clarity to complex political and philosophical discussions on the issue of refugee
integration. In this chapter, I outline a framework for future integration research that is refugeespecific, comprehensive across all relevant areas of social life, and as concrete as possible. In
particular, I clear up some conceptual confusion about the term ‘integration’ and generate a working
definition for future discussion; identify the domains of integration most relevant to refugees; and
establish, for each domain, the extent to which integration is morally desirable, as well as the content
of the most important rights and duties associated with facilitating integration in that domain.
Finally, in Chapter V, I turn to the question of family reunification rights for refugees – a topic that I
take to be particularly significant, for although a literature on family reunification has emerged in
recent years, very little has been said about refugee-specific family reunification rights. The goal of
this chapter is to fill this gap in the literature by extending the existing discussion on family
reunification to refugee-specific cases. Ultimately, I argue that states have particularly strong duties
to reunite refugees with their families, especially when those refugees are children; that refugee
family reunion rights are sometimes broader than the rights of “ordinary” citizens and permanent
residents; and that refugee family reunion applications should not be subject to financial conditions.
§3 Theoretical Commitments
The question addressed in Part One of the dissertation is global in scope: its concern is with the
proper definition of refugeehood for international law. To lay my cards on the table: my background
commitments concerning issues of global justice are broadly cosmopolitan. That is, I take it that
individuals, not states, should be the fundamental units of moral concern at the global level, and I
am in favor of the creation of global institutions which not only protect individuals’ basic interests,
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but also satisfy appropriate principles of wealth redistribution. Importantly, however, the central
arguments advanced in this dissertation do not rest upon these controversial commitments. Rather,
the substantive arguments for extending the scope of the right to refuge outlined in Chapters I-III
rest solely on the widely-accepted claim that the international community have strong obligations to
respect, protect, and fulfill internationally-recognized human rights. In fact, the definition of
refugeehood I defend in Chapter III is the most conservative definition of refugeehood possible that
also leaves no protection gaps. I consider it a virtue of the arguments in this section that they rest on
such a thin set of commitments, for this makes them – at least in principle – acceptable to scholars
with a wide range of theoretical commitments.7
As outlined in §2, Part Two of the dissertation focuses specifically on the rights of refugees
hosted in affluent democratic countries. Of course, since the majority of the global displaced
population are hosted in less-affluent states, with one-third living in the Least Developed Countries,
questions about the entitlements of refugees hosted in these states are urgently pressing. 8 I will not
address these cases directly in this dissertation, but two things can be said here about the significance
of the arguments of Part Two for future work on this issue. First, although countries in developed
regions currently host just 16% of the world’s refugees, there is good reason to think that affluent
states have obligations to admit many more refugees than they currently do.9 If affluent states were
to live up to these responsibilities, the arguments of Part Two would be relevant to a significantly

There is, at least, good reason to think that internationalists – that is, those who take states to be the ultimate unit of
moral concern at the global level, utilitarians, and those who hold some non-liberal views (e.g. the sorts of views
underlying the sort of political entity that John Rawls describes as a ‘decent people’) could all accept these arguments,
since all are committed to respect for human rights. For an argument for utilitarianism’s ability to accommodate human
rights, see Kok-Chor Tan, Justice Without Borders (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 41-44. For Rawls’s
description of decent hierarchical societies as one kind of non-liberal decent people that respects human rights, see John
Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 64-67.
8 UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2018, p. 2.
9 For a discussion on proper responsibility-distribution for hosting refugees, see e.g. David Owen, ‘In Loco Civitatis: On
the Normative Basis of the Institution of Refugeehood and Responsibilities for Refugees’, in Migration in Political Theory,
ed. by Sarah Fine and Lea Ypi (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 280-285.
7
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larger proportion of the world’s globally displaced population. Second, and more significantly, the
primary reason for limiting the scope of the analysis in these chapters is because it is possible to be
more precise about what host states owe to refugees as a matter of justice in contexts with fewer
institutional and resource limitations. However, this kind of analysis should still bear some relevance
to the question of what is owed to refugees in less-affluent states. Just as principles for non-ideal
theory can be identified by reference to the ideal, so too can at least some of the entitlements of
refugees hosted in less-affluent states be identified by reference to what refugees would be owed if
lack of resources, infrastructure, or institutional power were not obstacles to full rights-fulfillment.10
Thus, although I do not directly address the question of what is owed to refugees hosted in lessaffluent states here, I hope that the discussions of Part Two will be of some use to future work on
this issue.
In any case, because the discussion in Chapters IV and V focus on this question of what is
owed to refugees hosted in affluent democratic states, the arguments in these chapters generally
assume liberal principles of justice.11 To be clear, though, although this is true of most arguments in
these chapters, it is not the case that all arguments here rely on acceptance of these principles. For
instance, the argument in Chapter V in favor of states having stronger duties to reunite refugee
families is premised primarily on acceptance of a human right to family life.
Finally, throughout Part Two of the dissertation, I will assume that the definition of
refugeehood defended in Part One has been implemented in international law, and as such, that it is
possible to draw a relatively sharp distinction between refugees and migrants. Under this
assumption, refugees are individuals who have been forced to move to another state in order to secure
To be clear: of course, the conditions that are the topic of discussion in Part Two are not ‘ideal’ – for there would be
no refugees, and no xenophobia, racism or anti-refugee hostility in an ideal world. Still, though, to the extent that the
principles identified in these chapters are not limited by the resource and institutional limitations just outlined, they may
provide useful standards for identifying what refugees are owed with these limitations in place.
11 See e.g. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), and Political Liberalism (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1996).
10
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proper protection of their human rights, whereas migrants are individuals who choose to move
elsewhere, but retain the option to return to their state of origin. I make this assumption here
because it lends considerable clarity to the arguments of these chapters, since a major goal of Part
Two is to identify the ways in which the integration and family reunification rights of refugees differ
from those of non-refugee immigrants. Of course, in the actual world where the global refugee
regime leaves major protection gaps, existing refugee-migrant categories do not track this neat
distinction. As such, care must be taken when applying the arguments of these chapters to realworld contexts to ensure that the entitlements of individuals who are morally, but not yet legally,
entitled to refuge do not go unacknowledged.

7

PART ONE:
The Right to Refuge
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CHAPTER I: Against the Alienage Condition
§1 Introduction
The ratification of the Refugee Convention in 1951 and its Protocol in 1967 were major landmarks
in the history of humanitarian protection. The Convention was the first international legal document
to comprehensively codify refugee rights, and to this day the Protocol is the primary instrument in
global refugee law. However, as an international agreement, the Convention was a product of an
interstate compromise made in the context of its time. As such, the decades since its creation have
been marked by calls to extend refugee status to new groups of people. This debate has primarily
focused on whether it is too restrictive to require that a person must be fleeing the particular harm
of persecution in order to be eligible for refugee status. Perhaps most famously, in 1985 Andrew
Shacknove argued that the term ‘refugee’ should be extended to all people whose basic needs were
unmet for any reason, so long as they had no recourse to their home government and were
accessible by the international community.1
These debates about whether people fleeing harms other than persecution should also
qualify for refugee status are clearly of great practical significance. However, it is important not to
lose sight of the fact that in his 1985 paper Shacknove also rejected the Convention’s other
condition for refugeehood: alienage – that is, the requirement that a person must be outside of their
country of nationality or habitual residence. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a detailed
argument in support of Shacknove’s lesser-discussed claim that this condition for refugeehood
should be removed. In approaching this question, I set aside debates about whether the persecution
condition should be upheld, which will be addressed in the next two chapters. Instead, here I will

All uses of ‘international community’ in this chapter refer to the group of safe states that are in a position to host
refugees. Of course, whether a state is ‘safe’ depends on the refugee population in question, so in practice the obligationbearing set of states that make up the ‘international community’ will vary by context.
1
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argue that people who otherwise meet the requirements for refugeehood but have not yet crossed a
border should also be eligible for refugee status. However, my argument should also
straightforwardly apply to other accounts of refugeehood that modestly expand the persecution
condition. My aim in this chapter is to show that whatever the other requirements for refugeehood
might be, location should not affect refugee-status-eligibility.2
The chapter will proceed as follows. In §2, I will reconstruct Shacknove’s critique of the
Convention, as well as some recent defenses of this definition, and will say a few words about my
methodology and how it differs from Shacknove’s. In §3, I will offer some novel reasons for
rejecting the alienage condition. In §4, I will respond to an objection to my view, according to which
the alienage condition should be upheld because intervening militarily to provide refuge to those
who are within the territory of their home state would usually be impermissible. In §5, I will address
some implications of rejecting alienage for international law. In particular, I will discuss the ways in
which reforming the Convention definition would redraw the distinction between IDPs and
refugees; I will respond to the concern that a new definition would have bad implications for refugee
agency; and I will defend the claim that the legal reforms I endorse are both feasible and
implementable in the medium-term.
§2 Who is a Refugee?: Shacknove’s Critique of the Convention, and Two Recent Defenses
The 1951 Refugee Convention defines a refugee as a person who:
…owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection
of that country.3

Admittedly, it will not apply so straightforwardly to more radical accounts. It is not obvious, for instance, that all
people in severe poverty, including those who remain in their home state, should be refugees. This is a complication I set
aside in this paper – but it raises important questions for future work.
3 UNHCR, Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951 and 1967), p. 14.
2
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Here, the Convention sets out two necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for refugeehood: (1)
persecution for one of the five listed reasons, and (2) alienage – that is, being outside of one’s
country of nationality or former habitual residence. Shacknove argues that the centrality of these
conditions in the Convention definition suggest that it aims to make ‘concrete’ the more
fundamental idea that a refugee is a person whose normal bond of protection and assistance with
their state has been severed.4 However, he claims that the Convention goes wrong in suggesting that
persecution and alienage are always the products of a severed citizen-state bond. Persecution, he
argues, is merely one possible manifestation of the real indicator of a citizen-state breakdown – a
state’s failure to protect its citizens’ basic needs – and alienage is not necessary for refugeehood at
all.5
Two important commitments shape Shacknove’s positive account of refugeehood. First, he
adopts a particular methodological strategy, according to which the term ‘refugee’ is defined before
identifying the set of entitlements associated with refugee status.6 Second, he argues that in order to
be minimally legitimate, states must protect their citizens from ‘man-made threats’.7 On the basis of
these background commitments, Shacknove argues that the persecution requirement for
refugeehood should be replaced with the broader condition that a person have unmet basic needs.
The extent to which individuals are threatened by natural disasters or drought has been shown to be
in large part a result of the political and economic arrangements in their society, so threats to basic
needs from flooding or famine are, like persecution, within state control.8
Ultimately, Shacknove argues that a refugee is anyone with unmet basic needs, a wellfounded fear that recourse to their home government is futile, and who is situated such that

Andrew Shacknove, ‘Who is a Refugee?’, Ethics 95:2 (1985), p. 275.
Ibid., p. 277.
6 Ibid., p. 277.
7 Ibid., pp. 278-279.
8 Ibid., pp. 279-280.
4
5
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international assistance is possible.9 This revised conception of a refugee is significantly more
expansive than the Convention definition. Shacknove not only recategorizes migrants fleeing natural
disasters and poverty as refugees, but he also applies this label to all people with unmet basic needs
who remain in their home country. For Shacknove, fleeing from one’s country of nationality or
habitual residence is not necessary for refugeehood – whether a person is a refugee depends only on
their political, not their territorial, relationship with their state.10
In the years since Shacknove’s paper was published, a number of scholars have defended or
endorsed similarly expansive definitions, and it is arguably the dominant position in the
philosophical literature today that the Convention definition is too narrow.11 However, this view has
recently been challenged by some defenses of the Convention, most notably from Matthew Lister
and Max Cherem. Both Lister and Cherem argue that refugeehood should be reserved for those who
cannot be assisted by means other than asylum. They claim that the Convention accurately picks out
this group of people, because protection within one’s home state is usually impracticable for those
fleeing persecution, and this is not the case for those fleeing other serious harms.12
Interestingly, both Lister and Cherem’s defenses of the Convention are informed by a
rejection of Shacknove’s methodological approach: they each insist, more or less explicitly, that the

Shacknove, p. 282. Although I defend Shacknove’s rejection of the alienage condition in this paper, I do not accept his
international accessibility condition. As Matthew Lister points out, this requirement absurdly suggests that individuals
threatened by weak states are refugees while those threatened by strong states are not. Of course, if a person is
completely out of reach states may not have an all things considered obligation to provide them with refuge. But such cases
should not settle the question of whether individuals who remain in their home state should generally be entitled to
asylum. See Matthew Lister, ‘Who Are Refugees?’, Law and Philosophy 32:5 (2013), pp. 656-657.
10 Shacknove, p. 283.
11 See e.g. Joseph Carens The Ethics of Immigration (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 200-203; Michael
Dummett On Immigration and Refugees (London: Routledge, 2001), p. 37; Luara Ferracioli, ‘The Appeal and Danger of a
New Refugee Convention’, Social Theory and Practice 40:1 (2014), pp. 123-126; Matthew Gibney, ‘Liberal Democratic
States and Responsibilities to Refugees’, The American Political Science Review 93:1 (1999), pp. 170-171; Serena Parekh,
Refugees and the Ethics of Forced Displacement (New York: Routledge, 2016), pp. 11-13; Stephen Perry, ‘Immigration, Justice,
and Culture’, in Justice in Immigration ed. by Warren F. Schwartz (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 104.
12 Lister, pp. 660-662, and Max Cherem, ‘Refugee Rights: Against Expanding the Definition of a “Refugee” and
Unilateral Protection Elsewhere’, The Journal of Political Philosophy 24:2 (2016), pp. 187, 190-192.
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definition of a refugee should be informed by an understanding of what is owed to refugees.13 For
instance, Lister argues that even if people with unmet basic needs have the right to some form of
assistance from the international community, the question of whether an individual should be
entitled to the particular remedy of refugee status depends on the nature of the rights associated
with refugeehood.14 It may be the case, Lister suggests, that only some kinds of basic needs shortfalls
generate a right to the kinds of protection associated with being a refugee.15 As such, in his own
paper Lister begins his search for a proper definition of refugeehood with a rough conception of the
duties owed to refugees. In particular, he suggests that a refugee is anyone a state has ‘a moral duty
to admit entry to’ regardless of that state’s other immigration policies.16
I agree with Lister and Cherem’s critique of Shacknove’s methodological approach. The
rights to non-refoulement and durable solution are currently central to what it means to be a
refugee, and failure to acknowledge this threatens to change the meaning of the term beyond
recognition. However, while I agree with this general objection, I find the substance of Lister’s
suggested alternative starting point to be insufficiently general. His claim that refugees are
individuals who states must ‘admit entry’ to suggests that obligations to refugees begin only when
they attempt to enter the territory of another state. As such, this basic conception implicitly
presupposes that the alienage condition should be upheld. Instead, I take as my own starting point
the position that a refugee is any person the international community has an obligation to provide
refuge to. Here, I understand ‘refuge’ in a broad sense, to refer to any circumstance in which a
political authority acts as if it were the primary responsibility-bearer for the protection of a noncitizen. In line with current practice, refuge-provision would also involve a duty not to return a

Lister (2013), p. 658, and Cherem, pp. 190-192.
Lister (2013), pp. 658-9.
15 David Miller also makes this point in Strangers in Our Midst (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016), p. 80.
16 Lister (2013), pp. 647-8.
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refugee to a situation in which they would be at risk of persecution. This starting point preserves the
principles of asylum and non-refoulement central to the existing conception of a refugee, while
leaving open the possibility that individuals may be owed this sort of protection by the international
community before they have left the territory of their home state.
In the next section I will provide some positive reasons for thinking that the international
community owes refuge, understood in this properly broad way, to persecuted people who have not
yet exited their country. First, though, it should be noted that these people already satisfy Lister and
Cherem’s moral conception of who is entitled to refuge. They have a well-founded fear of
persecution and no recourse to their home government, so protection in-place is not possible – their
basic needs can only be fulfilled by means of surrogate national protection.17 The rationale behind the
alienage condition, then, must be that other principled or practical considerations trump these more
basic reasons for extending the right to refuge to all persecuted people, regardless of location.18
Indeed, Lister and Cherem explicitly offer reasons of this sort for refusing to extend the right to
refuge to persecuted people who remain in-place, and I will address these considerations in §3 and 4.
§3 Against Alienage
It is widely acknowledged that location is, at least prima facie, morally arbitrary. In light of this, I take
it that one should be presumptively in favor of the view that the right to refuge should not be
contingent on facts of location. It is true that location can sometimes appear to be relevant in
political matters – for instance, it is generally accepted that membership in a political community,

See Lister (2013), pp. 660-662, and Cherem, pp. 190-192. Again, I do not wish to take a stance on Lister and Cherem’s
defense of the persecution condition here – I only mean to highlight that (at least) all persecuted people already possess
the characteristics that should generate an entitlement to refugeehood on Lister and Cherem’s own terms.
18 This seems to be Lister’s approach. Cherem sometimes suggests that location is fundamentally morally significant –
e.g. he writes ‘Refugees are persecuted and cannot stay. This helps explain why leaving one’s country is partially
constitutive of refugee status’ (p. 190). However, this jumps the gun – a person can need to leave their country before they
actually do so.
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which usually overlaps with living within the state’s territory, generates special rights and obligations
between a citizen and their state. However, these sorts of considerations cannot alleviate the
international community’s responsibilities to persecuted people whose states are already failing to
protect their basic needs.19 Moreover, as outlined in §2, Shacknove rejects the alienage condition on
the grounds that alienage is not necessary for the breakdown of a citizen-state relationship – other
events can also signal that this relationship has been severed.20 As globalization and advancements in
communication technology have progressed, this claim has only become more plausible: it is entirely
possible for the international community to become aware that persecution is occurring within a
particular territory before a single individual has fled. A defense of alienage, then, cannot rest on the
claim that location is itself morally relevant or that alienage is the only indicator of a breakdown
between a citizen and their state. In what follows, I will outline some further positive reasons in
favor of rejecting the alienage condition.
A major problem with the existing system of protection, which requires that a person must
cross a border in order to be a refugee, is that it places the entire burden on persecuted people to
exit the territory of their homeland. Moreover, at least presently, the burden usually also falls on
persecuted people to travel to a safe state and claim asylum. Clearly this is worrying – as recent
events have demonstrated, persecuted people’s journeys to safety are often unnecessarily difficult
and dangerous. Many asylum seekers are forced to travel irregularly and pay smugglers large fees in
order to exit their home state. The result of this is a situation in which those who cannot afford to
pay may be unable to escape, while those who can often undergo extreme hardship at various points
in their journey. It is not uncommon for smugglers to detain and extort travelers en-route –
kidnapping those who attempt to flee without using their services, and using physical or sexual

For further discussion of this point, see David Owen, ‘In Loco Civitatis’, in Migration in Political Theory ed. by Sarah
Fine and Lea Ypi (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 279-280.
20 Shacknove, p. 283.
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violence to obtain additional fees.21 Moreover, since 2014, thousands of people fleeing persecution
have died while crossing the Mediterranean, usually because the vessels provided by smugglers are
unsafe, filled beyond capacity, insufficiently stocked with resources, or attacked during transit.22
A further problem with the current system is that irregular travel is typically more risky for
vulnerable groups, including women and those without access to financial resources. 23 While people
of all genders may be exposed to violence during transit, women and girls are also at increased risk
of sexual violence – though it must be emphasized that sexual violence against men and boys is also
highly pervasive.24 Additionally, those with fewer financial means are at higher risk, because
exposure to violence can sometimes be mitigated by money.25 Indeed, since crossing a border is
usually costly – even regular travel requires, at the very least, a passport – the poorest individuals
sometimes simply do not have the means to access asylum at all. Because of these risks associated
with irregular travel, refugees who are able to file for asylum in wealthier countries have historically
been ‘young, male and mobile’ – women and children are more likely to be found in refugee camps
where the standard of protection is frequently inadequate.26 Under the current system, then, more
vulnerable groups stand a lower chance of being able to apply for asylum, particularly in a wealthy
country, and are at a higher risk of violence during transit. This is at odds with the sentiment
expressed in other areas of refugee policy that priority should be given to the most vulnerable –
women, children, and those with medical needs have priority for resettlement, for instance, out of

UNHCR, Desperate Journeys (Feb 2017), p. 5.
In 2016 alone, over 5000 migrants died crossing the Mediterranean. See International Organization for Migration,
Missing Migrants: Tracking Deaths Along Migratory Routes, https://missingmigrants.iom.int.
23 See e.g. Alison Gerard and Sharon Pickering, ‘Gender, Securitization and Transit: Refugee Women and the Journey to
the EU’, Journal for Refugee Studies 27:3 (2013), pp. 338-359.
24 Ibid., pp. 349, 351. Regarding sexual violence inflicted on refugee men and boys, see UNHCR, Sexual Violence Against
Men and Boys in the Syria Crisis (2017).
25 E.g. Gerard and Pickering highlight cases where those without funds to purchase a border crossing were forced to
provide ‘sexual services’ as payment instead. Gerard and Pickering, p. 347.
26 James C. Hathaway and R. Alexander Neve, ‘Making International Refugee Law Relevant Again: A Proposal for
Collectivized and Solution-Oriented Protection’, Harvard Human Rights Journal 10 (1997), p. 153.
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recognition of their unique set of needs.27 There are good reasons to be wary of a system that, in
practice, systematically makes asylum less accessible to those who are already less advantaged.
An asylum system with no alienage requirement would be better-placed than the current
system to alleviate these hardships, because it would make persecuted people eligible for refugee
status before they crossed a border. The international community would thereby be required to do
as much as practically possible to take responsibility for facilitating their escape from the moment a
well-founded fear of persecution was established. Significantly, steps towards accepting such asylumfacilitating policies are already being endorsed in international circles. In the 2016 New York
Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, for instance, the General Assembly committed to ‘address
unsafe movements of refugees […] without prejudice to the right to seek asylum’ such as by
‘intensifying international cooperation on the strengthening of search and rescue mechanisms […]
improv[ing] the availability of accurate data on the whereabouts of people and vessels stranded at
sea’ and ‘strengthen[ing] support for rescue efforts over land along dangerous or isolated routes’. 28
The General Assembly also agreed to ‘consider reviewing policies that criminalize cross-border
movements’, and committed to ‘expand the number and range of legal pathways available for
refugees to be admitted or resettled in third countries’.29 While these steps are promising, they
currently exist only in the form of a political declaration. If alienage were rejected, these obligations
would no longer be mere commitments, but would be required by international refugee law.
A keen observer might object that these problems associated with irregular travel can be
tackled without reforming the Convention. The alienage condition only requires that refugees be
outside of the territory of their home country, not that they have arrived in the territory of another –

UNHCR, Resettlement Handbook (2011), p. 243ff.
UN General Assembly resolution 71/1, New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, A/RES/71/1 (19 September
2016), (objectives 27, 28).
29 Ibid., (objectives 33, 77).
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so, since refugee status is declaratory, persecuted people technically become Convention refugees as
soon as they leave the territory of their state. Thus, although persecuted people do usually have to
arrive in another state to claim their right to asylum-adjudication, refuge could be more immediately
accessible if states’ existing duties under the Convention were better enforced. Two main points of
response can be made here. First, even the amount of travel needed to escape the territory of one’s
state should not be required for refugee status. For many persecuted people, further travel by land or
sea is merely the next step after a lengthy, expensive, and potentially life-threatening journey to leave
their home country. In a range of cases, these harms could be mitigated if other states were required
to make it as safe and straightforward as possible for persecuted people to escape. Second, while it is
possible to insist that states currently have duties to refugees after they exit their homeland, removing
the alienage condition would centralize these duties in the refugee definition, making them harder to
shirk. Alienage makes location part of the definition of a refugee, and its inclusion in the existing
definition helps perpetuate the notion that persecuted people are “not our problem” until they arrive
on our territory – it suggests that duties to assist irregular travelers during transit are the exception,
not the rule. If this condition were removed, it would be impossible to ignore the fact that states
have duties to anticipate and distribute responsibility for refugees before they arrive at the border of a
safe state.
Another positive reason to reject the alienage condition is that this would make it easier to
critique so-called ‘non-entrée’ policies increasingly adopted by wealthy states, which effectively block
the arrival of large numbers of asylum seekers and immigrants.30 Measures implemented thus far
include: increasing visa controls for refugee-producing countries; creating pre-inspection agreements
allowing immigration officials to operate beyond state territory; screening travelers before entry – a

See e.g. Hathaway and Neve, p. 120ff; Dummett, pp. 125-6; and Matthew Gibney, ‘“A Thousand Little Guantanamos”:
Western States and Measures to Prevent the Arrival of Refugees’, in Kate E. Tunstall (ed.), Displacement, Asylum, Migration
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 139-169.
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measure that excludes refugees, who often lack the required documentation; contracting boundaries
to evade asylum claims, such as by making parts of airports international zones; and even conducting
interdictions in international waters, indiscriminately turning away refugees alongside irregular
migrants.31 Legally, these measures are often consistent with the Refugee Convention.32 However,
there is clearly something morally troubling about such actions – as Matthew Gibney puts it, there is
something ‘paradoxical’ about the fact that Western states simultaneously acknowledge the rights of
refugees while criminalizing the search for asylum.33
Gibney argues that these non-arrival measures have been made possible by the fact that, in
recent years, the term ‘refugee’ has increasingly been replaced by ‘asylum seeker’, where asylum
seekers are often characterized as abusers of the immigration system, or as economic and security
risks to the countries they travel to.34 This perceived gap between asylum seekers and refugees is
especially likely to arise on accounts of refugeehood that retain the alienage condition because they
place the burden on persecuted people to seek asylum. Under the Convention, it is not possible to
point out that states directly violate their responsibilities to refugees when they implement certain nonarrival measures – we can only say that they shirk their duties to asylum seekers. This difference in
terminology is not insignificant. The term ‘refugee’ is imbued with special moral status – for the past
sixty years, it has been widely accepted in international circles that refugees are a class of people with
rights to protection and non-refoulement that must be respected. This widespread acceptance of the
special status of refugees is fairly unusual, as states’ attitudes towards other categories of people with
unmet basic needs have been significantly more ambivalent. Immigration lawyer David Martin puts
the point this way:

Gibney, pp. 147-151.
Ibid., pp. 153-154.
33 Ibid., p. 143. Even when these policies are implemented for reasons of general immigration control (which may or
may not be permissible), they are clearly morally problematic when they create barriers to entry for asylum seekers.
34 Ibid., pp. 140-141.
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Paradoxically, to be a ‘refugee’ today – to fall into the class of persons whom the world
community is prepared to treat under that potent label – is also to assume a position of
privilege […] the label ‘refugee’ is not solely a neutral descriptive term. It has become a call
to action, a challenge to humanitarian response.35
Implementing an account of refugeehood that rejects the alienage condition would make it clear
that individuals who have not yet entered another territory are already entitled to refugee status and
all the normative significance that comes with that term. As such, these accounts emphasize that the
international community have immediate duties to these people that cannot easily be flouted. This,
coupled with the urgent need to alleviate the burden of travel currently imposed on persecuted
people, suggests that there is very good reason to reject the alienage condition.
§4 Objection from the Impermissibility of Humanitarian Intervention
Thus far, I have outlined Shacknove’s argument for expanding the definition of refugeehood and
offered some additional reasons in support of his claim that the alienage condition should be
rejected. As mentioned in §2, both Lister and Cherem have recently defended the Convention,
including the alienage condition, against Shacknove’s calls for expansion. Their arguments in
support of alienage are twofold. First, they both suggest that military intervention would be
necessary to provide refuge to people who remain within their country of nationality, and argue that
such intervention is generally impermissible. Second, Cherem worries that eliminating the alienage
condition would result in a radical rewriting of international law. In the following two sections, I will
respond to each of these objections in turn.
4.1 (Im)permissible Humanitarian Intervention?: An Unsettled Debate
Lister’s primary argument in defense of alienage – presumably based on the assumption that military
intervention is usually the only way to provide refuge to a person who remains within the territory of

35

David A. Martin, The New Asylum Seekers: Refugee Law in the 1980s (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijoff, 1988), p. 9.
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the state that is persecuting them – is that such intervention is generally impermissible. In particular,
Lister argues that intervention would usually fail proportionality requirements, placing excessive
risks on the intervening country’s troops or on the innocent citizens of the persecuting state.36 Like
Lister, Cherem also seems to assume that humanitarian intervention would be the primary way to
provide refuge to persecuted people who remain in-place. He objects that rejecting alienage ‘is
worrisome for those who […] value state sovereignty’, and in a footnote he argues that humanitarian
intervention is ‘often unwise’, claiming that policies permitting it ‘may foster pretextual
interventions’.37
I agree with Cherem and Lister’s assessment here that humanitarian intervention is rarely
justified. There are good prudential reasons to be wary of any proposal for reform that may make it
easier for aggressive states to get away with wrongful use of force. Nonetheless, as a reason for
rejecting alienage, this argument is a little too quick. Most importantly, I will argue in §4.2 that there
are other steps states can take to assist persecuted people who remain in their home country, and
that these measures are generally preferable to military intervention. Thus, even if Lister and Cherem
are right to claim that military intervention is usually impermissible, this alone does not save the
alienage condition. However, I will also argue here that the debate about the permissibility of
humanitarian intervention is far from settled, and that arguments advanced by those who believe
intervention is sometimes justified cannot be easily dismissed. To reject alienage on the basis of the
assertion that military intervention is usually impermissible is, therefore, to reject alienage on the
basis of a contentious objection to only one possible method of assisting persecuted people in-place.

Lister, p. 664. Interestingly, in a more recent article Lister suggests that military intervention might be appropriate in
some rare situations that give rise to refugees, particularly in cases ‘where the danger is very wide-spread and imminent,
and the possibility of success is quite high’. See Matthew Lister, The Place of Persecution and Non-State Action in
Refugee Protection’, in Alex Sager (ed.), The Ethics and Politics of Immigration: Core Issues and Emerging Trends (Lanham, MD:
Rowman & Littlefield, 2016), p. 48.
37 Cherem, pp. 188, 193n.
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In the philosophical literature it is generally accepted that state sovereignty is not absolute.
For instance, although Rawls calls for toleration of less-than-liberal ‘decent hierarchical societies’ in
his Law of Peoples, he draws the line at outlaw states, arguing that state sovereignty must be limited by
concern for protecting human rights.38 Moreover, respect for sovereignty is very important for
communitarian Michael Walzer who holds that individual rights are only enforceable within the
political communities where these rights are collectively recognized.39 However, even Walzer allows
that military intervention can be justified when a government is clearly engaging in extreme forms of
oppression of its people, including massacre, enslavement, or mass expulsion.40 Indeed, Lister
himself seems to concede something like this, for he suggests that the international community has a
duty to aid certain groups of persecuted people ‘via force in their home country if the situation is
dire enough’.41 The dominant view in the literature today, then, is that humanitarian intervention is
morally permissible in particularly severe circumstances.
Admittedly, Cherem does not make such concessions in his paper. He accepts that
intervention could sometimes be permissible in principle, but he insists that conditions for
permissible intervention – like having sufficient knowledge of human rights conditions in other
countries – virtually never obtain in practice, and he worries that rejecting alienage could yield a rise
in unjust interventions.42 Of course it is important to take this possibility very seriously. However,
there is at least some reason to question whether Cherem’s practical concerns are as pressing in the
contemporary context as they once were. A number of scholars in the humanitarian intervention
literature have suggested that the years since the Cold War have been marked not by an excessive

John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 25-27, 42, 59.
Michael Walzer, ‘The Moral Standing of States: A Response to Four Critics’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 9:3 (1980), p.
226.
40 Ibid., pp. 217-8.
41 Lister (2013), p. 668.
42 Cherem, p. 193n. Here, Cherem cites Christopher Heath Wellman, ‘Taking Human Rights Seriously’, The Journal of
Political Philosophy 20:1 (2012): p. 130.
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number of impermissible “humanitarian” interventions, but rather by failure to intervene when
doing so would have been appropriate.43
Moreover, the view that humanitarian intervention might sometimes be permissible is
increasingly endorsed in practice as well as in theory. Not just a permission but a duty to intervene in
circumstances of mass atrocities is already acknowledged in international law under the
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle adopted at the 2005 UN World Summit. While this
doctrine recognizes that states bear primary responsibility for protecting their own citizens, it also
affirms that the international community has a residual responsibility to protect basic rights when
‘national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations’.44 While the doctrine
emphasizes that peaceful means of protection are preferable, it also states that militarily intervention
may be required when alternative forms of diplomatic and humanitarian action fail.45 As several
writers have pointed out, the adoption of this doctrine demonstrates that there is growing practical
acceptance of the idea that states do not have absolute sovereignty, and recognition of the idea that
intervention might sometimes be obligatory suggests that in at least certain international circles it is
now taken for granted that intervention is sometimes permissible.46
The response made thus far suggests that Lister and Cherem’s assertion that humanitarian
intervention is rarely (if ever) permissible is not uncontroversial.47 The debate about humanitarian

See e.g. Kok-Chor Tan, ‘The Duty to Protect’, Nomos 47 (2006), p. 85, and Edward C. Luck, ‘The Responsibility to
Protect: The First Decade’, Global Responsibility to Protect 3 (2011), p. 393.
44 UN General Assembly, resolution 60/1, 2005 World Summit Outcome, A/RES/60/1 (16 September 2005), (paragraph
139).
45 Ibid., (paragraph 139).
46 See e.g. Tan, p. 89; and James Pattison, ‘Is There a Duty to Intervene? Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect’,
Philosophy Compass 8:6 (2013), p. 571.
47 It should be acknowledged that Cherem also has two more principled worries about the permissibility of military
intervention (p. 193n). He (1) appeals to Bas Van der Vossen’s argument for the asymmetry of legitimacy, according to
which states that pass unjust laws internally may still have a right against external intervention, and (2) Colleen Murphy’s
defense of Lon Fuller’s claim that the rule of law is non-instrumentally valuable – which provides further reason to
worry about intervention, because it often destabilizes the rule of law. However, it is worth pointing out that neither of
these arguments, by themselves, suggest that humanitarian intervention is usually impermissible in cases of widespread
internal persecution. With regard to (1), even if we accept that legitimacy is asymmetric, a further substantive account of
legitimacy would be needed to determine whether a refugee-producing state had a right against external intervention.
43
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intervention is ongoing – and the fact that its permissibility is increasingly accepted in both theory
and practice suggests that appeals to the impermissibility of intervention are not a particularly strong
basis for rejecting alienage. Even so, however, I agree with much of the spirit of Lister and Cherem’s
worries about humanitarian intervention. Even those who believe that intervention is sometimes
permissible agree that it is only appropriate in particularly severe circumstances, and that there are
good prudential reasons to be wary of reforms that may lead to a rise in unjust interventions. As
such, humanitarian intervention would not be an appropriate response to many refugee situations.
However, by focusing their defense of alienage on the impermissibility of military intervention, both
Lister and Cherem seem to suggest that this is the only thing states can do to protect persecuted
people who remain in-place. I do not accept this assumption. In the next section, I will argue that
there are other steps states can take to provide refuge to persecuted people who have not yet
crossed a border.
4.2 Alternatives to Military Intervention
As outlined in §3, a major problem with the system of protection under the Convention is that
responsibility for exiting the persecutory state is placed entirely on persecuted people, with the result
that asylum seekers are often forced to make dangerous journeys to access the refuge they are owed.
In response to the current crisis in the Mediterranean, a number of major humanitarian INGOs
have called for European governments to create more safe and regular routes to safety to minimize
the necessity of irregular travel. Increasing provision of humanitarian visas and expanding family
reunion laws are among the strategies recommended – both of which are peaceful steps states can

Regarding (2), Murphy herself states that the rule of law (a) is merely a façade in some states, (b) does not have value if it
does not promote reciprocity and respect for autonomy, and (c) has value that can be outweighed by other elements of
political morality. In severe cases of widespread persecution, there is reason to think that one of (a)-(c) will obtain. See
Colleen Murphy, ‘Lon Fuller and the Moral Value of the Rule of Law’, Law and Philosophy 24:3 (2005), pp. 239-262; and
Bas Van der Vossen, ‘The Asymmetry of Legitimacy’, Law and Philosophy 31:5 (2012), pp. 565-592.
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take to make refuge more accessible to persecuted people who remain in their country of origin.48
Other non-violent strategies are also available. Engaging in negotiations, imposing economic
sanctions and arms embargoes, and offering assistance to internal organizations that are already
supporting the persecuted are all non-militaristic strategies states can take to put pressure on a
refugee-producing state. Depending on context, these measures can be used to induce such a state
to either refrain from preventing persecuted citizens from exiting their territory, or to consent to
another state or NGO entering their territory to engage in rescue operations. Moreover, even when
refugee-producing states are not cooperative, the international community can still take action to
minimize the risks refugees face when travelling irregularly – most obviously, by placing rescue boats
in international waters as close to the border of the offending state as possible.49 These are all
measures safe states can and should be legally required to undertake as part of their obligation to
provide refuge to people fleeing persecution.
It might be objected that it is not necessary to alter the Convention to enforce duties of this
sort. These obligations already fall under the general requirement to protect human rights, and – the
objector might argue – need not also be categorized as duties to refugees. However, it is important
not to overlook the fact that the obligations listed above are owed to individuals who would be
eligible for refugee status if only they were located in the “right” place. As such, the goal of these
actions must be not only to fulfil basic needs, but also to provide surrogate national protection – for,
in the short-term at least, these people’s rights can only be guaranteed if other states accept
responsibility for their protection. This is not true of all individuals with unmet basic needs. People
affected by climate change or extreme poverty may come from states that are willing to adequately

Florian Oel, ‘Let Us Be Proud of Europe: more than 160 NGOs call on EU to lead by values, not fear, in migration
response’, ReliefWeb, available from https://reliefweb.int/report/world/let-us-be-proud-europe-more-160-ngos-call-eulead-values-not-fear-migration-response.
49 As mentioned in §3, such measures could also be implemented under the Convention definition – but recognizing that
alienage should be rejected generates further impetus for engaging in this sort of assistance.
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25

Chapter I | Against Alienage

protect their citizens, and would be able to do so with financial or operational assistance from the
international community. In light of this important difference, and the fact that, as outlined in §2,
the need for surrogate political protection is exactly what is morally distinctive about refugees
according to Lister and Cherem – it is natural to view the above-mentioned obligations as part the
particular duty to provide refuge to refugees, and not merely as general duties to protect human
rights.
Of course, even if the alienage requirement were removed from the definition of
refugeehood, in practice refugees would often need to take on some responsibility for escaping from
their country of origin. Even if humanitarian visas were readily available, for instance, persecuted
people would still have to travel to the nearest airport or border in order to escape. I take this to be
a practical inevitability. When military intervention is not permissible, and offending states do not
permit rescue teams to enter their territory, the best the international community can do is provide
as many accessible, safe and regular routes to safety as possible. I accept that sometimes these
measures will not succeed and refugees will remain trapped without access to refuge – but this is a
deeply unfortunate result of their state’s wrongful behavior, not a reason to uphold the alienage
condition. Rejecting alienage, after all, would oblige states to do much more than they currently do
for persecuted people who have not yet crossed a border.
§5 Changes in International Law and Lawmaking
In the previous section, I argued that Lister and Cherem’s appeal to the impermissibility of
humanitarian intervention is not a strong basis for rejecting alienage. In this section, I will address a
second set of objections to my view, based on worries about revising international law in a way that
would be appropriate, agency-respecting, and enforceable. In §5.1 I will address Cherem’s concern
that rejecting alienage would redraw the line between Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and
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refugees; in §5.2 I will respond to the worry that the system of protection I endorse would be
incapable of fully respecting refugee agency; and in §5.3, I will respond to the objection that
rejecting alienage is not a feasible policy proposal within the relevant nonideal conditions of refugeeproduction.
5.1 Internally Displaced Persons and Refugees
Cherem has a second objection to Shacknove’s rejection of the alienage condition: he observes that
if alienage were rejected, many IDPs would be recategorized as refugees.50 Shacknove was writing
before there was widespread awareness of IDPs, and Cherem takes the fact that international law
and policy have not developed in the way Shacknove recommended as reason in itself to question
the idea that alienage should be rejected. He suggests that the current system of international law –
which distinguishes between obligations to refugees and obligations to help states support their
internally displaced – is preferable to the revision Shacknove proposes.
Cherem’s claim that some IDPs would be recategorized if alienage were rejected is right, but
to be clear: removing the alienage condition would not turn all IDPs into refugees. Only those who
satisfied the other conditions for refugeehood – which, under the current system, would mean
having a well-founded fear of persecution and no recourse to one’s government – would be eligible
for refugee status. Moreover, some of the new refugees created by a rejection of alienage would not
be IDPs. All persecuted people, including those who were not displaced – internally or otherwise –
would become eligible for refugee status.
Now, as a first point of response to Cherem’s worry, it is worth recognizing that the current
system for the protection of IDPs is far from perfect. IDPs face a unique set of challenges: like
refugees, they have been forced to flee their homes and are at risk of (among other things) attack
during flight, family separation, and gender-based violence; but unlike refugees, IDPs do not have

50

Cherem, p. 188.
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special status in international law, and so the international response to their needs has often been
inadequate.51 Moreover, if IDPs wish to access asylum in a neighboring state, they may face barriers
to exit that prevent them from doing so – and in the interim they may continue to be subject to the
harmful state violence or human rights abuses that contributed to their original displacement. This is
in no small part because the soft law on IDP protection that emerged in the 1990s places primary
responsibility on the territorial state to avoid displacement, protect rights during displacement, and
end displacement.52 As Cathryn Costello has pointed out, these elements of IDP law ‘smack of
containment’, and may undermine the rights of IDPs to flee their country of origin and seek
protection elsewhere.53 Similarly, Guy Goodwin-Gill points out that:
In practice, internal displacement often occurs as a result of civil conflict, in situations where
the authority of the central government is itself in dispute, and its capacity or willingness to
provide protection and assistance are equally in doubt.54
Admittedly, in recent years efforts have been taken to fill the protection gap for IDPs, and it has
been recognized that the international community have responsibilities for IDPs when they are
displaced to areas where state authority is weak or absent.55 Nonetheless, existing practice continues
to grant primary responsibility to governments, even when they actively cause their citizens to be
internally displaced.56 Clearly, this is not a good outcome for internally displaced persecuted people.
Redrawing the line between IDPs and refugees also makes sense from the perspective of
theoretical simplicity. The UNHCR’s rationale for their involvement with IDPs is based on the
similarity between IDPs and refugees – they accept that they have obligations to:
…all those, who, had they crossed an international frontier, would have had a claim to
international protection […] Like refugees, many internally displaced persons have been
Global Protection Cluster, Handbook for the Protection of Internally Displaced Persons (June 2010), pp. 1, 8.
UNOCHA, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, (principle 6).
53 Cathryn Costello, ‘On Refugeehood and Citizenship’, in Ayelet Shachar, Rainer Bauböck, Irene Bloemraad, and
Maarten Vink (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Citizenship (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), p. 722.
54 Guy Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 264.
55 Global Protection Cluster, Handbook for the Protection of Internally Displaced Persons, p. 1.
56 Ibid., p. 9.
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forced to leave their homes because of fear of persecution, war, and violence. Again, like
refugees, they are in need of protection and assistance, as well as a solution to their plight. 57
The fact that the UNHCR views the rationale for their involvement with IDPs as being based on the
similarities between refugees and IDPs suggests that redrawing the boundary between IDPs and
refugees would be a welcome measure. As argued in §3, for at least the subset of people who are
internally displaced because they have a well-founded fear of persecution and who cannot find safety
anywhere in their home state, the mere fact of not having crossed a border does not seem to be a
principled reason for withholding refugee status.58
The need to fill this gap in the provision of humanitarian assistance under the current system
is the most important reason to recategorize some IDPs as refugees. Currently, internally displaced
persecuted people receive no assistance in leaving their country – even when they could only be
properly protected by means of asylum – and they receive insufficient global attention, largely
because internal displacement was, until recently, perceived to be an internal issue. This is morally
troubling. So, while the international community should not, of course, be involved in promoting
emigration to internally displaced people who would prefer to remain, they should be in the business
of facilitating exit where desired and needed. Rejecting alienage would not merely redraw the
conceptual lines between IDPs and refugees – it would generate a new set of responsibilities to
facilitate exit which, until now, have not been acknowledged.
Finally, it should be noted that there is some very modest precedent for treating persecuted
people who have not crossed a border as refugees. The USA’s Refugee Act of 1980 extended
refugee status to persecuted people who remained in their country of nationality or habitual
UNHCR, Internally Displaced Persons: The Role of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2000), p. 3.
Of course, as with Convention refugees, states could set principled restrictions on the IDPs they permit entry to. E.g.
it would be reasonable for a state to refuse to grant refuge to individuals who pose threats to internal security, or to
refuse to admit very large numbers of IDPs if such admission would pose a genuine threat to internal or regional
stability. A proper system of responsibility-distribution could ensure that these people would still have access to refuge
elsewhere. This should go some way towards assuaging the worry that recategorizing IDPs as refugees would overwhelm
bordering states.
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residence in ‘special circumstances’ to be identified by the President after ‘appropriate
consultation’.59 This provision provided the basis for the Orderly Departures Program (ODP),
agreed upon by the UNHCR and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in 1979, which enabled persons
wishing to leave Vietnam to do so by safe, orderly routes as opposed to the dangerous journeys
Vietnamese ‘boat people’ had been forced to undertake prior to this agreement. As Judith Kumin –
former head of UNHCR programs for orderly departure from Vietnam – has pointed out, this is the
only time the UNHCR has become involved on a large scale with helping people leave their country
of origin.60 Kumin acknowledges that there are some serious reservations to be had about the
implementation of ODP in this particular context – for instance, critics suggest that the program
amounted to UNHCR-sponsored ethnic cleansing since the resettled refugees were primarily from
the ethnically Chinese minority that the Vietnamese government wanted to expel.61 Of course, these
criticisms of this particular application of the policy should be taken seriously. Still, though, the
ODP resulted in a great number of people receiving the protection they were owed by being
resettled in safe, mostly wealthy countries – primarily the US – and significantly reduced flows of
irregular migration to less affluent countries. 62 Given the parallels between this situation and current
levels of irregular travel by sea, there is reason to think a similar strategy might again be appropriate.
Indeed, Kumin herself suggests that the ODP ‘may well have been ahead of its time’ and ‘could
provide some interesting ideas about approaches to contemporary problems’.63
Refugee Act of 1980 (Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102), USA, Title II, §201(42).
Judith Kumin, ‘Orderly Departure from Vietnam: Cold War Anomaly or Humanitarian Innovation?’, Refugee Survey
Quarterly 27:1 (2008), pp. 104-5.
61 Ibid., p. 107.
62 For this reason, assisted resettlement is not obviously all-things-considered objectionable even when it involves resettling
large numbers of minorities, as in the case of Vietnam. When evaluating the permissibility of a particular remedy, it is
often instructive to consider the perspective of its recipients. If the persecuted would prefer asylum over other forms of
international assistance, it is likely that conditions are sufficiently severe that UNHCR-supported departure should be
offered to those who wish to take it. In any case, though, it is not obvious that policies requiring assisted resettlement
would lead to a rise in UN-sponsored ethnic cleansing. In fact, they may motivate the international community to more
proactively challenge the root causes of refugee crises in order to avoid incurring such resettlement obligations in the
future.
63 Kumin, p.117.
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Ultimately, an account of refugeehood that rejects alienage could strike a more appropriate
balance between fulfilling the needs of displaced people and recognizing that states have primary
responsibility for their own citizens. On the one hand, a view that rejects alienage would respect
states’ primary responsibility for their citizens by maintaining that the international community only
have duties to assist when a person has no recourse to their home government. On the other hand,
the view insists that the international community does have obligations to facilitate escape for
internally displaced people from deeply negligent or actively hostile states, because this is the only
way for their needs to be fulfilled. Thus, rejecting alienage would redraw the line between IDPs and
refugees in an entirely appropriate way: displaced people with recourse to their home government
would be IDPs and could make claims against their own state; but displaced persecuted people with
no such recourse would rightly be recategorized as refugees.
5.2 Is Rejecting Alienage Better?: Respecting Refugee Agency
Thus far I have argued that removing the alienage condition from the definition of a refugee would
result in a better system of protection for persecuted people. An important objection might be made
against this claim. According to this objection, the existing system of protection has at least one
advantage over the system I propose: it respects refugees’ agency by making them responsible for
exiting their country and applying for asylum. If refugeehood were extended in the way I have
suggested, the objector might argue, it is unclear how persecuted people who remained in-place
could go about claiming their right to refuge. The power to identify and grant asylum to these
people seems to fall entirely in the hands of international actors, like other states or the UNHCR,
not persecuted people themselves. So, it is unclear how a system of protection without an alienage
condition could respect the agency of in-place persecuted people to claim their right to asylum.
Cherem hints at a concern along these lines when he suggests that there is value in the role
that irregular travel plays in the current asylum system. Irregular travel, he argues, is significant

31

Chapter I | Against Alienage

because it is the means by which persecuted people claim their right to fair adjudication of status
against a particular political authority.64 This functional role of irregular travel is important, Cherem
argues, because procedural rights have value even independent of refuge-provision.65
I agree with Cherem’s claim that procedural rights are independently valuable. However, I
hold that it is precisely because procedural rights are valuable that they must be realistically accessible
to those who should be entitled to claim them. Consider Michael Dummett’s discussion of the
nature of obligation-bearing, which he makes during his critique of non-arrival measures:
If an individual has a duty to give help to those in need when they ask him for it, he also has
a duty not to deny them the opportunity to ask. The same applies to states. They have an
internationally recognized duty towards refugees: they therefore have a duty to do nothing to
prevent refugees from reaching their borders.66
I take Dummett’s claim here to be a compelling one, and the following seems to be a natural
extension of it: if an entity has a duty to help an individual when they request assistance, that entity
not only has a duty not to deny that person the opportunity to ask – it also has a duty to take
reasonable measures to ensure that the process of asking for help is reasonably accessible to that
person.67 This principle is already practiced in a variety of scenarios, and in the refugee context it
suggests that simply doing nothing to prevent refugees’ arrival does not exhaust the content of the
international community’s obligations to persecuted people when that it is foreseeable that their
journeys to safety are frequently extremely burdensome. States have the power to make it more
accessible for persecuted people to assert their procedural rights – as such, they should take
reasonable steps to make this process more accessible.

Cherem, p. 187. An anonymous reviewer at Law and Philosophy has highlighted that, contrary to what Cherem suggests,
irregular travel is not a necessity under the current system – persecuted people who travel regularly to claim asylum are
also refugees. Still, Cherem’s general point that refugees currently have agency to claim their adjudicative rights through
some form of travel remains sound.
65 Ibid., p. 201.
66 Dummett, pp. 42-43.
67 Of course, it must be emphasized that refugees are not merely asking for help, but are claiming a right – if anything,
this strengthens the force of the argument here.
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So much for Cherem’s defense of the role of irregular travel in the current asylum system.
Still, it might be said that implementation of an asylum system with no alienage condition is not
much of a solution, because it is not clear how it could afford in-place persecuted people agency to
claim their rights. Although such a system would extend the right to refuge to individuals who had
not yet crossed a border, these ‘rights’ would, in reality, be empty and unclaimable since there is no
particular duty-bearer against whom they could claim their right to refuge.68 Now, the first thing to
be said in response here is that this objection applies to definitions of refugeehood that reject the
alienage condition only because rejecting alienage extends refugeehood to a new class of people
who, under the Convention definition, do not have a right to refuge at all. Thus, although the
objection raises a problem for views that reject alienage, it does not offer a reason to prefer the
Convention definition of a refugee. Indeed, it is plausible that rights without a clear duty-bearer are
better than no rights at all. Joel Feinberg, for instance, has suggested that the creation of such
‘empty’ rights is at least a recognition of an entitlement the right-bearer has, which is a step towards
rights-fulfillment.69
More importantly, though, there are solutions to these worries. If an international institution
like the UNHCR were given authority to distribute responsibilities for persecuted people who
remain in-place across safe states, refugees who remained in their country of origin could lodge their
claims against their assigned state through this organization, perhaps by applying for a humanitarian
visa.70 Admittedly, creating conditions in which an organization like the UNHCR could carry out
these functions effectively is no easy task – after all, it is likely that the organization in question

Such an objection is in the spirit of Onora O’Neill’s ‘manifesto rights’ objection to rights-based approaches to global
justice. See Onora O’Neill, ‘Transnational Justice’, in David Held (ed.) Political Theory Today (Stanford, California: Stanford
University Press, 1991), pp. 286-287. For the original discussion of manifesto rights from which O’Neill adopts this
term, see Joel Feinberg, ‘The Nature and Value of Rights’, The Journal of Value Inquiry 4:4 (1970), p. 255.
69 Feinberg, p. 255.
70 This response is in line with Kok-Chor Tan’s response to O’Neill’s criticism of rights-based approaches to justice.
According to Tan, problems of imperfect-duty-enforcement are practical, not conceptual. See Kok-Chor Tan, Justice
Without Borders (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 51.
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would need to be granted the power to impose meaningful penalties on non-compliers in order to
compel states to fulfil their duties. Even so, this suggestion is not beyond the bounds of feasibility.
Many philosophers have endorsed the view that it is appropriate, and perhaps necessary, to grant
authority to transnational or international organizations in order for certain issues of global or
regional importance to be effectively regulated.71 Distributing responsibility for refugees is a good
candidate for an issue of this sort.
5.3 Feasibility and Implementation
So far, I have argued that a system of refugee protection without an alienage condition is morally
superior to the existing system, and as such, the alienage condition should be removed from the
definition of refugeehood in international law. However, one final objection to my argument
problematizes both the ‘grant authority to the UNHCR’ solution to the agency worry, as well as the
argument for rejecting alienage more generally. According to this objection, my suggestion that
states could be motivated to fulfil their obligations to the new group of refugees created by
removing the alienage condition is overly idealistic. Even under the current, more conservative
definition, safe states are unwilling to admit their fair share of refugees. Although the refugee has a
relatively privileged position in the existing international order, this “privilege” only manifests in the
fact that states generally fulfil their basic duty of non-refoulement after persecuted people have
arrived on their territory. But beyond this, states often show very little respect for refugees – as
demonstrated by the pervasive use of non-arrival measures, and the fact that the demand for
resettlement far surpasses the number of spaces states have made available. Because states are not
currently motivated to assist refugees, this objector might argue, the legal reform I propose is

See e.g. Debra Satz, ‘Equality of What Among Whom?: Thoughts on Cosmopolitanism, Statism, and Nationalism’,
Nomos 41 (1999), pp. 77-78; Rawls, p. 36; Dummett, pp. 130, 134; and Kok-Chor Tan, Toleration, Diversity, and Global
Justice (Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University, 2000), p. 101.
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unlikely to be implemented – and even if it somehow were, states would not fulfil their duties to the
significantly wider category of refugees this reform would create.72
Before responding to this objection, I should be clear about target and purpose of my
argument. The Convention definition of a refugee is a legal one, and in this chapter I have argued
that this law should be changed. However, I do not mean to argue that the alienage condition could
or should be removed from the definition of a refugee overnight. It is appropriate to consider
practical and prudential factors when advocating for legal reform, and in light of these factors, I
mean to argue that such a revision of international law is both morally desirable and feasible in the
medium-to-long term. Although this insight may not prompt imminent expansion of the refugee
definition, there is still practical value in understanding that the definition needs to be changed. New
awareness that change is morally necessary can guide policy reformers to work towards this goal, and
push for more modest changes that can benefit persecuted people who remain in-place in the
meantime.
Now, to defend the claim that my proposal is feasible, I will offer some examples of realistic
“stepping stone” policies towards full removal of the alienage condition which seem achievable in
the short-to-medium term.73 To be clear, I do not mean to suggest that these policies are the only, or
even the best, “stepping stones” towards removing the alienage condition – that is for policymakers
to decide. I offer them only as examples to support my claim that an effective system of protection
without an alienage condition is not completely beyond reach.

In a related objection, Sune Lægaard argues that philosophical discussions of the refugee crisis are often ‘incoherent’ in
that they purport to be about problems that arise in nonideal circumstances, but their solutions to these problems make
ideal assumptions about the behavior of the duty-bearing agents. Sune Lægaard, ‘Misplaced Idealism and Incoherent
Realism in the Philosophy of the Refugee Crisis’, Journal of Global Ethics 12:3 (2016), pp. 269-278.
73 Of course, the question of whether an interim policy that brings us closer to removing the alienage condition is
implementable is importantly separate from the question of whether an effective system of protection without an alienage
condition is feasible. Nonetheless, providing evidence of implementable interim policies should go some way towards
convincing those who are skeptical that the recommendations I make are feasible.
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Expanding the UNHCR’s existing role with IDPs would be perhaps the most obvious
immediate policy reform. For instance, following the precedent of the ODP, UN-assisted
resettlement could become an option for persecuted IDPs in particularly severe circumstances.
There are a number of reasons to think that states might be motivated to accept resettled IDPs in
such cases – for instance, in order to be able to say that they fulfilled their responsibility to respond
to a particularly egregious atrocity, so as to avoid future criticism from other states. Alternatively, a
slightly more ambitious proposal would be to encourage states to make regional agreements
accepting stronger duties to refugees. This proposal follows James Hathaway and Neve’s suggestion
that states would be more motivated to assist refugees if sub-global ‘interest-convergence groups’ –
many of which already exist due to trading relationships or mutual security concerns – took on more
responsibility for regulating the asylum system and providing protection to refugees, with the
UNHCR playing a coordination role.74 James Hathaway and R. Alexander Neve offer a very
comprehensive list of reasons why states might be motivated to cooperate in agreements made at
this level, three of which are listed below:
1. Cooperation may help avoid regional instability – for instance, because a refugee-producing
state is less likely to act aggressively towards refugee-hosting states when refugees are
dispersed across many countries.
2. When states in a region have economic interests in other states currently hosting large
numbers of refugees, they may hope that alleviating some of this responsibility could protect
existing trade relationships or be conducive to the development of new ones.
3. States may feel connected to the refugee population – for instance, due to racial or religious
similarities between the refugees and the majority of their own citizens.75
Hathaway and Neve offer these as reasons why states might be more willing to fulfil their duties to
Convention refugees through interest-convergence groups, but all three are plausible motivations for

See Hathaway and Neve, p. 187ff. Their suggestion is informed by an earlier proposal – see Asha Hans and Astri
Suhrke, ‘Responsibility Sharing’, Refuge 15:1 (1996), pp. 12-13.
75 Hathaway and Neve, pp. 191, 193-4, 195.
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assisting in-place persecuted people too. But, in case further convincing is needed, the following are
two further reasons to think that states, as members of these groups, would be motivated to assist
this new category of refugees in particular.
4. Providing persecuted people with early regular routes to safety would make refugee flows
within a region more predictable and manageable than when the burden falls entirely on the
persecuted to escape.
5. In some cases, collectively deciding to recognize a particular group of in-place persecuted
people as refugees could be part of an effective strategy to challenge the root-causes of
refugee-production, minimizing the total number of displaced and persecuted people.76
Altogether, then, there is reason to believe that states could be motivated to implement policies
offering more robust assistance to in-place persecuted people in the short- to medium-term. Though
not conclusive, this is very good evidence that a global system of refugee protection without an
alienage condition is feasible, even in non-ideal conditions similar to those we see today.
As one final point of response to the objection that states would not fulfil their duties to the
new set of refugees created by expanding the Convention definition, it should be emphasized that it
is important not to underestimate the practical influence of lawmaking itself. While there is no
guarantee that a new international law will be complied with, it is increasingly accepted that legal
reform itself can fundamentally change the state-of-play – that the creation of new international law
can play a crucial role in shifting state behavior and, over time, create new international norms.77
This suggests that even if the alienage condition were removed from international law before all
states were completely on-board with the new set of duties created by this change, reform itself
could encourage states to respect the fact that all persecuted people should have a right to refuge,
regardless of location. Thus, while the creation of a system of refugee protection without an alienage
Consider, for instance, Matthew Price’s claim that asylum-provision expresses condemnation of the refugee-producing
state’s oppressive behavior, and is an early-stage coercive mechanism decent states can use to challenge oppressive
behavior. While I do not agree with Price’s claim that asylum should play this role in all cases, it is plausible that asylumprovision could sometimes serve this function. See Matthew Price, Rethinking Asylum (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2009), pp. 76-77.
77 See e.g. Oona Hathaway and Scott Shapiro, The Internationalists (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2018).
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requirement would not be straightforward, and it may take time before states were fully willing to
comply with such a system, there is good reason to think that the creation of such a system is
achievable.
§6 Conclusion
In this chapter I have defended Andrew Shacknove’s lesser-discussed claim that the alienage
condition present in the 1951 Refugee Convention should be rejected. Given the prima facie moral
arbitrariness of location, and the fact that the current system of protection often forces persecuted
people to undergo dangerous, sometimes deadly, journeys in order to reach safety, the burden is on
the defender of the alienage condition to show that it should be accepted – and yet, I have argued,
Cherem and Lister’s reasons for endorsing this condition do not stand up to scrutiny. Their appeal
to the claim that humanitarian intervention is rarely permissible is not a strong reason to uphold the
alienage requirement given that debates about the permissibility of humanitarian intervention are
ongoing and, more importantly, given that non-militaristic means are available to pressure hostile
states to release their persecuted citizens. Contra Cherem’s worries, the revisionary nature of this
approach – that is, the fact that it redraws the line between IDPs and refugees – should be
welcomed given the protection gaps in existing IDP law. Moreover, it is not the case that a system
of protection without an alienage condition would insufficiently value procedural rights, and would
thereby fail to properly respect refugee agency. In fact, by making refuge more accessible, this
system would better serve refugee rights. Finally, to mitigate the objection that a system of refugee
protection without an alienage requirement would be infeasible, I outlined a number of plausible
interim policies that could serve as realistic stepping stones towards a full rejection of alienage.
In the absence of compelling arguments in favor of the alienage condition, then,
Shacknove’s claim that geographical location should not influence the definition of refugeehood
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stands firm. As far as reasonably possible, states should take steps to enable people who are
otherwise eligible for refugee status to access refuge regardless of where in the world they happen to
be. This is much more than is currently required under the 1951 Refugee Convention.
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Chapter II: Examining the Persecution Condition for Refugeehood
Becoming a refugee is a gradual process, a bleaching out, a transition into ghostly experience […]
It happens when your identity fades, names and titles giving way to numbers and papers. You
become a visa to stamp, a pair of pupils for the quarantine doctor to check, fifty-five kilos to add to
the maximum capacity of a train; at worst, an infestation, at best, a particle in transit. After a
while, even your thoughts adjust to the new reality. […] Once you’ve made the transition from
When are we eating? to When are they feeding us? you know you’re a refugee.1
– Lev Golinkin.
The calamity of the rightless is not that they are deprived of life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness, or of equality before the law and freedom of opinion – formulas which were
designed to solve problems within given communities – but that they no longer belong to any
community whatsoever. Their plight is not that they are not equal before the law, but that no
law exists for them; not that they are oppressed but that nobody wants even to oppress them.
Only in the last stage of a rather lengthy process is their right to live threatened; only if they
remain perfectly “superfluous,” if nobody can be found to “claim” them, may their lives be in
danger. […] The point is that a condition of complete rightlessness was created before the
right to live was challenged. 2
– Hannah Arendt.

§1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, I argued that the alienage condition for refugeehood – that is, the
requirement that an individual be outside of her country of nationality in order to be eligible for
refugee status – must be eradicated. Whatever the other criteria for refugeehood might be,
individuals who would be entitled to refugee status but for the fact that they remain in their home
country should also be eligible for refugeehood. Now, in the next two chapters I will turn to an
evaluation of the Convention’s second condition for refugee status: the requirement that an
individual have a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion. This requirement has received
significantly more attention in the philosophical literature, but the vast majority of scholars have
critiqued this requirement against the background assumption that the alienage condition should be

Lev Golinkin, ‘Guests of the Holy Roman Empress Maria Theresa’, in The Displaced: Refugee Writers on Refugee Lives, ed.
by Viet Thanh Nguyen (New York: Abrams Press, 2018), pp. 68-69.
2 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich: New York, 1973), pp. 295-296.
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upheld.3 The analysis in the following two chapters is distinctive, then, because it begins with the
claim established in the previous chapter that location should not determine refugee status eligibility.
Over the course of these chapters I will argue that the persecution condition for
refugeehood is unjustifiably restrictive because it does not extend refugee status to some people
whose human rights can only be protected by means of refuge. Because it is imperative that these
protection gaps be eliminated, the persecution condition must be replaced with something more
inclusive. My own account of the proper definition of refugeehood for international law will be
defended at length in the next chapter. But first, in this chapter, I will prepare the groundwork for
my positive view by closely examining both the current application of the persecution condition in
international law, as well as a selection of significant philosophical analyses of this requirement.
Ultimately, this analysis will reveal three key desiderata for an appropriate definition of refugeehood:
it must (1) eliminate protection gaps; (2) be feasible to implement; and (3) preserve the notion that
refuge is a distinctively political remedy.
This chapter will proceed as follows. In §2, I closely examine the persecution condition for
refugeehood as outlined in the 1951 Refugee Convention, highlighting the protection gaps that
remain in the existing international refugee regime. In §3, I analyze some contemporary
philosophical defenses of the persecution requirement, arguing that they fail to show that the
protection gaps identified in §2 are either avoidable or justifiable. In §4, I evaluate one of the most
popular alternative accounts of refugeehood advanced in the philosophical literature, according to
which all individuals fleeing threats of sufficient severity should have a right to refuge. I argue that
while defenders of this position are clearly right to advocate for a more inclusive definition, their
specific proposal does not sit well alongside a rejection of alienage. In §5, I outline another, more

There are a few notable exceptions. For simultaneous critiques of both persecution and alienage see, most famously,
Andrew Shacknove, ‘Who is a Refugee?’, Ethics 95:2 (1985), pp. 274-284, and also David Owen, ‘In Loco Civitatis’, in
Migration in Political Theory ed. by Sarah Fine and Lea Ypi (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 269-289.
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fundamental problem for this alternative definition – namely, that it fails to preserve the important
connection between the right to refuge and loss of political membership. §6 concludes the chapter.
§2 The Convention and Other Legal Instruments: A Closer Look
2.1 Who is Covered (and Who is Not?)
Recall from the previous chapter that the 1951 Refugee Convention defines a refugee as a person
who:
…owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection
of that country.4
Again, in the previous chapter, I argued that the requirement that a refugee must be ‘outside the
country of his nationality’ should be removed. Now, in this chapter, I turn my attention to the
persecution condition for refugeehood. There are two components to this requirement. First, and
most obviously, it states that refugees must have a well-founded fear of persecution as opposed to
some other kind of harm. Second, and even more narrowly, it states that refugees must fear that they
will be persecuted because of their race, religion, nationality, membership in a social group, or political
opinion. This latter requirement is sometimes referred to as the ‘nexus clause’.
Despite its central position in the definition of a refugee, the Convention does not provide a
comprehensive explanation of what constitutes ‘persecution’, nor has any particular interpretation
been universally accepted subsequent to its implementation.5 In fact, it is generally agreed that the
drafters of the Convention purposely refrained from defining persecution out of a desire to
implement a concept that would be appropriately responsive to the circumstances of new refugee

4
5

UNHCR, Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951 and 1967), p. 14.
UNHCR, Handbook and Guidelines for Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status, p. 13.
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crises as they arose.6 However, there is a downside to this flexibility, for absence of a concrete
definition makes consistent implementation practically challenging.7 As such, there is ongoing debate
among legal scholars about precisely what constitutes ‘persecution’, particularly in marginal or
ambiguous circumstances. Broadly, though, it is accepted that persecution consists in something like
the illegitimate infliction of serious harm that poses a threat to individual life or freedom, where that
serious harm is inconsistent with the existence of appropriate state protection.8 To be clear, this does
not mean that the serious harm in question must be directly inflicted by official state agents. When
serious harm is inflicted by third parties and state agents turn a blind eye, or lack resources to protect
citizens from this harm, this may also amount to persecution.
Of course, this definition is quite general, and leaves many further interpretative questions
unanswered. For instance, it offers no concrete account of ‘serious harm’, which is itself a topic of
ongoing debate – for while human rights violations are increasingly accepted as evidence of serious
harm in courts, a human-rights-based account of serious harm is not robustly or universally
enforced. And this is not even to mention the debates surrounding proper interpretation of the
nexus clause categories – including the especially tricky question of what constitutes ‘membership in
a social group’.9 As a result of all this definitional indeterminacy, the question of whether a particular

See Atle Grahl-Madsen, The Status of Refugees in International Law (Vol 1, 1966), p. 193, and James C. Hathaway and
Michelle Foster, The Law of Refugee Status (Second Edition) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 182.
7 Hathaway and Foster, pp. 182-3.
8 See UNHCR, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status Under the 1951 Convention and the 1967
Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, p. 15; Hathaway and Foster, pp. 183-184, 303ff; Matthew Price, Rethinking Asylum:
History, Purpose, and Limits (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 135; Guy Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee in
International Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), pp. 66-68, 73-74. It should be noted, though, that unlike
Hathaway and Foster and Price, Goodwin-Gill argues that the connection to the state’s unwillingness/inability to protect
is merely coincidental, not intrinsically normatively significant.
9 See, for instance, Doreen Indra, ‘Gender: A Key Dimension of the Refugee Experience’, Refuge 6:3 (1987), pp. 3-4;
Jacqueline Greatbatch, ‘The Gender Difference: Feminist Critiques of Refugee Discourse’, International Journal of Refugee
Law 1:4 (1989), pp. 518-527; and Deborah E. Anker, ‘Refugee Law, Gender, and the Human Rights Paradigm’, Harvard
Human Rights Journal 133 (2002), pp. 133-154.
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harm amounts to persecution remains to a significant extent up to the discretion of state laws,
courts, and even individual judges.10
Clearly, these ongoing debates about the proper interpretation of persecution have troubling
practical implications. However, even more troubling is the fact that there is legal consensus that the
persecution requirement certainly excludes certain categories of people from refugee status. In
particular, it is agreed that those fleeing civil war, indiscriminate violence, and the effects of climate
change are ineligible for Convention refugee status, either because the harm they fear is not the
product of state violence or neglect, or because the harm they fear is generalized and not inflicted
for a nexus clause reason.11 This is surprising given that these groups make up a large proportion of
the world’s forcibly displaced, are commonly referred to as ‘refugees’ in ordinary discourse, may be
entitled to protection from the UNHCR in virtue of their “refugee-like” circumstances, and often
have little prospect of receiving adequate protection from their home state any time soon.12 The
most egregious problem with the persecution requirement for refugeehood, then, is that it leaves
some very important protection gaps.
2.2 Alternative Definitions: Regional Instruments and Complementary Protection
To fill the protection gaps left by the Convention, some states and regions have created additional
legal instruments that extend refugee or refugee-like protection to groups not eligible for
Convention refugee status. Perhaps the most significant example of this is the 1969 Organisation of
African Unity (OAU) Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa,
which extends refugee status not only to those experiencing persecution, but also to those forced to
flee ‘owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing

William Maley, What is a Refugee? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 22.
It should be noted, though, that cases where it can clearly be demonstrated that individuals have purposefully been
made especially vulnerable to these threats due to policies that discriminate against groups on the basis of race, religion,
nationality, social group, or political opinion are exceptions to this rule.
12 UNHCR, Resettlement Handbook (Geneva: High Commissioner for Refugees, 2011), p. 19.
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public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality’.13 In 1984, the
Cartagena Declaration extended refugee status for those displaced in Latin America in a similar
(albeit non-binding) manner.14 Unlike the Refugee Convention, both of these instruments make
refugeehood available to individuals facing serious threats, including non-persecutory threats, from
genuinely indiscriminate or generalized sources.
Of course, these more inclusive agreements are to be applauded, but they cannot fill the
protection gaps outlined in §2.1 by themselves. While it is laudable that certain regions have made
full refugee status available to those fleeing indiscriminate harm, protection gaps continue to remain
for those outside of these regions. What’s more, it is worth highlighting that these measures have
only been implemented in less-affluent parts of the world. This is concerning, not only because
states in these regions tend to have fewer material resources to support refugees, but also because
there is reason to think that states with greater financial capacity have strong responsibilities to host
a larger share of the world’s refugees.
Despite these considerations, wealthier regions have responded to the protection gaps
outlined in §2.1 in a less inclusive manner. The EU, for instance, endorses the Convention definition
of refugeehood without extension, and instead fills the remaining protection gaps through the
creation of the ‘complementary’ institution of subsidiary protection, available to individuals who
‘face a real risk of suffering serious harm’, defined as:
(a) the death penalty or execution; or (b) torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment of an applicant in the country of origin; or (c) serious and individual threat to a

Organization of African Unity, OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (1969), Article 1.
Conclusion III of this Declaration recommends that refugeehood be granted not only to those fleeing persecution, but
also to those ‘who have fled their country because their lives, safety or freedom have been threatened by generalized
violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violation of human rights or other circumstances which have
seriously disturbed public order’. See Colloquium on the International Protection of Refugees in Central America,
Mexico, and Panama, Cartagena Declaration on Refugees (1984).
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civilian’s life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or
internal armed conflict.15
Like the EU, the USA also has a complementary category of protection: Temporary Protected Status
(TPS) – an immigration status granted to nationals of countries determined to be ‘at risk’ by the
Secretary of Homeland Security (SHS) due to ongoing armed conflict, environmental disaster, or
other extraordinary or temporary conditions.16 Similar forms of complementary protection are also
available in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.17 Although more narrow than the OAU
Convention and the Cartagena Declaration, the fact that these forms of complementary protection
also provide asylum-like support to some people at risk of indiscriminate and non-persecutory harm
itself sheds doubt on the moral necessity of the persecution requirement. However, recipients of
these forms of protection are often afforded a more restrictive set of rights than recipients of
Convention refugee status. For instance, unlike asylum, TPS is an explicitly temporary category; and
in the EU, member states are required to issue refugees residence permits valid for at least three
years, whereas residence permits for recipients of subsidiary protection need only be valid for at least
one year.18 These differences are significant because assigning shorter residence permits to recipients
of subsidiary protection suggests that their status is less permanent than that of refugees, and this
may have a serious impact on an individual’s ability to move on with their life in their new society.
Overall, the creation of additional instruments of refugee-like protection indicates that the
Convention criteria for refugeehood are overly restrictive. However, because these alternative forms

European Parliament and Council, Directive 2011/95/EU, (December 2011), article 15. Although some EU countries,
like the UK, do not offer subsidiary protection, they typically have their own similar ‘complementary’ categories of
protection.
16 See U.S. Code §1254a.
17 In Canada, there is the ‘Country of Asylum Class (Humanitarian-Protected Persons Abroad)’. In Australia and New
Zealand, complementary protection obligations to those facing ‘significant harm’ or ‘cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment’ are recognized, based on CAT and the ICCPR. In Australia, such individuals may be eligible for a Protection
Visa, Temporary Protection Visa, or a Safe Haven Enterprise Visa; and in New Zealand they would be considered a
‘Protected Person’.
18 European Parliament and Council, article 24.
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of protection are deficient compared to Convention refugee status, they do not adequately make up
for the gaps created by the Convention.
§3 The Contemporary Convention Defenders
Despite the protection gaps in the existing refugee regime, in recent years a handful of scholars have
launched defenses of the persecution requirement for refugeehood, based on the claim that
persecution is a distinctive kind of harm. In this section I will outline and evaluate two of the most
influential examples of these arguments from Matthew Price on the one hand, and Matthew Lister
and Max Cherem on the other. Ultimately, I will argue that both of these defenses of the
Convention are unsuccessful because neither compellingly demonstrates that the protection gaps
outlined in §2 are avoidable or justified. However, in §5 I will argue that there is still valuable insight
to be gained from these Convention-defenses – for they accurately identify features of the existing
definition that are worth preserving.
3.1 Price’s Expressive Account of Asylum
On Price’s view, asylum should be reserved for those fleeing persecution because persecution is a
distinctive type of harm. It is significant, Price argues, that persecuted people have been directly
targeted and thereby treated in a way that repudiates their political membership.19 On his view,
asylum is the appropriate remedy to this particular harm because asylum-provision should be
expressive – a means by which the international community, united in their commitment to liberal
political values, can condemn the political persecution that has occurred. It is in virtue of its
distinctively expressive nature that asylum matches the nature of the harm persecuted people have
suffered:
[Persecute people are] exiles – people who have been expelled from their own political
communities. Asylum responds to that distinctive kind of harm by providing a distinctive
19

Price, p. 13.
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remedy. It communicates condemnation of the persecutory regime responsible for the
persecuted person’s plight, and, in recognition of the unique harm that persecuted people
have suffered, offers them surrogate political membership (not merely protection) in the
state of refuge.20
For Price, the expressive nature of asylum sets it aside from other purely palliative policy tools.21 Its
purpose is not only to protect the rights of targeted individuals – it also serves a political function as
an early-stage coercive mechanism for changing the behavior of aggressive states. When a state
provides an individual with asylum, Price argues, this serves to both condemn the behavior of the
aggressive state and also warn them that more aggressive sanctions will be implemented if their
behavior continues.22
Price motivates his claim that persecution is a distinctive harm by appealing to John Rawls’s
distinction between burdened societies and outlaw states. While citizens of burdened societies may
have unmet basic needs, Price argues, they nonetheless retain their standing as members of a
political community in virtue of the fact that their state is willing to protect them.23 Because these
individuals retain their original political membership, it would be inappropriate to provide them with
new membership, or condemn their state for failing to successfully protect their citizens. Instead, in
these cases, the appropriate response is to offer assistance, not to provide asylum. By contrast, Price
continues, asylum and expression of condemnation is an appropriate response to forced
displacement from outlaw states, because these states intentionally and knowingly violate their
obligations to their citizens.24
While Price’s argument for limiting asylum to the persecuted is novel and incisive, it faces
some significant problems. For instance, it is simply not clear that refuge-provision could, in

Price, p. 12.
Ibid., p. 69.
22 Ibid., pp. 76-77.
23 Ibid., p. 73.
24 Ibid., p. 73.
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practice, come to be associated with condemnation of illegitimate state behavior. Price is keen to
emphasize that his position need not leave protection gaps – that ‘limiting asylum to persecuted
people does not mean leaving behind other [displaced people]’ – because these individuals could be
assisted by alternative methods like overseas resettlement programs or temporary protection. 25
However, this concession threatens to undermine his expressive account of asylum, for if solutions
like long-term resettlement – which are so clearly asylum-like – were available to those fleeing harms
other than persecution, it unlikely that the international community could really be brought to
interpret asylum-provision as condemnatory.
What’s more, even if states did buy into an expressive account of asylum, Price himself
acknowledges that there could be costs to this – for states might be overly willing to grant asylum to
individuals fleeing countries with whom they have hostile relations, and, more dangerously, hesitant
to grant asylum to individuals fleeing countries with whom they are friends or allies. 26 Price insists
that these problems could be mitigated by creating legal processes that isolate asylum adjudicators
from political interference.27 However, it is doubtful that such processes could be effectively
implemented. Even now, in a context where asylum-provision is typically perceived to be politically
neutral, individual biases, public perceptions, and official pronouncements about conditions in other
states have excessive influence on asylum adjudication decisions.28 In practice, it is deeply unclear
that asylum adjudicators could ever be adequately shielded from these influences.
This points to a more fundamental problem with Price’s expressive account of asylum. Price
acknowledges that it would be problematic if existing relations between states influenced asylumadjudication decisions, because in such cases ‘the interests of refugees [would be] subordinated to
Price, pp. 69-70.
Ibid., p. 72.
27 Ibid., pp. 72 and 91.
28 See, for instance, Andrew Shacknove, ‘From Asylum to Containment’, International Journal of Refugee Law 516 (1993), p.
517, and Luara Ferracioli, ‘The Appeal and Danger of a New Refugee Convention’, Social Theory and Practice 40:1 (2014),
pp. 135-6.
25
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the interests of state’.29 However, subordinating the interests of refugees to the foreign policy
interests of liberal states is exactly what Price’s expressive approach does. After all, on his view,
asylum-provision should be limited to the persecuted because the purpose of refuge-provision is to
condemn illegitimate state behavior, preserve global peace, and promote liberal values – not to
protect individuals’ human rights. This gets things the wrong way round. Liberal values themselves
dictate that the purpose of international institutions must be, fundamentally, to protect the rights
and interests of individuals. Thus, even if asylum-provision does sometimes advance foreign policy
interests as Price suggests, this must be a side-effect of protecting individuals from harm, not the
condition upon which protection is afforded.
Finally, though, the most significant problem with Price’s account is that it falsely assumes
that illegitimate state behavior is the only cause of loss of political membership. In fact, there is good
reason to think that political membership can also be lost in other circumstances. Civil war, for
instance, may disrupt the functioning of the institutions of a state to such a significant extent that
membership in a political community becomes effectively non-existent; and in some circumstances
of particularly severe institutional failure it might also be plausible to suggest that members of those
states lack political membership. In contexts like these, it is usually inappropriate to condemn the
refugee-producing state. As such, Price’s account would predict that refuge should not be provided
to individuals fleeing harms in these contexts. But since these individuals have lost their political
membership, and need refugee status to remedy the harms they have experienced, Price’s view
leaves unacceptable protection gaps for these individuals.30

Price, p. 72.
One important qualification here is that, as I will outline in greater detail in the next chapter, I do not agree with
Price’s claim that asylum should involve, and therefore be reserved for, those who require new political membership in the
first instance. Rather, on my view, refugees are entitled to political protection and a pathway to citizenship.
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Clearly, then, there are major issues with Price’s expressive conception of asylum, and this
suggests that the persecution condition should not be upheld on his terms. Of course, this leaves
open the possibility that an alternative defense of the persecution condition, based on a less
controversial conception of the function of asylum, could be compelling. To test this, in the next
section I will evaluate Lister and Cherem’s less revisionary defense of the Convention definition, and
see if it stands up to scrutiny.
3.2 Defending the Convention: a Less Revisionary Route
As outlined in the previous chapter, both Lister and Cherem defend the Convention against Andrew
Shacknove’s influential call for radical expansion.31 Famously, Shacknove argued that the
fundamental normative basis for the Convention – the notion that refuge should be available to all
individuals whose bond with their state has been severed – suggests that the right to refuge in
international law should be significantly broader.32 Since basic needs shortfalls are almost always the
result of processes that are subject to state control, all threats to basic needs should be taken as
evidence that a citizen-state relationship breakdown has occurred and be grounds for refugee
status.33 Thus on Shacknove’s view, any person with unmet basic needs and no recourse to their
home government should be eligible for refugeehood.34
Both Lister and Cherem object to Shacknove’s methodology for defending this view.
Whereas Shacknove arrives at this definition by insisting that refugeehood should be defined before

There are many similarities between Lister and Cherem’s defenses of the Convention definition, so it will be
worthwhile to reconstruct them together here. However, it is important to note that Lister has recently made clear that
his defense of the persecution condition is importantly different from Cherem’s. Lister claims that Cherem takes
persecution to be ‘an essential and fundamental aspect of a proper account of refugees’, whereas on his own view
persecution is only contingently important because it is ‘an especially clear example of the sort of exposure to harm that
ought to ground an asylum claim’. See Matthew Lister, ‘The Place of Persecution and Non-State Action in Refugee
Protection’, in Alex Sager (ed.), The Ethics and Politics of Immigration: Core Issues and Emerging Trends (Lanham, MD: Rowman
& Littlefield, 2016), pp. 47-48.
32 Shacknove (1985), 277.
33 Ibid., 280-281.
34 Ibid., 282.
31
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identifying the rights and duties associated with refugee status, Lister and Cherem each insist that it
is important to have a conception of these rights and duties prior to defending a definition of a
refugee.35 Lister makes this point most explicitly. The definition of refugeehood is importantly
related to the question of what is owed to refugees, Lister insists, and in failing to recognize this,
Shacknove pays insufficient attention to the fact that the same basic principle can generate different
obligations in different contexts.36 For instance, suppose the general principle that generates
obligations to refugees is something like: “when a political authority is unwilling or unable to protect
the basic human rights of its citizens, the international community must step in.” Conventiondefenders can consistently accept this while denying that all obligations generated by this principle
are obligations to provide refuge.37 Basic human rights can go unmet for a number of different
reasons in a number of different ways, and the content of the international community’s obligation
to respond to a particular instance of unmet human rights may vary significantly from one context
to another, even though all obligations are derived from the same general principle.
Lister uses this methodological critique to defend the persecution condition against
Shacknove’s objections. Adopting exactly the opposite strategy from Shacknove, he begins with the
idea that, at base, a refugee is any person a state has a moral duty to admit entry to, regardless of that
state’s other immigration policies.38 Both he and Cherem argue that the Convention definition is
preferable precisely because it picks out the subgroup of all individuals experiencing human rights
shortfalls whose rights can only or best be fulfilled by means of refuge.39 Only persecuted individuals

Matthew Lister, ‘Who Are Refugees?’, Law and Philosophy 32:5 (2013), p. 658; and Max Cherem, ‘Refugee Rights:
Against Expanding the Definition of a “Refugee” and Unilateral Protection Elsewhere’, The Journal of Political Philosophy 2
(2016), pp. 190-192.
36 Lister (2013), 658-9.
37 David Miller makes a similar point – he argues that Shacknove’s definition fails to explain why refuge, as opposed to
other forms of intervention or assistance, is the right response to widespread basic needs shortfalls. See David Miller,
Strangers in Our Midst (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016), p. 80
38 Lister (2013), pp. 647-8.
39 Ibid., p. 659 and Cherem, p. 189.
35

52

Chapter II | Examining the Persecution Condition

require refuge for protection of their human rights, Lister and Cherem argue, and for this reason,
only the persecuted have a right to refuge in particular. By contrast, those whose basic needs are
unfulfilled for other reasons can be effectively assisted by alternative means – like humanitarian aid –
and so while they may have a general right to international assistance of some form, they do not
have a right to refuge specifically.40
As stated in the previous chapter, I agree with Lister and Cherem’s critique of Shacknove’s
methodological approach. They are right to point out that refuge is distinct from other responses to
human rights violations in that it provides recipients with, at minimum, entry into a state that is not
their own. However, their claim that only those who satisfy the persecution requirement need to
enter another state in order to receive effective human rights protection is less compelling. As was
outlined in §2, there are many non-persecuted individuals – such as those fleeing civil war or
generalized violence – who cannot feasibly be assisted in-place, but are ineligible for Convention
refugee status. In fact, Lister and Cherem’s view leaves even more protection gaps than Price’s, for
while Price’s goal is primarily to defend the persecution condition, Lister and Cherem also defend
the nexus clause. However, as Price points out, the requirement that an individual fear persecution
for particular reasons fails to capture the widely-accepted ‘anti-brutality norm’ – that is, the view that
some harms are so serious that they should not be inflicted for any reason.41
Lister anticipates that some readers will object that the Convention leaves protection gaps.
He emphasizes that he is defending a wide reading of the Convention, and explains that on this
reading, refugee status would be available to all individuals with a ‘well-founded fear’ of persecution,
where even a relatively low likelihood of actual persecution occurring would be sufficient to satisfy
this requirement. Moreover, under this wide reading, individuals harmed by war, environmental
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disasters or poverty who ‘are made to suffer more severely or kept from aid because of their race,
religion, nationality, or membership in a particular social group’ would also satisfy the Convention’s
requirements.42 However, Lister accepts that even on this wide reading, individuals fleeing serious
harms who are not directly targeted for a nexus clause reason would be ineligible for refugee status.
He argues that this is appropriate, for unlike ‘typical refugees’, such individuals will usually only
require short-term protection, and so some form of complementary temporary status would be
more appropriate for these groups.43 Lister also directly defends the nexus clause, arguing that it
accurately picks out features that are ‘central to our identities’, and as such it is ‘more serious or
threatening’ to be targeted for these reasons, and emphasizes that it is also practically valuable,
because states are often reluctant to grant the ‘weighty remedy’ of asylum, so upholding the nexus
clause is a means of ensuring that the need responded to is a ‘serious one’ and not ‘merely the result
of a personal or idiosyncratic dispute of no interest to the international community’.44
Lister is, of course, right to point out that the Convention definition of a refugee has the
potential to be more inclusive than its critics sometimes recognize. However, as Lister
acknowledges, even on his wide reading, important protection gaps remain for individuals fleeing
generalized and indiscriminate harms – for although he suggests that temporary protection would be
sufficient for these people, there is good reason to doubt this claim. A large proportion of the
world’s displaced population – including those displaced by internal violence and civil war – live in
protracted displacement situations, and as was argued in §2, temporary protection is not an adequate
solution to long-term displacement.45 Moreover, Lister’s defense of the nexus clause requirement
also falls short – for whether a person’s human rights are at risk for an ‘idiosyncratic’ reason, or for

Lister (2013), pp. 667-8.
Lister (2013), p. 668.
44 Ibid., p. 668-670.
45 See e.g. Serena Parekh, Refugees and the Ethics of Forced Displacement (New York: Routledge, 2017), p. 17.
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no reason at all, if their state is unwilling to protect them, this should be of concern to the
international community. Ultimately, then, because these protection gaps remain, Lister and Cherem
defenses of the Convention definition of refugeehood are unsuccessful.
§4 The Need-First Critique
Thus far I have evaluated the Refugee Convention and responded to some defenses of the
persecution condition for refugeehood, arguing that the biggest and most enduring problem with
this requirement is that it unavoidably yields unjustifiable protection gaps. For precisely this reason,
many other theorists have argued that the persecution condition gets things drastically wrong and
must be replaced. In the next two sections I will evaluate one of the most commonly-advanced
proposals for reform – which I will refer to as the ‘Need-First view’ – and will show that although
this account has some advantages over the Convention, it is neither a morally desirable nor a feasible
alternative to existing requirements.
Need-First accounts of refugeehood emphasize that the type of serious harm an individual
faces should not determine whether they are eligible for refugee status.46 Instead, on this view,
asylum applications should be assessed solely on the severity of the harm the applicant is fleeing.
Joseph Carens and Michael Dummett are two notable scholars who have defended this view.
Carens, for instance, argues that the Convention requirement that refugees must be deliberately
targeted by their state indicates a ‘misplaced set of priorities’, because it suggests that people
imprisoned for their political views should generally be eligible for refugee status, while those fleeing
civil war and famine should not, even though the latter harm is significantly more severe. 47 On this
basis, Carens argues that ‘from a moral perspective, what is most important is the severity of the

See, for instance: Christopher Boom, ‘Beyond Persecution: A Moral Defence of Expanding Refugee Status’,
International Journal of Refugee Law (2018), p. 15; Joseph Carens, The Ethics of Immigration (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2013), p. 201; and Michael Dummett, On Immigration and Refugees (London: Routledge, 2001), p. 37.
47 Carens (2013), pp. 200-201.
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threat to basic human rights and the degree of risk rather than the source or character of the
threat’.48 Similarly, Michael Dummett has argued that ‘all conditions that deny someone the ability to
live where he is in minimal conditions for a decent human life ought to be grounds for claiming
refuge elsewhere’.49 Dummett too, then, suggests that the severity, not the source, of harm is what is
relevant in determining refugee-status-eligibility.
In practical terms, Need-First accounts extend refugee status to all displaced people fleeing
threats of sufficient severity.50 According to this view, individuals fleeing civil war, generalized
violence, extreme poverty, and the effects of natural disasters should all be eligible for refugee status
if they are able to travel to another country and file a claim for asylum, regardless of whether their
need is caused by their state being actively hostile towards them, unwilling to protect them from
harms caused by natural events or non-state actors, or simply unable, though willing, to protect their
basic interests. These accounts of refugeehood are morally attractive because they remove the
protection gaps outlined in §2 and §3 – after all, those fleeing generalized and indiscriminate
violence are clearly fleeing a serious harm. More abstractly, fulfilling individuals’ needs is clearly an
important priority for those who endorse Need-First definitions of refugeehood, and there is
something fundamentally morally appealing about this. In spite of these obvious advantages,
however, Need-First views are not without their flaws.
A significant problem with Need-First conceptions of refugeehood is that their revision of
the persecution condition does not sit easily alongside a rejection of the alienage requirement. In the
previous chapter I argued that this requirement is unjust because it effectively places the entire
burden on asylum seekers to escape from the territory of their country of nationality, creating

Carens (2013), p. 201.
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50 As Carens puts this point, while serious harm should be grounds for refugee status, the ‘ordinary inequalities of the
modern world’ should not. See Carens (2013), p. 200.
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protection gaps for people facing serious harm who remain in their home country and for whom
exit is either impossible or highly risky. Clearly, systems of protection that uphold the alienage
condition should raise ethical red flags for anyone whose primary concern is fulfilling the human
rights of all individuals. Yet Need-First definitions of refugeehood – which otherwise prioritize the
protection of individuals – are typically defended alongside an assumption that the alienage
condition should be upheld.
Carens, for instance, defends his expansion of the persecution condition against the
background assumption that states have a right to exercise discretionary control over immigration,
and refugees are merely an exception to this rule.51 From this perspective, Carens argues:
…it is precisely the fact that a person seeking asylum has made it to our territory that matters
morally. Her physical presence creates a degree of moral responsibility that did not
previously exist. The arrival of the refugees implicates us directly and immediately in their
fate.52
This, Carens argues, is because:
The division of the world into separate states matters for the extent of our moral
responsibilities. We have a different kind of responsibility for what goes on in our own
jurisdiction than we do for what goes on elsewhere. Normally, we should not try to impose
our collective will on other states, and we will not be as responsible for what goes on there
as we are for what goes on in our own state.53
Of course, Carens is right to observe that a commitment to state sovereignty generally involves a
commitment to the idea that states have stronger obligations to those who are on their territory than
those who are not. However, in the previous chapter I argued that even if this is an accurate
assessment of states’ obligations to outsiders in general, it should not be accepted as an assessment
of states’ obligations to refugee-like outsiders who are not receiving adequate protection from their

Of course, Carens elsewhere rejects the claim that states have a right to exercise discretionary control over
immigration. See, most famously, Joseph Carens, ‘Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders’, The Review of Politics
49:2 (1987), pp. 251-273. However, since questions of refugee rights implicitly assume background conditions of
sovereignty, he grants this assumption for the purpose of his discussion of refugees.
52 Carens (2013), p. 207.
53 Ibid., p. 117.
51
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home government. This argument did not challenge the assumption that states have a right to noninterference in their internal affairs as long as they do not egregiously fail their duty to protect the
rights of their inhabitants. Nor did it challenge the idea that states may sometimes have reasons to
prioritize their obligations to individuals who are already on their territory. All that the argument
required was the notion that every individual is entitled to protection of their most fundamental
rights, and that the international community has responsibilities to fulfill individuals’ rights when
their national authorities fail to do so. On this basis, the claim that physical arrival uniquely
transforms the moral relationship between a state and an asylum seeker was rejected. While it is true
that physical arrival is currently the most common mechanism by which states’ imperfect obligations
to refugees are transformed into perfect obligations to provide asylum to particular individuals, this
should not, and need not, be the case.
This is a major problem for the Need-First view, because its main advantage over the
Convention definition was that it eliminated protection gaps and put individuals first. So, to retain
this advantage, advocates of Need-First views must also reject the alienage condition. However,
once the alienage condition is rejected, it is not clear what to make of the Need-First view. Consider
the two most obvious options available to defenders of this position.
1. Maintain that all individuals facing severe threats who travel across a border to claim asylum
should be granted refugee status, but argue that stricter requirements should be adopted for
those facing severe threats who have not yet crossed a border.
2. Argue that all individuals who face severe threats should be eligible for refugee status,
regardless of their location.
If the goal is to identify a definition of refugeehood that eliminates protection gaps while being
feasible to implement, neither of these options is tenable. Option (1) is inconsistent with the
argument against alienage in the previous chapter, because it makes location relevant to refugee
status. It is also inconsistent with the idea that makes Need-First views most intuitive – that priority
should be given to those affected by the most serious harms. After all, adopting Position (1) could
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entail that a person who crossed a border to flee moderate economic disadvantage would be granted
asylum before a person who remained in their country of nationality who was significantly more
impoverished, even though the latter person faced the more serious harm. Position (2), on the other
hand, faces some serious feasibility concerns.54 Changing the definition of a refugee to accord with
(2) would be extraordinarily revisionary – for instance, it would make many of the world’s 767
million people in extreme poverty eligible for refugee status, compared to the 70.8 million forcibly
displaced people currently estimated to exist globally.55 It is deeply unclear that refuge could be
provided on such a scale. More importantly, though, it is also unclear whether it is necessary for basicneeds-fulfillment to extend refugeehood to all individuals fleeing serious harms. As Price, Lister and
Cherem have pointed out, many individuals with unmet basic needs can be assisted by means other
than asylum.56 Indeed, measures that protect basic interests in-place are typically preferable for all
parties involved: they do not require recipients of assistance to engage in disruptive and unnecessary
relocation; they are typically more cost-effective, and so can reach more individuals; and when
conducted appropriately, they build the capacity of the home state to respond autonomously to
similar events in future.57 This is significant insofar as we think that an effective system of
international protection will assign the appropriate type of remedy to different types of harm.58 The
right to refuge is just one component in a broader system of international protection, and as such –
at least in non-ideal conditions in which demand for refugee status is very high – availability of
Here, I follow Pablo Gilabert and Allen Buchanan in taking the relevant feasibility constraint in non-ideal conditions
to be one of accessibility – that is, a context-specific form of feasibility, wherein an institutional scheme is accessible from
a particular context if it can ‘realistically be reached’ (Gilabert) or where there is a ‘practicable route’ from the current
state of affairs to ‘at least a reasonable approximation’ of the state of affairs endorsed by the theory (Buchanan). See
Pablo Gilabert, ‘Global Justice and Poverty Relief in Nonideal Circumstances’, Social Theory and Practice 34:3 (2008), p.
414, and Allen Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 61.
55 UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2018 (2019), p. 2; and International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, World Bank Group, Taking on Inequality: Poverty and Shared Prosperity 2016 (2016), p. 35.
56 Lister (2013), p. 660; and Cherem, p. 191.
57 Lister, p. 660-661.
58 Or, as Stephen Perry expresses this point, 'the content and scope of the obligation must be distinguished from the
content and scope of the underlying principle that justifies it’. See Stephen R. Perry, ‘Immigration, Justice, and Culture’,
in Justice in Immigration, ed. by Warren R. Schwartz (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 100.
54
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alternative forms of protection is an important factor to consider when determining the scope of the
right to a particular remedy.
Overall, then, it is unclear what to make of Need-First views in the context of a rejection of
the alienage condition. Application of an approach like option (1) would be discordant with the
spirit of the argument against alienage, and would conflict with the most intuitive basic idea that
seems to underlie Need-First views themselves. On the other hand, it is deeply unclear that it would
be feasible to implement a Need-First view alongside a full rejection of alienage, as outlined in
option (2). Thus, although defenders of Need-First views are right to highlight that the Convention
definition is in need of expanding, a more nuanced approach is necessary in light of the arguments
of Chapter I.
§5 On the Importance of Political Membership
In addition to the problems outlined above, there is another, more fundamental issue with NeedFirst definitions of refugeehood. Because these accounts extend the right to refuge to anyone fleeing
a sufficiently severe harm, regardless of the nature of that harm or the character of that individual’s
relationship with their state, Need-First definitions transform the nature of refugeehood itself. As
outlined in §2, it is generally accepted that the Convention’s persecution requirement broadly
extends protection to those fleeing serious harm that is inconsistent with the existence of
appropriate state protection. In fact, Hathaway and Foster explain that the Convention signatories
intended to restrict the right to refuge to individuals facing serious threats caused by failure of state
protection – those who were ‘disenfranchise[d] from the usual benefits of nationality’.59 As such, a
distinctive feature of the existing refugee regime is that it extends protection to those who have
experienced a breakdown in their relationship with their state – and this makes sense, for refuge in
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the form of non-refoulement and surrogate political protection is the corresponding solution to this
harm. However, the Need-First account overlooks this important function of refugeehood and
repurposes refuge as just another instrument in the humanitarian toolkit – a means of fulfilling basic
needs that are threatened for any reason, appropriate even when an individual’s home state is willing
to protect them and only unable to do so due to lack of resources or capacity.60 This expansive and
revisionary notion of refugeehood is not only problematic because it generates feasibility problems.
By transforming refuge into a catch-all solution for a variety of different harms, Need-First accounts
decentralize the essential political function of refuge-provision. To illustrate the negative
implications of reconceiving refugeehood in this way, it will be productive to appeal to the writings
of Hannah Arendt, as well as Serena Parekh’s helpful interpretation of Arendt’s work, to understand
why loss of political membership is a distinctive harm.
Parekh argues that Arendt – who was herself a refugee – identified two distinct harms
associated with the experience of what Arendt termed ‘statelessness’, or what we might today call
‘forced displacement’.61 The first and most well-known of these harms is the loss of political
community and legal identity. For Arendt, the implications of this loss ran incredibly deep: on her
view because we now find ourselves in a world completely divided into sovereign states, where states
are the only entities that can effectively guarantee human rights, ‘the loss of national rights was
identical with the loss of human rights'.62 Famously, Arendt referred to this need for political

To use Rawls’s terminology, we might say that the Need-First approach would extend refugee status not only to
citizens of outlaw states who have been intentionally targeted or neglected, but also to some citizens of burdened
societies that are willing to support their citizens and could do so with appropriate international assistance. See John
Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999).
61 Parekh clarifies that Arendt was not primarily concerned with refugees or de jure stateless people, since at her time of
writing the de jure stateless were small in number and asylum laws were relatively effective at granting surrogate political
protection to officially recognized refugees. Rather, she was primarily concerned with the de facto stateless – that is,
people who were effectively without citizenship even though they technically retained their legal identity. As will become
apparent in the next chapter, on my view refugeehood should be extended to exactly this group of individuals. See
Parekh, p. 84.
62 Arendt, p. 292.
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membership as a ‘right to have rights’, and described stateless people – that is, forcibly displaced
people who lack political membership – as rightless.63 Such individuals are not ‘rightless’ in the sense
that they have particular unmet human rights. Rather, their loss is more fundamental, for they have
been deprived of the condition of membership in a political community, which is a precondition for
the fulfillment of any rights at all. As Arendt puts this point:
Not the loss of specific rights, then, but the loss of a community willing and able to
guarantee rights whatsoever, has been the calamity which has befallen ever-increasing
numbers of people.64
This idea that political membership in a minimally functional state is a precondition for stable
human rights protection remains plausible today.65 As Parekh affirms, although advances in
international human rights law have been made since the time in which Arendt was writing, states
remain the primary duty-bearers for human rights fulfillment, and mechanisms for claiming and
enforcing human rights at the international level are still emerging and precarious.66 Indeed, Arendt’s
claim that loss of political membership is itself a deep harm is consistent with contemporary analyses
of the value of political community – for even those who deny that political membership is

Arendt, p. 296.
Ibid., p. 297.
65 As evidence of this, T. Alexander Aleinikoff and Stephen Poellot cite Arendt’s claim that political membership is a
precondition for effective human rights protection as part of their argument for an international responsibility to solve
the harm of protracted displacement (as opposed to merely protecting refugees during displacement). See T. Alexander
Aleinikoff and Stephen Poellot, ‘The Responsibility to Solve: The International Community and Protracted Refugee
Situations’, Virginia Journal of International Law 54:2 (2014), p. 205.
66 Parekh, p. 85. This is harmonious with Charles Beitz’s two-level analysis of human rights, according to which states
bear primary responsibility for protecting and respecting human rights, and the international community is merely a
guarantor of those rights. Beitz, too, insists that although there has been a growth in the reach and power of international
nongovernmental organizations, as well as an elaboration of systems of global and regional law, formal mechanisms for
monitoring human rights violations are constituted of and reliant on states, with nongovernmental organizations playing
a primarily subsidiary role. See Charles Beitz, The Idea of Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 108109, and 122-124. Arendt’s analysis is also consistent with Michael Walzer’s assessment that those without political
membership are in a condition of ‘infinite danger’ due to the fact that they do not belong to a community in which
goods are distributed, and so no entity exists to guarantee their security and welfare – their needs are not socially
recognized. See Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice (New York: Basic Books, 1983), pp. 31-32, 65.
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intrinsically valuable recognize its instrumental worth in a world in which responsibilities for
protecting individuals’ basic rights are distributed among states.67
Clearly, being forced to exist in a condition in which one’s human rights are critically
precarious is a major harm in itself. However, Parekh explains that for Arendt, being deprived of
political membership also generated a separate and more fundamental harm, which Parekh refers to
as the ontological deprivation: the loss of something central to one’s humanity – one’s dignity and
identity as an individual as such.68 The full nature of the ontological deprivation is complex, but to
briefly summarize, the core idea is that because stateless people are deprived of political
membership, which is so crucial for rights-fulfillment in the current state of the world, the stateless
are not treated as equal human beings. Because they lack political membership, political rights, the
opportunity to socially integrate on a particular territory, and the ability to participate in the global
economy, the stateless are excluded from ‘common humanity’ – that is, roughly, the world that is the
product of human creation.69 This exclusion deprives stateless people of agency and freedom:
because they are denied access to public political discourse, their words and actions do not influence
how the world perceives or treats them; and instead of being treated as identifiable individuals, they
are judged based on what is merely ‘given’ about them – the fact that they are ‘human beings in
general’.70 Appealing to the work of Giorgio Agamben, Parekh describes this loss of identity as a
reduction to ‘bare life’ – that is, biological life separated from political existence; or in Arendt’s
words, the stateless are left with the feeling of being undistinguished from a ‘huge and nameless

See e.g. Robert E. Goodin, ‘What is so Special About Our Fellow Countrymen?’, Ethics 98:4 (1988), pp. 678-685.
Indeed Goodin directly argues that in such a world people who lose their political membership come under the ‘residual
responsibility of the international community’.
68 Parekh, pp. 83, 86.
69 Ibid., p. 90. Here, Parekh is appeals to the work of Michel Agier in On the Margins of the World: The Refugee Experience
Today (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2008).
70 This claim that the stateless are deprived of agency and freedom is a product of Arendt’s distinctive accounts of these
concepts. Arendt conceived of freedom as the ability to exert agency, which she defined as the ability to speak and act
intersubjectively – true action, for Arendt, must be recognized by others in a public realm. See Arendt, p. 287, and
Parekh, pp. 86, 94.
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crowd’ of anonymous people.71 This harm of identity-deprivation, Parekh explains, is not only
‘existentially difficult’ – it also has practical consequences. Being reduced to ‘bare life’ in the eyes of
the world diminishes the stateless person’s chances of receiving effective assistance, since resources
and resettlement opportunities are, ironically, more readily provided to individuals perceived to have
meaningful identities.72 As Arendt puts this point, ‘it seems that a man who is nothing but a man has
lost the very qualities which make it possible for other people to treat him as a fellow-man’.73
Arendt’s emphasis on the political and ontological significance of membership in a state
explains why the Convention signatories conceived of refuge-provision as an importantly distinctive
kind of remedy. Unlike mechanisms of humanitarian assistance which are designed only to fulfill
basic human needs, refugeehood also provides political protection in another state – which is
important because states, unlike humanitarian organizations, are the kind of entity against whom
individuals can effectively make political claims.74 The significance of this for Need-First
conceptions of refugeehood is clear. Because these views extend the right to refuge to all individuals
fleeing any kind of serious harm, and do not distinguish between those who retain a functional
relationship with their state and those whose relationship with their state has fully broken down,
these views fail to recognize that refuge is a distinctive remedy. Because Need-First approaches lose
sight of this, if implemented, they would transform refugeehood into what would be first and
foremost a humanitarian institution concerned with needs-fulfillment. To see why this is

Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. by Daniel Heller Roazen (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1998); Parekh, p. 86; and Arendt, p. 287.
72 Parekh, p. 86. Arendt’s observation is now supported by empirical research – the phenomenon is sometimes referred
to as the ‘identifiable victim effect’. See e.g. Alexander Genevsky et. al, ‘Neural Underpinnings of the Identifiable Victim
Effect: Affect Shifts Preference for Giving’, The Journal of Neuroscience 33:43 (2013), pp. 17188-17196.
73 Arendt, p. 300.
74 Consider, for instance, Michel Agier’s insight that humanitarian organizations require the ‘social and political nonexistence of the beneficiaries of aid’ because they are set up only to protect people qua human being, and because, as
non-state entities, it is expedient for them to be politically neutral (p. 133); or as Arendt put this point, the lives of the
stateless are prolonged ‘due to charity and not to right, for no law exists which could force nations to feed them’ (p.
286).
71
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problematic, consider the differences between the recommendations a political approach would
make compared to those of a humanitarian approach in a hypothetical emergency scenario where
states’ capacities to admit refugees are genuinely limited. 75 The Need-First view would demand that
those fearing the most serious harms have priority for refugee status, even if these individuals could
be more effectively assisted by other means, leaving those who fear “less serious” harms completely
without a remedy, and in a dehumanizing and fundamentally precarious human rights situation. By
contrast, a political conception of refugeehood would make the more sensible suggestion that
priority should be given to those who need refuge in particular, and would recommend that those
experiencing other serious harms be assisted by alternative means – which are usually less costly, and
can thereby reach more people.
It is worth noting here that this valuable insight – that refuge is a distinctively political
remedy – seems to at least partially motivate the defenses of the Convention outlined in §3. In fact,
Price quotes Arendt when defending his claim that refuge should be reserved for the persecuted,
suggesting that only the persecuted are ‘rightless’ in Arendt’s sense.76 Similarly, Lister and Cherem’s
defenses of the persecution condition are grounded in the basic moral idea that only those who need
asylum in particular to secure their human rights have a non-negotiable right to refuge. As argued
previously, these defenses of the Convention fail because their empirical assessments are false. It is
not the case that illegitimate state behavior is the only reason for loss of political membership, or
that only the persecuted need refuge in particular for human rights fulfillment. Even so, however,
the fundamental normative insight underlying these positions – that refuge should be reserved for
those who have lost functional political membership – is highly intuitive. At least in a world like ours
where demand for asylum is very high, there is good practical reason to endorse the most minimal

I should emphasize that this scenario is purely hypothetical – most states in today’s world which claim to be “full” in
fact retain significant capacity to admit many more refugees.
76 Price, p. 74.
75
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account of refugeehood that eliminates protection gaps. Of course, states will still have duties to
assist other individuals experiencing human rights shortfalls. However, international law need not
require that these duties be fulfilled by way of refuge-provision when alternative, less costly, and
more appropriate responses are available.
§6 Conclusion: Three Desiderata For a New Definition
In this chapter, I have evaluated the persecution condition for refugeehood as it is currently applied
under the 1951 Refugee Convention, as well as some prominent defenses of this requirement.
Ultimately, I argued that the Convention definition is inadequate because it leaves some important
protection gaps, and that none of the contemporary defenses successfully show that these gaps are
either avoidable or justifiable. I also evaluated the Need-First account of refugeehood, commonly
advanced as an alternative to the Convention definition, which recommends that anyone fleeing
sufficiently severe harm be entitled to refugee status. Although this view has the clear advantage of
eliminating protection gaps, I argued that it too faces some serious shortcomings – for it would be
infeasible to implement without an alienage condition, and it fails to recognize that refugeehood is a
political remedy, best suited as a solution to the distinctive harm of loss of political membership.
These analyses of the Convention definition and the Need-First view yielded some crucial
insights into three desiderata for an appropriate definition of refugeehood. First, as established in §2
and §3, an acceptable definition of refugeehood must eliminate protection gaps. A system of
international protection that leaves a group of individuals with unmet human rights with no remedy,
even though such remedies are available, is unjustifiable. Second, as established in §4, an appropriate
definition of refugeehood for international law must be feasible – that is, it must be at least
conceivable that it could be implemented in a world like ours. This desideratum needn’t rule out all
ambitious proposals for reform. Rather, it merely highlights that those theorizing about real-world
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matters have a duty to ensure that their normative recommendations are not fantastical, and can be
action-guiding for real-world agents.77 Finally, as argued in §5, an appropriate definition of
refugeehood must respect the fact that refuge is a distinctively political remedy, and acknowledge
that refugeehood is just one of many possible mechanisms for human rights fulfillment. Unlike
those with recourse to their home government, those who have lost a functional relationship with
their state are in a position in which their human rights are fundamentally precarious, and as such,
they need refuge in particular to secure their rights. In order to ensure that appropriate assistance is
available for individuals affected by this distinctive harm, then, it is imperative that the legal
definition of refugeehood continue to recognize that refuge provides the distinctive remedy of
surrogate political protection, which goes beyond the fulfillment of particular human rights.
Altogether, then, an appropriate definition of refugeehood must:
1. Eliminate protection gaps
2. Be feasible to implement, and
3. Preserve the notion that refuge is a distinctively political remedy.
In the next chapter, I will outline a new definition of refugeehood for international law which, I
argue, satisfies all three of these desiderata.

For a more detailed discussion of this point, see David Miller, ‘How “Realistic” Should Global Political Theory Be?
Some Reflections on the Debate So Far’, Journal of International Political Theory 12:2 (2016), pp. 217-233.
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CHAPTER III: Towards a New Definition of Refugeehood
§1 Introduction
The previous chapter’s evaluation of the persecution condition for refugee status yielded three key
desiderata for a definition of refugeehood. These were: eliminating protection gaps, being feasible to
implement, and preserving the notion that refuge is a distinctively political remedy. In this chapter, I
will defend a definition of refugeehood which, I will argue, satisfies each of these criteria. In
particular, I will argue that in order to be eligible for refugee status, an individual must have a wellfounded fear that their human rights are urgently threatened, and it must be the case that receiving
refuge in another state is the only or best way for their rights to be secured.
Variations of this type of approach have been suggested by other scholars.1 Alexander Betts
and Paul Collier argue that identification of a refugee should be grounded in the concept of force
majeure – the absence of a reasonable choice but to leave.2 David Owen argues that the distinguishing
feature of a refugee is the imperative that the international community act in loco civitatis – that is, that
they ‘act as a surrogate’ for the home state to secure the basic rights of threatened individuals. 3
Matthew Gibney defines refugees as ‘those people in need of a new state of residence’ due to the
threats to their basic needs and physical security at home; Luara Ferracioli argues that refugees
should be defined as ‘persons who cannot secure their most fundamental human rights without
migration’; and David Miller argues that, morally, refuge is owed to all individuals ‘whose human

These scholars are primarily focused on critiquing the persecution condition. Some, like David Owen, also explicitly
reject the alienage requirement; some, like Miller, explicitly accept it; and others do not explicitly express their views
about this requirement.
2 Alexander Betts and Paul Collier, Refuge: Rethinking Refugee Policy in a Changing World (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2017), p. 44.
3 David Owen, ‘In Loco Civitatis: On the Normative Basis of the Institution of Refugeehood and Responsibilities for
Refugees’, in Migration in Political Theory, ed. by Sarah Fine and Lea Ypi (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 2778.
1
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rights cannot be protected except by moving across a border’.4 Some of these proposals are offered
only in passing, others are outlined and defended more thoroughly. However, those who do robustly
defend a definition of this sort typically ground their defenses in controversial premises.
Additionally, defenders of this kind of approach have yet to offer a detailed description of what
application of this definition would look like on the ground, and how this compares to existing
refugee law. The discussion in this chapter is distinctive, then, because I will offer a defense of this
definition which rests on a relatively uncontroversial premise – namely, that the international human
rights regime should not leave avoidable protection gaps – and because I will offer a thorough
explanation of how this definition should be applied in practice and how this compares to existing
interpretations of the 1951 Convention.
The chapter will proceed as follows. In §2, I will outline my preferred definition of
refugeehood, and will explain, in detail, how each component of the definition should be
interpreted. In §3, I will outline some benefits of my definition over alternatives that have been
proposed. In §4, I will respond to objections to my definition. §5 concludes.
§2 Refugeehood: A New Definition
In §5 of the previous chapter I suggested that although Matthew Price, Matthew Lister, and Max
Cherem’s defenses of the Convention were ultimately unsuccessful, the principle underlying their
defenses is highly plausible. According to this principle, refugeehood should be available to all and
only those individuals who require refuge in particular in order for their human rights to be
guaranteed.5 Refuge provides a particular good – surrogate protection in another state – and, at least

Matthew Gibney, The Ethics and Politics of Asylum (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Luara Ferracioli, ‘The
Appeal and Danger of a New Refugee Convention’, Social Theory and Practice 40:1 (2014), p. 128; David Miller, Strangers in
Our Midst, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016), p. 83.
5 This principle is broadly in line with Michael Walzer’s characterization of refugees as individuals ‘whose need is for
membership itself, a non-exportable good’. I take it to be a merit of this view that even strong defenders of the right to
exclude immigrants accept duties to admit this category of people. See Michael Walzer, ‘The Distribution of
4
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in a world where a very large number of individuals require this specific kind of protection, the
definition of refugeehood in international law should be reserved for individuals who require this
distinctive remedy. On my view, then, the Convention definition should be reformed to comply
more directly with this principle. The definition of the term ‘refugee’ that I endorse is as follows:
A refugee is any person with a well-founded fear that their human rights are urgently
threatened; who would have no effective recourse to their home government, even in the
presence of appropriate international assistance; and whose rights can only or best be
protected by means of refuge – that is, by means of protection from a political authority that
is not their own, usually in the form of asylum within the territory of that country.
There are several moving parts to this definition. Each component will be outlined in detail below.
*
A refugee is any person with a well-founded fear that their human rights are urgently threatened…
In §2 of the previous chapter, I noted that the Convention definition of refugeehood is problematic
for at least two reasons: because the nexus clause leaves protection gaps for those fleeing generalized
harms; and because there is no universally-accepted interpretation of ‘persecution’ in international
practice. To avoid these sorts of issues, the definition I endorse does away with the nexus clause,
and replaces the persecution requirement with a clear specification of the type of harm an individual
must fear in order to be eligible for refugee status. On my view, refuge should be available to anyone
whose human rights are under threat. This recommendation is in line with James Hathaway and
Michelle Foster’s interpretation of existing refugee law, according to which ‘persecution’ should be
understood as the ongoing or systematic denial of an internationally recognized human right.6 As
Hathaway and Foster point out, this approach has the joint benefits of being both objective and
flexible, for there is a definitive answer to the question of whether an international-recognized
Membership’, in Boundaries: National Autonomy and its Limits ed. by Peter G. Brown & Henry Shue (Totowa NJ: Rowman
and Littlefield, 1981), p. 20.
6 See James C. and Michelle Foster, The Law of Refugee Status (Second Edition) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2014), p. 195. Moreover, as I will outline in §4 below, the picture is a little more complex than I suggest here. In
particular, the human rights violation must also amount to serious harm and some further work may be necessary to fully
specify which human rights violations are the strongest candidates for refugeehood.
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human right has been violated in a particular context; but also, since international human rights law
is itself responsive to changes in the way harm is inflicted, this definition does not restrict the right
to refuge to people fleeing harms that primarily occurred in a particular historical context.7
Less needs to be said here about the requirement that an individual have a well-founded fear
that their human rights are urgently threatened, since this component of the definition is a
continuation from the Convention. I take it that this requirement should be interpreted widely, as
Lister recommends, such that everyone with a reasonable fear that their human rights would be
violated would satisfy this condition – even if the actual likelihood of human rights violations
occurring were relatively low.8
Finally, this definition requires that individuals have not only a well-founded fear that their
human rights are threatened, but that they are urgently threatened. This condition is included out of
recognition of the fact that refugeehood is a remedy that provides surrogate political protection in
response to emergency situations. As developments in the social and natural sciences progress, it has
become increasingly possible to predict that a human rights crisis will develop in several years’ time.
Climate displacement is an obvious example of this: according to one widely-repeated prediction,
there will be around 200 million individuals displaced by climate change by 2050 – three times the
global number of displaced people in 2018.9 Under my definition, these individuals should not be
eligible for asylum at present. I take this outcome to be the most appropriate one. As Jane McAdam
compellingly argues, simply extending the right to refuge is not the most advisable way to respond

Hathaway and Foster, p. 183.
Matthew Lister, ‘Who Are Refugees?’ Law and Philosophy 32:5 (2013), p. 667. For practical acknowledgement of this idea
in the USA, see INS 480 at 431: ‘There is simply no room in the United Nations' definition for concluding that, because
an applicant only has a 10% chance of being shot, tortured, or otherwise persecuted, he or she has no "well founded
fear" of the event's happening.’
9 International Organization for Migration, Migration and Climate Change (no. 31) (Geneva: International Organization for
Migration, 2008), p. 9; and originally, Nicholas Stern (ed), The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 76.
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when communities face predictable threats.10 Instead, longer-term, situation-specific solutions – like
establishing non-emergency temporary or circular migration pathways to safe areas for affected
communities – will usually fulfill rights more effectively, and be less disruptive for the individuals
involved. So on my view, individuals affected by predictable threats would only become eligible for
refugee status if the international community failed to provide appropriate protection and adaptation
assistance, and, at some future time, their human rights came under imminent threat. This residual
entitlement to refuge is important – for not only is it necessary to eliminate protection gaps, but it
also provides an incentive for the international community to provide appropriate protection
solutions sooner rather than later, since these mechanisms are usually less costly for the assistanceproviding states.
*
…who would have no effective recourse to their home government, even in the presence of appropriate international
assistance; and whose rights can only or best be protected by means of refuge…
Following Andrew Shacknove’s recommendation, my definition includes a ‘no recourse to home
government’ requirement.11 There are various good reasons to include a condition of this sort. First,
this requirement is consistent with Charles Beitz’s highly influential philosophical account of the role
of human rights. According to Beitz, human rights are the kinds of things that should protect urgent
interests – interests that are so important that when states fail to protect them, international actors
have good reason to step in.12 This two-level structure to Beitz’s account of human rights is
important. On his view, states bear primary responsibility for respecting, protecting, and fulfilling
the human rights of their citizens, and the role of the international community is to act as guarantors

Jane McAdam, ‘Swimming Against the Tide: Why a Climate Displacement Treaty is not the Answer’, International
Journal of Refugee Law 23:1 (2011), pp. 2-27.
11 Andrew Shacknove, ‘Who is a Refugee?’, Ethics 95:2 (1985), p. 277.
12 Charles Beitz, The Idea of Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2009), pp. 127-141.
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of those rights.13 As such, Beitz’s account of human rights suggests that my view’s recommendation
that refuge be reserved for individuals whose states are not fulfilling their primary responsibility to
protect human rights is appropriate.
Importantly, this definition requires that an individual have not only no recourse to their
home government, but no effective recourse. It is not enough that their home government claim
willingness to protect their citizen’s human rights – they must also take sufficient steps to follow
through on this promise. When protection is promised but not provided in a timely manner, it
would be appropriate to infer that the state is in fact unwilling to assist that individual, and they
should be entitled to full refugee status.
Beyond this, this definition states that a refugee is a person who would have no recourse to
their home government even if international assistance were available – and as such, refuge is the only
or best means by which human rights can be protected. This requirement reflects the normative
principle endorsed by Betts and Collier, Owen, Gibney, Ferracioli, and Miller outlined in the
introduction to the chapter, as well as the moral idea underlying Price, Lister and Cherem’s defense
of the Convention. While it is true that the international community have duties of justice to provide
some form of assistance to all individuals whose states are unable or unwilling to fulfill their human
rights, normative considerations alone do not specify the precise form that this assistance must
take.14 In contexts where states are willing to protect their members’ human rights, but merely
unable to do so due to, say, lack of resources or institutional capacity, it would be entirely acceptable
for the international community to provide assistance by means other than asylum.15 Indeed, in a

Beitz, p. 108.
See again Stephen Perry’s claim that ‘the content and scope of the obligation must be distinguished from the content
and scope of the underlying principle that justifies it’, in Stephen Perry, ‘Immigration, Justice, and Culture’, in Justice in
Immigration ed. by Warren F. Schwartz (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 104.
15 It is frequently more cost-effective to assist those with unmet rights ‘in place’ – meaning that more people can be
assisted with the same level of resources; and protecting human rights in-place is usually less disruptive for the affected
individuals involved. See Lister pp. 660-661.
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world like ours where demand for refuge is already very high, it may be morally irresponsible as well
as unnecessary to extend the right to refuge to those who do not require refuge in particular. As
Cherem points out, this could result in a situation in which some individuals are blocked from
accessing the only remedy available to them because assistance was first provided to those whose
rights could have been fulfilled by other means.16 Again, this highlights that refuge is a distinctive
remedy compared to alternative forms of assistance. As Owen puts this point, when the
international community provide resources or institutional support, they merely supplement the state’s
existing capabilities; whereas when the international community provide asylum to refugees, they
replace the state, acting as a surrogate to secure refugees’ human rights.17 As such, although it would
of course be permissible for states to choose to provide refuge to individuals whose human rights
could be fulfilled by other means, they do not have an obligation to assist these individuals by way of
refuge in particular.
Importantly, though, this definition does not completely restrict refuge to those who can only
be assisted by means of refuge. By including the or best condition, the definition leaves some room
for exceptional cases where an individual’s human rights could in principle be fulfilled by means
other than refuge, but where doing so would be inadvisable or very difficult for some contextspecific reason. Consider, for instance, the case of an individual whose state is willing to protect her
from the powerful gang that operates across its territory. Suppose that very robust and thorough
measures would be required to properly guarantee that individual’s human rights, and even if their
state did take appropriate action to protect them, the targeted individual may quite reasonably
continue to feel unsafe in their home state in virtue of the sheer power and breadth of influence of
the gang in question. In unusual cases such as these, where it is clearly significantly better for a

Max Cherem, ‘Refugee Rights: Against Expanding the Definition of a “Refugee” and Unilateral Protection Elsewhere’,
The Journal of Political Philosophy 2 (2016), pp. 192-194.
17 Owen, p. 279.
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threatened individual to be protected by means of asylum, even though provisions could be made by
that person’s state and/or the international community to provide protection at home, then that
individual should be entitled to refugee status should they wish to claim it.
It should be noted that this concession will not generally result in the international
community being required to extend refugeehood to those affected by lack of economic subsistence
or natural disasters. In such cases, it will almost always be possible to provide appropriate protection
in-place by means of proper (re)distribution of resources, institutional capacity-building, and/or
assistance with climate adaptation responses. In any case, such mechanisms are usually preferable for
all involved: they do require those affected to undergo the disruption of leaving their homes and
communities, and – when properly implemented – they enable the home state to build sufficient
capacity such that assistance with human rights protection will not be necessary in the future.
*

…that is, by means of protection from a political authority that is not their own, usually in the form of asylum within
the territory of that country.
This component of the definition refers to the central right associated with refugee status. This is a
topic of some contention. Christopher Boom, for instance, has recently defended an account of
refugeehood that is even more expansive than Shacknove’s, based on the premise that the only right
that flows directly from possession of refugee status is non-refoulement. That is, according to
Boom, refugees only have rights against being returned to a place where they are at risk of
persecution, and refugee-hosting states have no obligation to provide a durable solution – such as
local integration or permanent political membership.18 At the opposite end of the spectrum, Michael

Christopher D. Boom, ‘Beyond Persecution: A Moral Defense of Expanding Refugee Status’, International Journal of
Refugee Law 20:20 (2018), p. 8.
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Walzer characterizes refugees as those individuals who have a strong claim to admission based on
the fact that their need ‘is for membership itself’.19 I take it that the more plausible view lies between
these two extremes: refugees are entitled to non-refoulement, protection, and temporary
membership in the first instance, but in contexts of protracted displacement where return within a
reasonable period of time is not an option, refugees become entitled to citizenship in the host state
after a sufficient period of residence.20 This assessment is in line T. Alexander Aleinikoff and
Stephen Poellot’s assessment that, although the 1951 Refugee Convention does not guarantee a right
to new membership, it does have an implicit teleology – of which the right to non-refoulement is a
mere stepping stone towards the ultimate purpose of the Convention: finding a solution.21 As such,
although there is no ‘hard’ right to new membership outlined in the Convention, it was clear that the
Convention-signatories envisioned that creating a pathway to citizenship is an important
responsibility states have to refugees.
Thus, on my view, a refugee is an individual who is entitled surrogate political protection in
another state, where this protection may be either temporary or permanent in form. For genuinely
short-term crises, temporary protection may be sufficient, but since refugees are entitled to a durable
solution, those in protracted displacement situations become entitled to new membership, at least
after a sufficient period of time.
***

Walzer, p. 20.
For a defense of a similar position, see James Hathaway, ‘Reconceiving Refugee Law as Human Rights Protection’,
Journal of Refugee Studies 4:2 (1992), p. 125. Owen also seems to hold that whether refugees are entitled to temporary
protection or permanent membership is context-specific. See Owen, pp. 278-280. However, it is worth noting that in
current contexts, voluntary repatriation within a reasonable period of time is not an option for the majority of the
world’s refugees. As such, for most individuals, refuge-provision will ultimately entail a right to full membership. See
Chapter IV for a more thorough discussion of this topic.
21 T. Alexander Aleinikoff and Stephen Poellot, ‘The Responsibility to Solve: The International Community and
Protracted Refugee Situations’, Virginia Journal of International Law 54:2 (2014), pp. 204, 210-211.
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Under this new definition, those fleeing persecution, generalized violence and prolonged and
widespread conflict will almost always be considered eligible for refugee status. Moreover, those
harmed by severe poverty or natural disasters due to purposeful neglect by their home government
will generally also be eligible for refugee status on this definition. All such individuals face urgent
threats to their human rights, and – in virtue of the type of harm they are experiencing, or the
attitude of their home state towards them – they can only be effectively protected by means of
refuge. Unlike the Need-First approach, however, this definition does not extend refugee status to
those experiencing poverty or environmental threats whose states are willing to protect them, and
could do so if international assistance were forthcoming. Although the international community
have strong obligations to assist states to fulfill their citizens’ human rights when they go unmet, the
assisting states have discretion to decide the form of assistance provided, and may permissibly do so
my means other than asylum.
In many ways, this definition is in line with the spirit of Shacknove’s early argument for
expanding the definition of refugeehood, according to which refuge should be available for all
individuals who have experienced a breakdown in their relationship with their state.22 Where
Shacknove and I differ, however is in our understanding of the actual events that signal a citizenstate breakdown. On Shacknove’s view, unmet basic needs always signal a citizen-state breakdown –
because protection of basic needs is a minimum condition for state legitimacy, and because the
extent to which a natural disaster or drought harms individual citizens is, to a significant extent,
within human control.23 On my view, however, although unmet human rights do signal that the
citizen-state relationship is unstable, the international community should not assume that a full
citizen-state relationship breakdown has occurred in all such cases. If a state demonstrates
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willingness to protect its members, and if there is reason to think that human rights could be
effectively fulfilled within that state, then the international community should assist the state to
repair its relationship with its citizens – and if the state succeeds in protecting its citizens’ human
rights with appropriate international assistance, then it is reasonable to assume that the citizen-state
relationship has been repaired in this instance. I take this account to be more plausible than
Shacknove’s for a variety of reasons. As outlined above, in a world in which demand for refuge his
high, it is important to reserve the right to refuge for individuals who truly have no recourse to their
state – and so when repair of the citizen-state relationship is possible, this should be the preferred
solution. What’s more, the process of leaving one’s state and creating a life in a new country is also
highly demanding for affected individuals.24 For both these reasons, then, where it is possible, it will
usually be preferable to fulfil human rights at home.
§3 Benefits of this Definition
3.1 Three Desiderata
Crucially, the definition just outlined satisfies each of the three desiderata for an appropriate
definition of refugeehood identified in the previous chapter. As such, it is preferable to both the
Convention definition and the Need-First account of refugeehood.
According to the first desideratum, the definition of refugeehood must leave no protection
gaps when implemented as part of an appropriate system of international protection. The above
account satisfies this condition almost by definition, for it explicitly states that everyone whose
human rights can only or best be satisfied by means of refuge is entitled to refugeehood. It also
makes no reference to location – eradicating the problematic alienage condition. As such, it is

See, for instance, the discussion in §3.4 of Chapter IV, which highlights the loss associated with moving to a culturally
distinct state.
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superior to the Convention definition, which leaves protection gaps for individuals facing nonpersecutory threats, as well as those with no recourse to their home government who have not yet
left the territory of their home state.
The second desideratum identified in the previous chapter requires that the definition of
refugeehood be feasible to implement in a world like ours. Following Pablo Gilabert and Allen
Buchanan, here, I take an institutional scheme to be ‘feasible’ insofar as it is accessible from a
particular context – that is, where there is a ‘practicable route from the current state of affairs’ to ‘at
least a reasonable approximation’ of the recommended regime.25 This requirement was included in
response to the version of the Need-First account that would extend the right to refuge to all
individuals facing severe threats, regardless of location, which is obviously infeasible in this sense. By
contrast, the definition defended above is the most conservative definition of refugeehood that
eliminates protection gaps – for it extends refugeehood to everyone who requires refuge for human
rights fulfillment, and no further. This – coupled with the fact that this definition is grounded in the
imperative of human rights fulfillment, and all UN member states have ratified at least one of the
core international human rights treaties, with 80% ratifying four or more – provides good reason to
think that a policy of the sort outlined above is within reach, at least in the long-term.26
Finally, this definition preserves the existing understanding of refuge as a distinctively
political remedy. As Arendt compellingly argued, loss of political membership is a distinctive harm –
for human rights are fundamentally precarious outside of the nation-state, and because loss of
political voice is a deeply dignity- and identity-depriving experience for an individual.27 Because my
view reserves the right to refuge for those who need the international community to replace their
Pablo Gilabert, ‘Global Justice and Poverty Relief in Nonideal Circumstances’, Social Theory and Practice 34:3 (2008), p.
414, and Allen Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 61.
26 UN, ‘Human Rights Law’, available from: https://www.un.org/en/sections/universal-declaration/human-rightslaw/index.html.
27 See, Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973), pp. 265-302; and
Serena Parekh, Refugees and the Ethics of Forced Displacement (New York: Routledge, 2016), pp. 82-103.
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state – which means, in effect, that their relationship with their state has broken down – this account
acknowledges the depth of the harms associated with loss of political protection, and ensures that
the necessary remedy is available for those fleeing this harm. Of course, as outlined above, my
account does not demand that the refugee regime immediately provide permanent membership in a
host state. Still, under the recommendations outlined above, every individual would receive at least
temporary surrogate protection, and would be put on a path to new citizenship in the event that
return to their country of nationality within a reasonable period of time proved impossible. That is,
the definition generates an entitlement to more than mere non-refoulement – it aims at a full
solution to the harm of loss of political membership .
3.2 Minimal Commitments
Another benefit of the definition outlined above is that it rests on a relatively minimal set of
commitments. Many other defenses of a new definition of refugeehood rely on controversial claims.
Shacknove’s definition, for instance, rests on the disputable notion that all unmet basic needs are
evidence of a full citizen-state breakdown. Similarly, Owen’s definition is premised on the claim that
an expanded definition of refugeehood is necessary to legitimize the existing global order, under
which all inhabitable territory is claimed by sovereign states with primary authority for protecting
their own citizens, leaving those whose states have failed them with nowhere to go.28 By contrast,
the definition outlined above can be reached by accepting two very basic assumptions: (1) that –
whatever the underlying justification for this might be – the international community have
obligations to implement a system of international protection that robustly respects, protects, and
fulfills human rights, leaving no avoidable protection gaps; and (2) whatever definition of
refugeehood we come up with must be implementable in international law. Essentially, these are the
first two desiderata identified in the previous chapter. I take it to be a benefit of the approach that it
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also satisfies the third, but I do not think one must be committed to the plausibility of the third
desideratum to accept the definition – the first two considerations alone support the conclusion that
refuge should be available to all and only those who require asylum for human rights fulfillment, and
it just happens to be the case that this group is identical to the group of individuals who have lost
political membership. In any case, I take it to be a virtue of this definition that it rests only on these
two widely-accepted assumptions. As outlined above, most states have already committed
themselves to respecting, protecting, and fulfilling human rights standards, and theoretically, too,
there is broad consensus on the importance of upholding human rights.29 Given the urgency of the
interests at stake, it is helpful to choose an account that rests on only these principles, and nothing
more.
While controversial substantive commitments do come into play on my view, they only enter
at a later stage, in the interpretation of the extent of the international community’s obligations to
assist refugees. Importantly, unlike some other definitions that have been offered, these
controversial commitments are entirely independent of the commitments grounding the scope of
the right to refuge.30
To illustrate this point, consider, for instance, David Miller’s preferred definition of
refugeehood, which – as outlined at the opening of this chapter – is close to my own, except for the
fact that Miller accepts the alienage condition. According to Miller, refugees are ‘people whose

Human rights standards are acceptable to cosmopolitans, internationalists – that is, those who take states to be the
ultimate unit of moral concern at the global level, and at least some utilitarians, as well as certain non-liberal views (e.g.
the sorts of views underlying the creation of what John Rawls describes as a ‘decent people’). For an argument for
utilitarianism’s ability to accommodate human rights, see Kok-Chor Tan, Justice Without Borders (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2004), pp. 41-44. For Rawls’s description of decent hierarchical societies as one kind of non-liberal
decent people that respects human rights, see John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press,
1999), pp. 64-67
30 Owen’s account is also a good example of a view that connects these two claims – his (controversial) claim that we
need to legitimize the current system of global governance grounds both his account of the scope of the right to refuge
and his account of the nature of states’ duties to refugees.
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human rights cannot be protected except by moving across a border’.31 Importantly, though, Miller
endorses the idea that refugeehood should be reserved for those who require refuge in particular out
of concern for the self-determination rights of states. For him, the fact that states generally prefer to
assist non-citizens with human rights shortfalls by means other than refuge is itself a reason not to
extend the right to refuge any further.32 This is because, according to Miller, the nature of the
international community’s obligations to refugees are similar to the duty of easy rescue. Just as
individuals have obligations to help strangers at risk of serious harm when they can do so at low cost
to themselves, so too do states have duties to provide asylum to non-citizens who have experienced
human rights violations so long as it is not unacceptably burdensome to do so.33 Consistent with this
account of the source of duties to refugees, Miller argues that states have obligations to admit
refugees so long as this does not place ‘an unacceptable burden’ on the refugee-hosting state.
Instead, because states can permissibly prioritize their citizens’ interests, their duties to admit
refugees are limited and conditional on considerations of cost. Indeed, Miller explicitly argues that a
state that has set overall admissions targets on grounds that are publicly justified can permissibly
‘take steps to ensure that the number of refugees it admits does not exceed that target’, even if this
leaves some refugees without a state willing to admit them.34
Ultimately, Miller’s commitment to the controversial claim that states have strong selfdetermination rights influences both the scope of the right to refuge and the extent of states’ duties
to admit refugees on his view. Because states have strong self-determination rights, they have no
obligations to admit individuals who can be accepted by means other than refuge, and they can
permissibly refuse to admit refugees beyond a point they deem to be excessively burdensome. Now,

Miller, p. 83.
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33 Ibid., p. 78.
34 Ibid., pp. 92-93.
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I do not accept Miller’s claim that states have strong self-determination rights which trump their
duties to accept refugees, or that states’ duties to admit refugees are comparable to the duty of easy
rescue. Rather, on my view, states’ duties to admit refugees are duties of justice – they are embedded
into international institutions, ongoing, and necessary to properly respect the moral status of
individuals.35 As such, on my view, states have strong obligations to admit refugees even when doing
so would be “burdensome” – and they may only refuse to host more refugees when doing so would
genuinely threaten their ability to fulfil the human rights of those already on their territory.
Admittedly, these claims are controversial – though I take it that it is unavoidable not to appeal to
controversial principles at this stage of the discussion. What is important, though, is that these
controversial claims in no way inform the definition of refugeehood I have outlined above. Unlike
Miller, whose commitment to the strong self-determination rights of states also influences his
account of the scope of the right to refuge, my definition of refugeehood rests only on the
imperative of fulfilling human rights, and nothing more.
§4 Responding to Objections
Thus far, I have provided a detailed outline of my preferred definition of refugeehood for
international law, and have explained its benefits in both theory and practice. Now, in this final
section, I will defend my definition against some possible objections.
4.1 Price Against the Human Rights Approach
My definition extends the right to refuge to those with a well-founded fear that their human rights
are urgently threatened. As outlined in §2, this human-rights-based approach has been compellingly
defended by Hathaway and Foster, and has the joint benefits of being both objective – since there is
a fact of the matter about whether an internationally-recognized human right has been threatened –
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but also flexible, since international human rights law is itself an evolving institution. However,
although a human rights-based interpretation of ‘persecution’ has increasingly been adopted in
various nations’ courts, Hathaway and Foster’s human rights approach has not gone without its
critics. Matthew Price, for instance, has objected that considerations of state legitimacy, not human
rights violations, are really what should be fundamental in assessing a refugee claim – for while
human rights ‘may in the aggregate be good proxies of legitimacy’, he insists that ‘they are not
determinative of legitimacy’.36 Price’s insistence on the fundamentality of legitimacy is largely due to
his other theoretical commitments – as outlined in Chapter II, Price endorses an expressive account
of asylum according to which asylum-provision serves the purpose of signaling disapproval of
illegitimate state action.37
Price’s main objection to a human rights approach is that it would be both over- and underinclusive. It would be over-inclusive, he argues, because some human rights provide protection
against harms that are insufficiently serious to generate a right to refuge – such as article 25 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which includes a right to vote in
genuine periodic elections, and article 9 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which dictates that everyone has a right to social security and social
insurance.38 Though benign monarchies and countries without minimally robust welfare states may
fail to fulfill liberal principles of justice, Price suggests, it would, intuitively, be inappropriate to
provide refuge to individuals on the grounds that these sorts of human rights have been violated.
Moreover, Price argues that the human rights approach would also be underinclusive. For instance,
the ‘right to own and be free from arbitrary deprivation of property’, outlined in the (non-binding)
Universal Declaration of Human Rights is not included in either the ICCPR or the ICESCR – even
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though, Price points out, American courts agree that egregious instances of arbitrary propertydeprivation can constitute grounds for refugee status even under the Convention.39 Finally, beyond
these problems of over and under-inclusion, Price also worries that human rights do not provide
standards that are as ‘objective’ as Hathaway and Foster suggest, because many human rights involve
vague terms – consider, for instance, the prohibition on ‘arbitrary arrest and detention’, or the
requirement that states take steps toward fulfilling economic rights.40 In order to properly interpret
these terms, Price argues, it will inevitably be necessary to return to the more fundamental question
of whether the relevant harm amounts to a violation of legitimacy.41
Let’s begin with the problem of overinclusion, for Price himself provides a solution to this
worry, based in current practice. The courts that currently implement a human rights approach in
their interpretation of ‘persecution’ supplement this with the requirement that an individual have a
well-founded fear of serious harm.42 Similarly, notable refugee scholar Guy Goodwin-Gill has argued
that refuge should be restricted to those fleeing violations of rights ‘that are inherent to the
maintenance of the integrity and human dignity of the individual’ – that is, harms involving:
…deprivation of life or liberty; torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment; subjection
to slavery or servitude; non-recognition as a person (particularly where the consequences of
non-recognition impinge directly on an individual’s life, liberty, livelihood, security, or
integrity); and oppression, discrimination, or harassment of a person in his or her private
home, or family life.43
Essentially, I take it that the existing practice of supplementing the human rights requirement with a
serious harm condition is appropriate. Price may be right in his assessment that, ultimately, states
will need to appeal to fundamental notions of legitimacy in order to resolve issues concerning the
proper interpretation of ‘serious harm’, as well as some human-rights-specific terms. Even so,
Price, p. 117.
Ibid., pp. 117-8.
41 Ibid., pp. 119-120.
42 Ibid., p. 116.
43 Guy Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee In International Law: Second Edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), p. 69.
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however, his objections are not sufficiently forceful to demonstrate that we must move away from a
human rights approach. The goal of this chapter is to identify an appropriate definition of
refugeehood for implementation in international law, not merely to identify the appropriate
principles that should underlie the refugee definition. For this reason, it is essential that human
rights standards be preserved – for there is significantly more scope for arbitrary and inconsistent
implementation of even a thoroughly-specified ‘legitimacy’ standard than in the implementation of
individual human rights, each of which would be supported by their own particular specifications
and, over time, legal precedent.
So much for the concerns about over-inclusiveness and inadequate objectivity, then, but
what of Price’s worry that a human rights approach would be under-inclusive? This objection has the
potential to be more worrying, given that a major goal of this first part of the dissertation was to
identify a definition of refugeehood that eliminates protection gaps. Thankfully, then, there is good
reason to think that, in practice, the human rights approach is well-equipped to eliminate these gaps.
For instance, Hathaway’s original human rights interpretation of ‘persecution’ was based on the
International Bill of Rights, which includes rights outlined in the UDHR as well as those in the
legally-binding ICCPR and ICESCR.44 Under his hierarchical model, freedom from arbitrary
deprivation of property is included, albeit at the lowest level – meaning that it will not usually suffice
in itself as evidence of a failure of state protection, but leaving open the possibility that violation of
this right could amount to such evidence in severe cases where, for instance, property deprivation
left the individual in question with insufficient means to fulfill her subsistence rights. 45 This outcome
is in line with current practice, and intuitively, this result seems acceptable – while arbitrary
deprivation of property is a serious harm, and an indicator that the citizen-state relationship is
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unstable, it would be inappropriate to involve the international community except in particularly
severe cases. Ultimately, then, the flexibility of the human rights approach wins out. As Hathaway
and Foster emphasize, human rights standards are themselves emerging, and so when cases of
under-inclusion do arise, a human rights approach is better equipped than any other standard to fill
protection gaps. Moreover, it is also more practical than Price’s alternative, for an individuated
human rights standard has the capacity to be more specific than a general legitimacy condition.
4.2 Hathaway and the Nexus Clause
James Hathaway has made an objection to views, like mine, which reject the nexus clause. According
to Hathaway, it is appropriate that the Convention requires that a persecuted individual be
individually targeted for reasons that are central to their identity, because although all human rights
abuses are bad,
…refugee status is a recognition of the special imperative to respond to the needs of persons
in flight from risk prompted by discrimination – the prohibition of which is the most central
human rights commitment of the international community. Simply put, refugees are persons
who are seriously at risk because of who they are or what they believe.46
On Hathaway’s view, individuals fleeing persecution inflicted for reasons of discrimination are
‘doubly deserving’, for it is not “only” the case that their human rights are seriously threatened, but
they are threatened because of features of their identity that are either unchangeable or fundamental
to who they are.47
Perhaps Hathaway is right to suggest that, all else being equal, those experiencing threats to
their human rights on discriminatory grounds experience a greater wrong than those whose human
rights are insecure for indiscriminate or generalized reasons. However, this observation is
insufficient to demonstrate that the nexus clause should be upheld. First, even if Hathaway were

James C. Hathaway, ‘Forced Migration Studies: Could We Agree Just to “Date”?’, Journal of Refugee Studies 113 (2007),
p. 352.
47 Ibid., p. 352.
46
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right to suggest that those facing discrimination-based human rights violations are always more
deserving of refugee status, further argument would still be needed to show that refugeehood should
not also be extended to individuals fleeing indiscriminate threats – particularly in cases where refuge
is the only remedy available to a particular harm. More fundamentally, though, there is good reason
to doubt Hathaway’s suggestion that those fleeing discrimination are always more deserving. As
outlined in Chapter II, defenders of the Need-First view have pointed out that individuals fleeing
discrimination-based persecution are sometimes fleeing harms that are, at least intuitively, less severe
than some indiscriminate harms. Joseph Carens, for instance, has highlighted that an individual
fleeing generalized violence may fear for her very life, whereas an individual feeling discriminationbased persecution may fear wrongful imprisonment.48 Thus, while Hathaway may be right to
highlight that those fleeing discrimination-based harms are ‘doubly deserving’ in the sense that there
is an additional wrongful dimension to harms that are inflicted for discriminatory reasons, Carens’s
analysis highlights that this additional dimension is separate from the severity of the harm in
question. Because of this, when all else is not equal regarding the severity of the harms in question, it
may not be the case that discriminatory harms are worse than indiscriminate ones. Altogether, then,
my account’s rejection of the nexus clause is not problematic.
4.3 A Concerning Counterfactual?
Finally, concerns have been raised in relation to the component of my definition which reserves
refugee status for those ‘who would have no effective recourse to their home government, even in
the presence of appropriate international assistance’. As outlined in the introduction to this chapter,
Miller’s view, like mine, similarly reserves refugee status for those whose human rights can only be

48

Joseph Carens, The Ethics of Immigration (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 200-201.
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fulfilled by means of refuge.49 In the postscript to his book, Miller acknowledges that there might
seem to be something unacceptable about this component of his definition:
The problem is that my definition includes a counterfactual element: it asks whether the
person in question could be adequately protected when remaining in her present country of
residence […] But for the people who are actually living in [overcrowded refugee camps], the
relevant question is whether the resources they need to live decent lives […] will in fact be
provided so long as they remain where they are. They do not want to wait in hope for ten or
twenty years.50
In a review of Miller’s book, Kieran Oberman doubles down on this objection.51 Oberman concedes
that Miller might be right that there is something conceptually distinctive about individuals who can
only be assisted by means of refuge. However he insists that in actual, non-ideal conditions, if it is
predictable that, say, an economic migrant who has just arrived on the shores of an affluent
European country will not receive adequate assistance they are deported, then it would be
normatively unacceptable not to provide them with refugee status.
Carens has also offered another version of this objection. In requiring that refuge be
reserved for those who can only be helped through relocation, Carens argues, accounts like mine
conflate two related questions: ‘What is the best solution to a particular problem?’ and ‘Should a
person who has fled because of this problem be granted asylum as a refugee?’52 Carens agrees that
refuge is not the best way to solve problems like global poverty or climate change, but insists that
answers to such big-picture questions do not matter when assessing the asylum application of an
individual. In Carens’s words:

Again, however, there are some important differences between Miller’s definition and my own. For one thing, Miller’s
definition upholds the alienage condition; for another, Miller intends only to provide a moral account of a refugee,
whereas I intend to provide a definition of refugeehood for future implementation into international law.
50 Miller, p. 168.
51 Kieran Oberman, ‘Reality for Realists: Why Economic Migrants Should Not Just “Go Home and Wait for
Assistance”’, in ‘Review Symposium: Strangers in Our Midst’, European Political Science (2017).
52 Carens, p. 202.
49
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the question we are faced with when someone arrives seeking asylum is not what is the best
way to address these broad problems but rather whether this particular person deserves to
be considered a refugee.53
Miller’s response to this objection is to insist that, upon closer inspection, his definition does, in fact,
cover ‘survival migrants’ fleeing harms like inadequate subsistence when it is foreseeable that the
harms they are fleeing will be ‘unfixable’ for a relatively long time in the future.54 While individuals
who temporarily have no recourse to their home government – for instance, because its institutions
have been disrupted by an environmental event – would not count as refugees on Miller’s view,
those fleeing protracted situations which could in principle be resolved by means other than refuge,
but are very unlikely to be resolved in this way, fulfill Miller’s requirement of being ‘those whose
human rights cannot be protected except by moving across a border’, and should be entitled to
refugee status.55
In some ways, my definition is less capable of making this kind of flexible response than
Miller’s. My view is even more explicit about the potentiality response in its definition, for it suggests
that refugees are those ‘who would have no effective recourse to their home government, even in the
presence of appropriate international assistance’. This account would, as Miller suggests, extend refuge to
those whose human rights would predictably go unprotected for a significant duration of time, even
if international assistance were forthcoming, perhaps because their circumstances are particularly
complicated. But unlike Miller’s view, it would not make individuals fleeing serious harms that are

Carens, p. 202. To be clear: I resist Carens’s suggestion that my account defines refugeehood on the basis of what the
‘best solution’ to a general problem is. Under my account, individuals fleeing civil wars would usually be eligible for
refugee status, even though refuge-provision is not the best way to end a civil war. Unlike Price’s account, outlined in
Chapter II, my definition of refugeehood is not grounded in a desire to identify a definition best suited to tackling major
global problems. Rather, I endorse it because I believe that it, more than any alternative definition, fits best in a system
of international protection that will maximally guarantee the human rights of as many individuals as possible.
54 Miller, p. 169. Miller borrows this ‘survival migrant’ term from Alexander Betts – it refers to ‘persons who are outside
their country of origin because of an existential threat for which they have no access to a domestic remedy or resolution.
See Alexander Betts, Survival Migration: Failed Governance and the Crisis of Displacement (Ithaca and London: Cornell
University Press, 2013), p. 23.
55 Miller, p. 83.
53
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resolvable in the short-term eligible for refugeehood in the first instance, even if it were predictable
that assistance was not likely to be forthcoming. Since I argued that a major benefit of my view is
that it eliminates protection gaps, some further explanation is needed here.
I should begin by emphasizing that I agree with the moral claim underlying Oberman and
Carens’s objections. It is morally wrong to return an individual to their country of origin when it is
foreseeable that their human rights will go unmet there, and appealing to the fact that their rights
could hypothetically be satisfied by means other than refuge would in no way reduce the wrongness
of deportation when no alternative assistance is in fact forthcoming. However, my point of
departure from Carens and Oberman is that I do not believe that these sorts of considerations about
particular cases should influence arguments about the proper legal definition of refugeehood. In this
sense, my project is different from Miller’s – for while Miller suggests that it would be inadvisable to
reform the legal definition of refugeehood, and indicates that he only aims to identify a proper moral
definition, I hold that legal reform is necessary to take human rights seriously.
By focusing on the particular example of an individual who has arrived at the border of a
safe state, after fleeing a form of deprivation that is consistent with ongoing political membership,
Oberman and Carens seem to be advancing a Need-First account of refugeehood, implemented
alongside the alienage condition. As argued in Chapter I, however, this approach would leave
unacceptable protection gaps for those with insecure human rights and no recourse to their home
government who have not yet crossed a border. Moreover, as argued in Chapter II, removing the
alienage condition from such views would make them infeasible to implement, even in the longterm. As such, views of this sort are – unlike my own – unsuitable for implementation in
international law. Again, as argued in Chapter II, a major problem with Need-First views is that they
fail to recognize that, when the goal is to identify an appropriate legal definition of refugeehood,
philosophers must engage in the difficult task of identifying a general definition that could feasibly
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be implemented in international law as part of a broader system of human rights protection. Given
that this is the nature of the enterprise, it is not appropriate to begin with Oberman’s assumption
that the international community will fail to fulfil their other obligations under this broader system.
This is primarily a principled argument, but considerations of realism are at play here too – in the
actual world, there is no good reason to think that states that are failing to fulfill their other, often
less-demanding, obligations under international law would uphold their commitments to a drastically
more expansive category of refugees, like the one advocated by proponents of Need-First view.56
Most importantly, though, because I aim to provide a definition of refugeehood to be
implemented as part of a broader system of human rights protection, my view will still predict that it is wrong to
deport individuals in the kinds of predicament Oberman and Carens are concerned with. My
definition of refugeehood is grounded in the more basic idea that every individual with unmet
human rights is entitled to rights-fulfillment, and when their state lacks the capacity to fulfill rights
on its own, individuals are entitled to make claims against the international community. My view
merely insists that refugeehood – that is, a claim-right to refuge in particular – should be reserved
for those who need the international community to replace, and not merely assist, their state. The
only disagreement between my view and Carens and Oberman’s, then, is in the identification of the
nature of the wrongdoing that has occurred when an individual with unmet subsistence needs is
deported. According to Carens and Oberman, such a person has been wronged qua refugee with a
claim-right to refuge in particular. By contrast, on my view, such a person is wronged qua individual
with unmet human rights, with a claim-right to some form of assistance, which may or may not take

It might be objected here that I offered just such a reason in Chapter I, when I argued that there has been unusually
widespread acceptance of the special moral status of refugees, and that states have been more inclined to fulfill their
obligations to refugees compared to other groups with unmet basic needs. However, there is good reason to think that
dramatically expanding the definition of refugeehood, as Need-First accounts recommend, would threaten the special
moral status of the refugee. For this reason, as well as for considerations of feasibility, I take it that is good reason to
extend the right to refuge only as far as necessary to eliminate protection gaps, and no further.
56
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the form of refuge in another state. It is only because that individual’s claim is not to refuge in
particular that they do not fall under the legal definition of a refugee on my view.
This approach is more appropriate than revising the definition of a refugee in international
law for the reasons of feasibility outlined above. In a non-ideal world where demand for assistance is
high, an effective system of international protection will match distinct harms with their most
appropriate remedy. For this reason, international law must distinguish between refugees and other
individuals with unmet human rights. It is important that we are able to recognize that when
individuals with unmet human rights request asylum, even though their human rights could have
been protected by alternative means, this is a very clear sign that states are failing to fulfil their
international obligations to protect human rights in-place. Revising the legal definition of a refugee
to include the individuals Oberman and Carens are concerned with would obscure this.
§5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have thoroughly reconstructed and defended a definition of refugeehood that falls
between the expansive but infeasible Need-First view on the one hand, and the inadequate
Convention definition on the other. On my view, entitlement to refugeehood in international law
should be extended to all individuals who face threats to their human rights and require the
distinctive remedy of refuge in order to escape these threats. This approach, I have argued, is
preferable to the alternatives because it leaves no protection gaps, does not unnecessarily overextend
the definition of refugeehood in a way that would hamper feasibility of implementation, and, unlike
the Need-First approach, preserves the importantly political nature of the institution of refuge.
***
The discussion in this first part of the dissertation has centered on the right to refuge in an
international context. The arguments advanced thus far have turned on distinctively global
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considerations, like the international community’s obligation to protect human rights, the need for
political membership in a world divided into sovereign states, and what kinds of policies are feasible
at the global level. However, now that the proper scope of the right to refuge in international law
has been established, in Part Two, I will turn to the question of what is owed to refugees after they
have received asylum in an affluent democratic country. As outlined in the introduction to this
dissertation, I focus on these sorts of cases in particular because it is possible to be more precise
about what host states owe to refugees as a matter of justice in contexts with fewer institutional and
resource limitations. Because this is the nature of the discussion, the arguments in the next two
chapters will be driven primarily by liberal principles of justice for individual states – though global
considerations will also be relevant at certain points in the discussion.
It is also important to flag here that throughout the next part of the dissertation, I will
proceed on the assumption that the definition of refugeehood just defended has been implemented
in international law. That is, I will assume that refugees are those who must move in order to be
safe, whereas non-refugee migrants can live safely in their country of nationality, and as such, a clear,
morally-salient distinction can be drawn between refugees and non-refugee migrants. This
assumption will make it possible to reach some clear conclusions about what is owed to refugees in
particular upon receipt of asylum, and the ways in which these entitlements differ from those of
non-refugee migrants. Of course, this kind of clear distinction between refugees and migrants is not
currently available in our world today. As such, the entitlements outlined in the next two chapters
also apply to some individuals not eligible for refugee status in our current, imperfect world.
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CHAPTER IV: On Refugee Integration
But isn’t glorifying the refugees who thrive according to Western standards just another way to
endorse the same gratitude politics? Isn’t it akin to holding up the most acquiescent as examples of
what a refugee should be, instead of offering each person the same options that are granted to the
native-born citizens?
– Dina Nayeri1

§1 Introduction
Public discussion on the topic of integration has proliferated in recent years due to a perceived
increase in the number of refugees and immigrants entering affluent Western states. Frequently,
these discussions begin from the assumption that integration, loosely defined, is a valuable outcome.
It is clear that there is some truth to this claim: refugees and immigrants frequently state that they
value certain kinds integration out of a recognition that some degree of integration is necessary to
live a flourishing life in a new state.2 There are also political reasons to value integration, for liberal
political philosophers broadly agree that integration among members of a democratic state is
necessary for political stability.3 However, it is also clearly true that many forms of diversity are
compatible with the successful operation of democratic institutions, and excessive demands for
integration may be detrimental to individual welfare and unjustifiably restrictive on the scope of
individual autonomy.
The goal of this chapter is to lend some clarity to these discussions by providing a
framework for future research on the topic of refugee integration in affluent, culturally dissimilar
democratic states. This is a thoroughly complex issue, and it would be impossible to answer all the
relevant questions here. Instead, the goal of this chapter is to highlight some key conceptual

Dina Nayeri, ‘The Ungrateful Refugee’, in The Displaced: Refugee Writers on Refugee Lives, ed. by Viet Thanh Nguyen (New
York: Abrams Press, 2018), pp. 137-150.
2 See e.g. All Party Parliamentary Group on Refugees, Refugees Welcome? The Experience of New Refugees in the UK (2017), p.
27.
3 See, e.g., Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 174-5.
1
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distinctions, and make some initial high-level claims about the general desirability of integration in
various areas of social life. More specifically, the purpose of the chapter will be to: (1) clear up some
conceptual confusion about the term ‘integration’, generating a working definition for future
discussion; (2) identify the domains of integration most relevant to refugees; and (3) establish, for
each domain, the general extent to which integration is morally desirable, as well as the content of
the most important rights or duties associated with facilitating integration in that domain.
I take this project to be valuable for both political and philosophical reasons. Politically, the
situation in many affluent Western states is one in which negative attitudes towards refugees are
highly pervasive, partly because of refugees’ perceived “failure” to integrate.4 In order to
appropriately respond to this kind of hostility, it is important to establish the extent to which these
desires for refugee integration are (un)reasonable. Philosophically, too, there is much need for a
discussion of these issues. Although questions concerning cultural accommodations for minorities
have been discussed in detail in the multiculturalism literature, and the issue of immigrant integration
has received increased attention in recent years, relatively little has been said about the cultural rights
or integration of refugees in particular. What’s more, the emerging literature on immigrant integration
has largely focused on the relatively narrow issues of citizenship and legal rights.5 Principles offered
to guide integration in social and cultural contexts are often general and unspecific, and it is not
always clear how they apply in real-world contexts. The aim of this chapter is to go some way
towards filling these gaps in the literature – that is, to provide a framework for addressing questions
of integration that is refugee-specific, comprehensive across all relevant areas of social life, and as
concrete as possible.
IPSOS, Global Views on Immigration and the Refugee Crisis (July 2017), p. 4.
E.g. David Miller spends the majority of his most recent chapter on immigrant integration discussing issues of
citizenship; and in his chapter on inclusion, Joseph Carens indicates that states may permissibly incentivize integration,
but offers very few concrete examples to explain what this might look like. See Joseph Carens, The Ethics of Immigration
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 62-87; and David Miller, Strangers in Our Midst (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2016), pp. 130-150.
4
5
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Before getting into the substance of this discussion, a few clarifications will be necessary.
First, throughout this chapter I will assume that integration in the host community is the most
appropriate durable solution for the majority of refugees hosted in wealthy democratic states.6 I
mean this only as a descriptive claim – I do not mean to make the revisionary suggestion that local
integration, as opposed to voluntary repatriation, is the most desirable durable solution for refugees.
Rather, I merely mean to recognize the reality that, due to the increasingly prolonged nature of
displacement, voluntary repatriation within a reasonable period of time is not an option for most
refugees.7 Second, for the purposes of this discussion I will assume that refugees should be entitled
to full citizenship after sufficient period of residence within the host state. Here, I am simply joining
the theoretical consensus. As Peter Higgins has recently pointed out, scholars with a range of views
on the right to exclude outsiders broadly agree that all immigrants, including refugees, should be
entitled to citizenship after around five to ten years of residence.8 Altogether, then, this chapter aims
to create a framework for thinking about refugee integration in affluent democratic states on the
assumption that refugees hosted in such states are, more likely than not, future citizens of those
states.9

There are three durable solutions for refugees: voluntary repatriation, resettlement, or local integration. Voluntary
repatriation is presumed to be the most desirable of these outcomes, but it is in fact rarely possible within a reasonable
period of time. See e.g. Serena Parekh, Refugees and the Ethics of Forced Displacement (New York: Routledge, 2017), pp. 2-3.
Resettlement in another country is most typically a solution for refugees living in camps or less-affluent states.
7 Of course, voluntary repatriation will be possible in some cases. For particular groups of refugees for whom this seems
likely, it may be appropriate to proceed on the assumption that the residence period will be temporary. However, as a
general rule, for reasons of both justice and efficiency it is appropriate to proceed as if local integration is the most likely
outcome for the majority of refugees.
8 Peter Higgins, ‘The Rights and Duties of Immigrants in Liberal Societies’, Philosophy Compass (2018), pp. 2-3.
9 This is not just a theoretical assumption, but an empirical reality. See, for instance, Nadwa Mossaad et al, ‘Determinants
of Refugee Naturalization in the United States’, PNAS 115:37 (2018), pp. 9175-9180.
6

98

Chapter IV | Integration

§2 Conceptualizing Integration
2.1 What is Integration?
Both academic and policy experts have pointed out that there is no consensus on a definition or
theory of integration.10 Instead, discussions on issues of integration are typically based on a set of
tacit assumptions which may be complex or even incoherent.11 Padmaparna Ghosh offers a helpful
explanation of this point in the introduction to her article on refugee integration in Ireland:
Everyone’s definition of “integration” is different. After all, not everyone in Ireland likes
Gaelic football—so why does liking Gaelic football count in a refugee’s favor? Does bingewatching Netflix count as integration? Does going to church or mosque or temple? Does
shopping at certain stores, or buying certain clothes? Longtime Irish residents can and do
live very different lives from each other; there might be a vast gulf between a rural farmer
and an urban real estate agent. Who defines the culture into which refugees should
integrate—and who decides when that point is reached?12
In light of this confusion, before discussing the normative nature of integration, it is imperative to
first clarify what, exactly the term ‘integration’ refers to.
Perhaps most importantly, ‘integration’ should be distinguished from ‘assimilation’ – for the
terms are often conflated. Historically, ‘assimilation’ has referred to the process by which members
of a minority, oppressed and/or immigrant group are required to completely lose their distinctive
cultural traits and take on the culture of the majority, oppressor and/or dominant national group. 13
Today, this assimilationist model is widely rejected. As Will Kymlicka points out, since the 1970s,
high-immigration countries have moved towards a more tolerant and pluralistic policy which permits

See e.g. S. Castles, M. Korac, E. Vasta, S. and Vertovec, ‘Integration: Mapping the Field’, Home Office Online Report
(2002), p. 112; and Alastair Ager and Alison Strang, ‘Indicators of Integration’, Home Office Development and Practice Report
(UK) (2004), p. 9.
11 Castles et al, p. 112.
12 Padmaparna Ghosh, ‘Refugees Are Asked To “Integrate”, But What Does That Even Mean?”, Quartz (May 18, 2019).
13 In 1969, S. Alexander Weinstock defined assimilation as ‘the complete loss of original ethnic identity in an individual
or group of individuals leading to absorption into the dominant culture’; and more recently Tommie Shelby defined it as
a ‘demand for conformity to dominant group norms’. See S. Alexander Weinstock, Acculturation and Occupation: A Study of
the 1956 Hungarian Refugees in the United States (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969), p. 4; Tommie Shelby, ‘Integration,
Inequality, and the Imperatives of Justice: A Review Essay’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 42:3 (2014), p. 264.
10
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and even encourages immigrants to maintain elements of their ethnic or cultural heritage. 14 Clearly,
then, practices of assimilation are at odds with what liberal toleration demands in a very deep way.
Integration is unlike assimilation in that it is a two-way process. Whereas calls for
assimilation begin from the assumption that only immigrants and refugees must make behavioral
changes – that they must completely adapt to conform with the norms of the host society –
discussions about integration begin from the assumption that everyone involved, including
institutions of the host state and members of the host community, may need to adapt in order for
integration to occur.15 To be clear: this does not mean that refugees and the receiving society must
always “meet in the middle”. As will become clear from the discussion in §3, what integration entails
in any given context will be contingent on a variety of contextual features as well as liberal principles
of justice.
Because of its associations with assimilation, in recent years some progressive scholars have
favored the term ‘inclusion’ over ‘integration’.16 Although the sentiment behind this move is
laudable, I take it that there are several good reasons not to join their ranks for the purposes of the
discussion in this chapter. Unlike ‘integration’, ‘inclusion’ has decisively positive connotations – and
since one purpose of this chapter is to consider whether integration is desirable at all, it is preferable
to begin with the more value-neutral term. Moreover, just as the term ‘assimilation’ is problematic
because it suggests that responsibility to adapt falls wholly on newcomers, ‘inclusion’ similarly
implies that responsibility for change falls wholly on existing members of society.17 Since another

Kymlicka, p. 14. Kymlicka cites the United States, Canada and Australia as examples of such countries. Admittedly,
there has been a modest rise in support for assimilationist policies in recent years under the Trump presidency in the US
and the rise of ethno-nationalism in across Europe. Still, at least at present, the majority view is that assimilationist
policies are unacceptable.
15 I do not mean to suggest at this stage that integration is always desirable. The claim here is purely descriptive – if an
integrated society is to be created, then integration work will be required from all members of society.
16 See, e.g. Carens, p. 321 n. 2.
17 Indeed, this may partially explain the shift in terminology towards ‘inclusion’ – as a sort of antidote to the assumptions
underlying the historically pervasive assimilation narrative. This may be a rhetorically sound move, but it is not suited for
the purpose of this chapter.
14
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purpose of this chapter is to establish the extent to which refugees and long-term residents might
have obligations to integrate with one another, it is best to begin with the most neutral term
available.
Thus far I have distinguished integration from some related terms, and in doing so, I have
outlined the general contours of what ‘integration’ consists of. Now, I will offer a more specific
definition of integration to guide discussion in this chapter. It is as follows:
(1) Integration (process): Integration is the process by which two or more groups, e.g. A
and B, which are segregated and/or unequal in domain X at time t1, increasingly mix
and/or become equal to one another in X.
(2) Integration (outcome, maximal): Groups A and B are integrated in domain X at time
t2 if members of A and B interact with one another in X on terms of equality appropriate
to that domain as frequently as members engage in intra-group interactions, and/or if
there are no statistically significant inequalities between members of A and B in X.
There are a number of important features of this definition that should be made explicit here. First,
and most obviously, this definition distinguishes between integration as a process and integration as
an outcome. This distinction highlights that integration can occur by degrees, and that for any
particular set of groups in any particular domain, it may not be the case that maximal integration is
the right “goal”. In some circumstances it may only be morally desirable that a certain threshold of
integration be achieved; in others no integration may be necessary. Second, this definition recognizes
that integration is a domain-specific process. That is, groups A and B could be integrated in one
domain at t2, but unintegrated in another. This is important, because – as Ghosh accurately
highlights above – much of the confusion that arises in discussions of integration stems from a
failure to properly distinguish between the different domains in which integration can occur. Third,
this definition identifies two distinct ways in which groups can be unintegrated. They can be
physically and socially segregated – formally or informally – such that increased intergroup mixing
would be the means to integration; or they can receive unequal treatment, such that reducing
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inequalities would be the means to integration.18 Which of these is the relevant outcome in a
particular domain will depend on contextual features of the domain in question. For instance,
equality of treatment is the relevant outcome when assessing integration in the legal system;
intergroup mixing on terms of equality is the relevant outcome in the context of social integration;
and both outcomes are relevant to integration in the workplace.19
Finally, there are two guidelines for implementation of integration policies not included in
the above definitions which should be made explicit here. First, it should be emphasized that if
integration in a particular domain is morally desirable, it is only desirable pro tanto – as in order for
the integration process to be morally acceptable, it must be constrained by the usual principles of
justice. Thus, even if integration was a desirable outcome in domain X, if the process of integrating
two groups in X would predictably involve human rights violations, the process of integration would
be all-things-considered morally wrong. Second, a complicating feature of the integration process is
that in the real world, integration occurs in nonideal conditions in which institutions may be failing
to fulfil the requirements of justice, and groups within the host state may themselves be
unintegrated. In such circumstances, there are multiple different groups against whom refugee
integration might be measured. I take it that contextual factors should ultimately determine the
relevant comparison community in any particular domain.20 Moreover, in contexts where the
baseline standards of justice are non-ideal, processes of integration are morally acceptable qua
processes of integration so long as they involve no more injustice than other similar processes

I do not mean to suggest here that all inequalities are necessarily indicative of lack of integration. For instance, it is at
least controversial whether it is appropriate to describe certain economic inequalities as a failure of integration between
richer and poorer groups. I only mean to suggest here that where it is appropriate to use the term ‘integration’, this is one
way in which two groups can be unintegrated.
19 Note that the type of equal interaction involved in full integration will also be domain-specific. Socially equal
interactions are necessary for full social integration; culturally equal interactions are necessary for full cultural integration.
20 E.g. given the importance of legal rights, coupled with the non-spatial nature of legal integration, refugee integration in
the legal system should be measured against the status of the privileged/majority. By contrast, since social integration is a
physical process that occurs within a geographical space, the relevant contrast group will frequently be the community in
which refugees are living, which may or may not be the privileged/majority group.
18
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already in place in the host society. For instance, while it might be all-things-considered unjust to
require jobseekers to engage in unpaid work in order to receive subsistence welfare payments, if
such requirements are already in place in the receiving society, then no more injustice is done to
refugees if they are also required to work unpaid to receive welfare payments. Of course, in such
circumstances, host states have independent obligations to revise these unjust policies, but these are
obligations of justice, not obligations to facilitate refugee integration, and refugees are not uniquely
wronged by these policies.
2.2 Domains of Integration
In addition to the lack of clarity concerning the concept of integration itself, a second source of
confusion in discussions about integration stems from the fact that there are multiple domains of life
in which integration can occur. As such, the purpose of this section will be to clearly distinguish
between these various domains. Of course, the theoretical divisions made here are artificially cleancut – in real-world circumstances domains frequently overlap, and integration in one domain may
impact integration in another. Still, it will be helpful to have clear conceptual distinctions established
before suggesting guidelines for normative action in messier real-world scenarios.
Drawing inspiration from both David Miller’s philosophical distinction between three kinds
of integration for immigrants, as well as Alastair Ager and Alison Strang’s policy-oriented framework
outlining ten areas of refugee integration, the domains of integration I will use to guide discussion in
§3 are as follows:21

See Miller, pp. 132-133; and Ager and Strang, p. 3. These two approaches are combined here because there are merits
to each. Miller’s framework is useful for normative analysis because it is simple and theoretically clear – the social, civic,
and cultural category headers are all borrowed from his discussion. On the other hand, Ager and Strang identify
important dynamics of integration overlooked in Miller’s framework, many of which are incorporated here.
21
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1. Institutional integration:22 This domain encompasses refugee integration in the formal
social institutions of the receiving state, including the employment, housing, education,
health, and welfare systems.23 As Ager and Strang observe, integration in this domain is both
itself a marker of general societal integration, and also a means to integration in other
domains.24 Moreover, institutional integration is frequently the kind of integration most
immediately requested by refugees upon arrival in a new state.25
2. Social integration: Following Miller, who is himself influenced by Elizabeth Anderson’s
account of integration, I take it that social integration between refugees and host
communities occurs when individuals frequently interact socially and physically across a
range of contexts on terms of equality, in a manner that is cooperative, trusting, respectful,
easy, and intimate.26 However, whereas Miller’s account of social integration only
incorporates inter-group interactions between immigrants and the receiving population – for
instance, between refugees and members of the host state with different national, cultural,
ethnic, and/or religious identities – my account of social integration preserves Ager and
Strang’s observation that intra-group social integration within communities with shared
features can also occur – such as between newly-arrived refugees and refugees who have
been settled for several years.27
3. Civic integration: Included under this domain are all forms of integration in both the
formal and informal political institutions of the receiving state. In line with Miller’s account

This domain is not included in Miller’s philosophical evaluation of immigrant integration. Instead, it draws from Ager
and Strang’s ‘Means and Markers’ category of integration, which they describe as the ‘public face’ of integration.
23 The reference to the welfare system here is my own addition, not mentioned in Ager and Strang’s framework.
24 Ager and Strang, p. 3.
25 See, e.g. Oxfam and Refugee Council, ‘Safe But Not Settled: the impact of family separation on refugees in the UK’
(January 2018).
26 Miller p. 132; and Elizabeth Anderson, The Imperative of Integration (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), p. 116.
27 Ager and Strang, pp. 4, 9-10. Interestingly, Ager and Strang found in their qualitative research with resettled refugee
communities that participants repeatedly stressed the importance of relationships in their integration experience.
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– according to which civic integration involves shared commitment to a set of norms and
principles guiding the pursuit of social and political goals – informal forms of civic
integration may involve increased understanding of political processes, increased sharing of
democratic norms and procedures, and a general sense of feeling welcome to engage in
politics.28 Moreover, in line with Ager and Strang’s discussion, formal elements of civic
integration may involve being entitled to a pathway to citizenship, or experiencing effective
state protection of basic social and political rights on par with members of the host society.29
4. Cultural integration: This final domain refers to the process by which members of distinct
national identities increasingly interact in cultural contexts.30 Depending on the degree of
cultural integration that occurs, this process may result in mutual cultural understanding –
that is, when cultures remain distinct, but their members have a detailed understanding of
the content and value of one another’s cultural practices. Alternatively, this process might
involve mutual cultural merging, resulting in the creation of a new cultural identity shared by
members of previously distinct cultures.31 These processes may occur formally – e.g. through
language-classes and official education about various cultural norms and characteristics in
mainstream schools – or informally, through social interaction that promotes cultural
exchange.

Miller, p. 133.
Ager and Strang, p. 4. Importantly, their qualitative research indicated that attitudes of non-refugees toward refugees,
and refugees toward the integration process, were significantly affected by perceptions of refugee rights and
entitlements.
30 In the context of this discussion, the culture in question is national or societal culture as opposed to a religious, ethnic,
or other more narrow or exclusive culture. For further descriptions of this sort of culture, see e.g. Kymlicka pp. 18-19,
23, 76-77; and Avishai Margalit and Joseph Raz, ‘National Self-Determination’, Journal of Philosophy 87:9 (1990), pp. 442447.
31 Interestingly, while Ager and Strang’s framework does reference the importance of mutual cultural understanding, at
no point do they mention shared cultural identification. Since the purpose of their report is to identify the key factors
that contribute to the process of integration for refugees in the UK, this omission suggests that they do not consider
shared cultural identification necessary for full societal integration.
28
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In addition to these four central domains, I take it that the following is also a particularly important
(though not strictly necessary) background condition for all forms of integration:
•

Fundamental background condition: Refugees must feel safe in the receiving community,
and have a sense that their right to live there is relatively stable. Circumstances that may
promote these sorts of feelings include: absence of both interpersonal and institutional
discrimination and harassment; minimal fear of crime; the preservation of intimate social
connections such as family ties; and being actively welcomed by a local community.32

Though this condition will not be discussed independently, the importance of these sort of
background circumstances will become clearer as the discussion progresses. In particular, in §3.2 I
will argue that absence of these background circumstances may have implications for the content of
obligations to socially integrate; and the particular importance of family ties will be the topic of
discussion in the next chapter.
§3 Integration: Desirability and Obligation
It is often assumed that integration between refugees and members of their host society is desirable.
Consider, for instance, the following commitment from the 2016 New York Declaration for
Refugees and Migrants:
We will take measures to improve [refugees’] integration and inclusion, as appropriate, and
with particular reference to access to education, health care, justice and language training.
[…] National policies relating to integration and inclusion will be developed, as appropriate,
in conjunction with relevant civil society organizations, including faith-based organizations,
the private sector, employers’ and workers’ organizations and other stakeholders.33
However, because of the conceptual confusions outlined in the previous section, it is often unclear
what kinds of outcomes politicians and policymakers actually aim to achieve when they make claims

This condition is inspired by Ager and Strang’s observation that feelings of safety and stability are important
facilitators of general integration for refugees.
33 UN General Assembly, New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants (2016), p. 8 article 39.
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of this sort. Moreover, even when the nature of the proposal in question is relatively clear, it is not
always obvious how to permissibly achieve the stated outcome in non-ideal circumstances in which
hostility towards refugees in the host society is widespread. Consider, for instance, Ghosh’s
observation in the article cited at the opening of §2:
The nations that host [refugees] often face a paradoxical challenge: new arrivals need help to
adjust to life in their host country, but at the same time, they try not to appear too
welcoming, for fear of inspiring xenophobia among the existing population […] Refugees
are asked to leave behind old cultural and social behaviors. At the same time, longtime
residents of these countries may mistrust or even actively fear newcomers. How do you ask
someone to integrate into – and to reshape their identity around – a community that may be
defined by a shared dislike of you?34
The purpose of this section is to provide some initial clarity on these questions. In particular, this
section will offer a normative analysis of the desirability of refugee integration in each domain
identified in §2, generating some general normative guidelines and applying them to concrete
examples to highlight what these principles mean for individuals and states in practice.
3.1 Institutional Integration
Recall from §2 that institutional integration is integration in the formal social institutions of the
receiving state, including the employment, welfare, housing, education and healthcare systems. It will
be productive to begin with this domain, since it is arguably the least normatively controversial area
in which refugee integration occurs. As evidenced by the commitment from the 2016 New York
Declaration, the necessity of this kind of integration is broadly accepted in international circles.
Access to the institutions of the host state is usually necessary for basic rights protection, and host
states have obligations to protect the basic rights of refugees within their borders.
An interesting feature of this domain which is often overlooked is that the institutional
integration rights of refugees may differ dramatically from those of non-refugee immigrants. Many
scholars hold that it is acceptable for states to temporarily deny new immigrants access to

34

Ghosh.
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redistributive social programs like means-tested welfare benefits or social housing.35 Regardless of
whether such practices are in fact acceptable, it is clear that the rationales used to justify these
policies in the non-refugee case are unconvincing when applied to refugees. For instance, Carens
argues that such policies are acceptable because an individual’s moral claim to be treated as a full
member of a society is proportional to duration of residence; and because social insurance programs
are premised on the principle of reciprocity among members, but new immigrants have yet to make
a sufficient contribution.36 However, since everyone has a right to be a member of a political
community somewhere, to be successful, the first part of this argument must be premised on the
assumption that new immigrants retain their membership in their previous state of residence.37 Since
refugees are individuals who have lost functional membership in their home state, it is imperative
that they always be treated as full members, regardless of duration of status. Moreover, there are also
good reasons to reject reciprocity-based arguments for denying refugees access to social programs.
These sorts of policies could buttress the perception that refugees are ‘second-class’ residents in
their host state – which would be a particularly bad outcome given that refuge is designed to protect
individuals from harms like political ostracization and discrimination. Moreover, just pragmatically,
refugees are entitled to sufficient state assistance to secure their basic rights, and full inclusion in
social systems will usually be the best way for states to fulfil this obligation. Finally, evidence
suggests that statistically, refugees tend to make net contributions to their host state’s economy over
time.38 As such, more conservative policymakers can rest assured that refugees will tend to fulfill
more than their share of the reciprocity upon which redistributive social programs are based.

See e.g. Carens, pp. 89, 108.
Carens, pp. 96, 99, 108.
37 The importance of political membership was established in §5 of Chapter II. See also §3.3 below.
38 See, e.g. Philippe Legrain, ‘Refugees Work: A Humanitarian Investment that Yields Economic Dividends’, Tent: Open
Political Economy Network (2016).
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What’s more, there is good reason to think that refugees are entitled to more than just formal
equality of access to welfare support. Citizens and long-term residents have significant advantages
over refugees with regards to these services. They are more likely to understand the processes for
accessing services; have accurate expectations about necessary documentation and waiting times; be
able to successfully navigate complications or barriers to access; and, crucially, long-term residents
typically speak the same language as service providers. When these conditions do not obtain, or
when service-users find themselves in particularly complex circumstances, organizations exist to
support citizens out of recognition that access to these services is particularly crucial for individual
wellbeing.39 For similar reasons, at least for the most essential services, refugees should be entitled to
additional support to ensure they have functionally equal access. This may include introductory
information sessions on accessing welfare services, being accompanied by an advocate when using a
service for the first time, or translation support.
Thus far, I have argued that refugees are entitled to welfare assistance on par with citizens,
and in some circumstances they may be entitled to additional support to facilitate access to essential
services.40 However, one institution of the receiving state – the employment sector – has been left
out of this discussion. There may be good reason to be skeptical of calls for refugee integration here,
for they could (understandably) be conflated with demands from refugee-hostile groups that
refugees “contribute” to the host society in order to “earn their place”. Clearly, such demands are
morally suspect and inconsistent with the fact that, in international law, all individuals who meet the

Consider, for instance, Citizens Advice in the UK.
It might be objected here that the fact that responsibility to facilitate integration in this domain falls entirely on
institutions of the host state contradicts the claim that integration is a two-way process. However, it is important to recall
that this requirement does not mean that all sides must “meet in the middle”. What integration requires of refugees and
their host societies depends on contextual features. It is entirely appropriate that the institutions of the host society bear
most responsibility for facilitating institutional integration, because in this particular domain, state institutions provide
services that are essential for individual wellbeing, and necessary for the state to meet minimal requirements of justice.
39
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conditions for refugeehood are unconditionally entitled to asylum.41 As Dina Nayeri – an Iranian
author who, as a child, received refuge in the USA – puts this point, ‘civilized people don’t ask for
resumes when answering calls from the edge of a grave’.42
However, recognizing the value of refugee integration into the employment sector need not
involve buying into this problematic “refugees must contribute” rhetoric. Employment is valuable
for a number of reasons: studies repeatedly connect employment with improved mental health – for
instance, because work is an important component of our self-conception, and facilitates the
creation of social connections.43 Moreover, engaging in at least some kinds of productive work can
help create a sense of autonomy and independence, and can yield greater financial security than is
available on welfare support alone. As such, refugees should have the right to work equal to that of
citizens if they choose to do so. Moreover, for the reasons outlined above, states may have
obligations to provide refugees with additional support in the form of CV-writing workshops or
employment-focused language training to ensure functional equality of access to work. Finally, it
should be emphasized that full integration in the employment sector has only occurred if refugees
secure jobs comparable to those they occupied before displacement – all else being equal.44 That is,
if a former surgeon is now working as a lab assistant, full integration has not yet occurred. Liberal
principles of justice require equality of opportunity, and if refugees systematically obtain less well-

This is not strictly true – the Refugee Convention and Protocol include a very limited set of conditions for
refugeehood in order to ensure that refugees do not pose a serious threat to the security of their host state. However,
any individual who has received refugee status will have proven that they do not satisfy these conditions, and beyond
this, refuge-provision must be unconditional.
42 Nayeri, p. 147. Indeed, Nayeri also highlights that demands for refugees to “earn their place” frequently come from a
place of hostility and prejudice, for the same people who demand this of refugees also resent refugees who are “too”
successful: ‘You’re not enough until you’re too much. You’re lazy until you’re a greedy interloper.’
43 See, e.g. J. Evans and J. Repper, ‘Employment, Social Inclusion, and Mental Health’, Journal of Psychiatric and Mental
Health Nursing 7 (2000), pp. 15-16.
44 To be clear, the ‘all else being equal’ standard here should accommodate concerns about regional differences in
licensing requirements. It is to be expected that refugees, like all migrants, may be expected to undergo some additional
training to obtain local licenses or become familiarized with local practices and standards. Still, there is reason to be
concerned if these requirements, or any other circumstance in the host state, creates significant barriers to entry for
otherwise well-qualified refugees.
41
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paid or prestigious jobs in their host state, this is evidence that full integration has not occurred and
conditions of justice have not yet been fulfilled.45
The discussion in this section indicates that institutional integration is morally desirable, and
places strict obligations on the host state to facilitate access to work, education, healthcare, housing,
and welfare for refugees. Because liberal standards of justice require that all individuals have access
to a social minimum, and because employment is an important facilitator of social connections,
welfare, and autonomy, refugees are entitled to support from their host state to ensure full,
functional access to these social systems.
3.2 Social Integration
Now, I will turn to a more complex project: assessing the moral desirability of social integration. As
outlined in §2, social integration occurs when individuals frequently interact with one another in a
range of contexts on terms of equality. Moreover, social integration can be either intra-group – as
when refugees integrate with members of the host society with whom they share similar experiences
and identities – or inter-group – when refugees form social connections with culturally, ethnically,
religiously and experientially dissimilar individuals.
It is relatively uncontroversial that some form of social integration is morally desirable. For
most people, social relationships are an important part of life, are necessary for stable mental health,
and can be instrumental in overcoming trauma.46 In practice, intra-group social connections are
usually most accessible and arise most naturally – for it is simply easier to make friends with
individuals who share our language and social cues, and who understand our experiences and values.

Of course, there are other complicating factors here – history of trauma, for instance, may impact employment rates
for legitimate reasons. These should be taken into account (by comparing with comparable individuals in the receiving
population) when measuring for equality of opportunity.
46 For refugee-specific examples of this, see e.g. Navjot K. Lamba and Harvey Krahn, ‘Social Capital and Refugee
Resettlement: The Social Networks of Refugees in Canada’, Journal of International Migration and Integration 4:3 (2003), pp.
335-360; and Karen Wells, ‘The Strength of Weak Ties: The Social Networks of Young Separated Asylum Seekers in
London’, Children’s Geographies 9:3-4 (2011), pp. 319-329.
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As such, for refugees who do not form such bonds, where there is good reason to think that this
may be significantly detrimental to their wellbeing, it is acceptable for social workers or other official
state agents to (non-coercively) promote intra-group social interaction. This is not a refugee-specific
practice: non-refugee individuals who become dangerously isolated are also encouraged to attend
community events and develop social connections. Moreover, because of the value of intra-group
social interaction for both individual wellbeing and effective state functioning, states may have
obligations to fund community projects which facilitate this for affected individuals including (but
not limited to) newly-arrived refugees.
However, the question of whether inter-group social integration is desirable is significantly
more complex. In his work, Miller offers two reasons to think that the social integration of
immigrants is instrumentally valuable. First, he argues that social integration is often instrumental to
social and economic justice, for ‘communities are never in reality “separate but equal”’. 47 Second, he
argues that social integration is valuable insofar as it promotes trust among members of a society –
for members of poorly integrated communities are ‘less likely to understand, to communicate with,
and to trust one another’, making it harder to solve conflicts when they arise. Moreover, reasons to
think inter-group social integration might be valuable can also be found in Jorge Portilla’s account of
the harms associated with living in a divided society in mid-20th century Mexico, recently
reconstructed by Francisco Gallegos. According to Portilla, at this time in Mexico’s history there was
no shared ‘horizon of understanding’ to unite members of society in a community, and the result
was a feeling of ‘zozobra’ – a kind of existential anxiety, ‘a painful and peculiar sense of not being at
home in the world’.48 Portilla argued that an environment of this sort tends to produce three kinds
Miller, p. 134.
Francesco Gallegos, ‘Surviving Social Disintegration: Jorge Portilla and the Phenomenon of Zozobra’, APA Newsletter:
Hispanic/Latino Issues in Philosophy 17:2 (2018), p. 3; and Jorge Portilla, ‘Community, Greatness, and Misery in Mexican
Life (1949)’, Mexican Philosophy in the 20th Century: Essential Readings ed. by Carlos Alberto Sanchez and Robert Eli Sanchez
Jr. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), pp. 178-195. To be clear: Portilla was describing the experience of living in
a deeply fragmented society. He believed there were benefits to living in a partly multicultural society – e.g. it gave rise to
47
48
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of behavior. First, social action becomes harder, because the lack of shared norms and customs
makes it difficult to anticipate how actions will be received by others, which is deeply ‘disorienting’. 49
Second, zozobra tends to give rise to cynicism as a form of self-defense, sometimes manifested as a
tendency towards introversion, sentimentality and nostalgia for the past. Third, because loss of a
sense of community tends to reduce one’s feeling of security, individuals tend to develop a
‘profound sense of the fragility and contingency of life’. 50
Portilla and Miller’s insights provide principled reasons to think that a socially integrated
society is better for the basic welfare of individuals and the well-functioning of the state than a
socially segregated one. Even so, however, this does not necessarily mean that states should promote
social interaction between refugees and host communities in actual, non-ideal contexts. To see why,
it will be worthwhile to turn to a nearby discussion in the philosophy of race. In The Imperative of
Integration, Elizabeth Anderson argues that racial integration in the contemporary USA is a moral
imperative because it is a necessary condition for ending unjust racial inequalities. Not only does she
endorse state policies promoting integration in various areas of social life, she also holds that
integration is not achievable by law and policy alone, and so individuals – both black and white –
have non-optional moral obligations to integrate.51 However, in response to Anderson, Tommie
Shelby has compellingly argued that black self-segregation – particularly residential self-segregation –
is not incompatible with justice.52 Shelby points out that black communities have very legitimate
reasons to engage in this kind of self-segregation and social closure: for self-segregation enables
black individuals to avoid interpersonal discrimination and interracial conflict; protects shared

the ‘normative freedom’ to alter the norms and concepts that give action meaning. Empirically speaking, most wealthy
refugee-hosting states most likely fall into the former category. Even so, Portilla’s analysis helpfully describes the nature
of the responses that can arise when socio-cultural groups unfamiliar with one another’s norms live side by side, even in
multicultural contexts.
49 Gallegos, p. 4.
50 Ibid., pp. 4-5.
51 Anderson, p. 189.
52 Shelby, pp. 269-272.
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interests and expresses social solidarity in a society in which black people are systematically
disadvantaged and racially marginalized; and, moreover, it is also understandable that individuals
may simply desire to live in an area that better caters to black preferences and interests.53 Thus, black
individuals have both positive and negative incentives to live in black-majority neighborhoods, for
self-segregation is a means of avoiding harms in a racially unjust society, and there are also positive
incentives to self-segregate which are reasonable for individuals to act on. For all these reasons,
Shelby rejects Anderson’s argument that black individuals have non-optional moral obligations to
integrate. Instead, Shelby endorses ‘egalitarian pluralism’ as a response to racial injustice, which
requires formal desegregation and economic fairness, but does not mandate integration or proscribe
voluntary self-segregation.54
Shelby’s arguments in response to Anderson’s call for interracial integration could equally
apply to calls for inter-group social integration between refugees and long-term residents in realworld conditions. Refugees hosted in affluent democratic societies are also often subject to
interpersonal discrimination when they engage in inter-group social interaction – either in virtue of
their refugee status, or because they are members or minority ethnic or religious groups. As Shelby’s
analysis indicates, in such contexts, refugees have both negative and positive incentives to selfsegregate as a means of avoiding some of the worse harms of discrimination, and as a mechanism
for protecting opportunities to engage in shared cultural or religious practices.55 As Shelby’s
arguments demonstrate, these desires are entirely reasonable and compatible with justice.56

Shelby, pp. 268-272.
Ibid., p. 274.
55 Of course, there are important differences between the circumstances of refugees in wealthy host countries and black
communities in the USA. In contexts where there is not a sufficiently large community with whom refugees share an
identity, refugees simply will not have the option to self-segregate. In these circumstances where opportunities for intragroup social connection are minimal, it is possible that inter-group social integration could become more of imperative.
56 Interestingly, Carens makes a similar point in his discussion of immigrant integration, highlighting that immigrants
may have positive and/or negative incentives to live alongside other immigrants in separate neighborhoods. See Carens,
p. 81.
53
54
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Ultimately, then, the question of whether inter-group social integration between refugees and
dissimilar members of the host community generates obligations for individuals or host states is a
particularly difficult one. On the one hand, Miller and Portilla’s analyses suggest that there is good
reason to think that social integration is, in principle, desirable. On the other, it is entirely reasonable
for refugees to want to self-segregate, particularly in contexts where they are likely to experience
hostility or discrimination from areas of the receiving population. Altogether, this suggests that
although all members of society may have pro tanto moral obligations to engage in inter-group social
integration, refugees have no such obligations in non-ideal contexts of relatively widespread hostility
towards them. Instead, in such circumstances, the obligation falls entirely on the institutions of the
state and members of the host society who are not the subject of discrimination to challenge antirefugee prejudice – both because this is a moral requirement in itself, and because it is necessary to
achieve the conditions in which inter-group social integration can occur.57
3.3 Civic Integration
Civic integration consists of integration in the formal and informal political institutions of the
receiving state. At first glance, this form of integration may appear to share many similarities with
the kinds of institutional integration discussed in §3.1 – that is, it may seem uncontroversial that
refugees are entitled to civic integration, and that states have obligations to facilitate civic integration
for refugees. In what follows, I will argue that this is true for the most commonly-discussed element
of civic integration: the right to citizenship. However, as the discussion proceeds, it will become

Here, my proposal differs from Carens’s recommendations for responding to anti-immigrant hostility. Carens suggests
that in such contexts, states should impose anti-discrimination laws, and may optionally create non-coercive incentives
for immigrants to ‘participate in mainstream institutions and engage with other citizens (pp. 81-82). However, while
Carens’s former recommendation is clearly advisable, his latter recommendation is not, both because social integration
into a hostile environment may be dangerous for immigrants and refugees, and because his suggestion that incentives be
directed at immigrants alone is in conflict with the requirement that integration be a two-way process.
57
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clear that other forms of civic integration are deeply tied up with complex cultural questions, and as
such, some matters of civic integration are less straightforward.
First, though, to the question of citizenship. As outlined in the introduction of this chapter,
there is broad consensus in the philosophical literature that all migrants – including refugees –
should be entitled to citizenship after a sufficiently long period of residence.58 I take it that there are
good reasons to accept this view, particularly in the case of refugees. As discussed in Chapter II,
refugees are individuals who have lost effective political membership in their country of nationality,
and as Hannah Arendt’s analysis of the experience of forced displacement highlights, this is a
distinctive kind of harm – at least in a world like ours where states bear primary responsibility for
human rights protection.59 Moreover, international law already goes some way towards recognizing
this, as the right to nationality is guaranteed in a number of human rights instruments. 60 So, because
possession of functional citizenship is so important, and because the asylum-providing country is the
natural entity to provide refugees with new citizenship, refugees should be entitled to citizenship in
their host state after a sufficiently lengthy period of residence. Moreover, because it is especially
important that refugees be able to access new citizenship, barriers to citizenship should be minimal
for refugees.61 For instance, if citizenship tests must exist, they should be implemented in a way that
does not make naturalization prohibitive for refugees, and states should remove unnecessary
financial or bureaucratic barriers to citizenship for refugees – such as the requirement in the US that
refugees first become Legal Permanent Residents before naturalizing, regardless of how long they
have resided in the US with refugee status.62

See Peter Higgins, pp. 2-3.
Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich: New York, 1973), pp. 296-297.
60 UDHR (article 15), CRC (article 7).
61 Here, I remain neutral on whether it is permissible for states to implement relatively demanding barriers to citizenship
for long-term immigrants. I only mean to suggest here that even if such barriers are acceptable in the case of immigrants,
it is not acceptable to implement such barriers for refugees.
62 This is important because evidence suggests that such tests do not incentivize integration for future citizens as states
sometimes claim, but rather they create barriers to entry or naturalization which target “less desirable” categories of
58
59
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Altogether, then, the consensus view that refugees should have access to citizenship after a
sufficient period of residence in their host state is well-supported. Having established this, I will now
turn to a more controversial issue of civic integration: whether it is desirable that refugees and host
citizens develop a shared commitment to democratic principles and norms.
In his work on the integration of immigrants, Joseph Carens emphasizes the importance of a
‘democratic ethos’ for effective state functioning, where a democratic ethos exists when ‘most of the
citizens accept democratic values and principles’ and ‘reflect these commitments in their attitudes
and dispositions’.63 Carens argues that a democratic ethos is valuable because widespread acceptance
of the moral legitimacy of democratic principles is a basis for regulating public life – and as such, all
members of democratic societies have moral obligations to live up to their state’s democratic ethos. 64
Throughout the chapter, Carens is careful to insist that these obligations apply to all members of
society, and that non-immigrants and immigrants alike may sometimes fall short of the relevant
standards. For instance, while immigrants may have obligations to familiarize themselves with the
norms guiding public life in their host society, nonimmigrants may have work to do to challenge
xenophobic, racist, or other prejudiced tendencies they may have that violate their own democratic
norms.
Because a stable democratic ethos is politically valuable, Carens argues that states may
permissibly promote democratic behaviors via informal social norms – that is, by encouraging
members to expect one another to conform to the principles of the democratic ethos, and endorsing
social disapproval when democratic norms are violated. 65 However, Carens offers just one specific
example of an acceptable mechanism to achieve this outcome: civic education for all children,

immigrant. See Sara Wallace Goodman, ‘Integration Requirements for Integration’s Sake? Identifying, Categorising, and
Comparing Civic Integration Policies’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 36:5 (2010), pp. 753-772.
63 Carens, p. 64.
64 Ibid., pp. 64, 79.
65 Ibid., pp. 71-72.
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immigrant and nonimmigrant alike. While this policy suggestion is reasonable, it does not address
the considerably more difficult question about whether civic education for adults is advisable. This
question is particularly pressing because civic education programs for adult immigrants are currently
being implemented real-world contexts, and debates about the acceptability of these programs are
fraught.
For example, in Stravanger, Norway, following a spike in rape cases allegedly connected to
the immigrant community in the city, it was mandated that new immigrants and refugees take social
values classes on gender norms and the treatment of women.66 These classes are now compulsory
for all asylum seekers, and failure to attend results in welfare payments being sanctioned. 67 Per Isdal,
a clinical psychologist associated with the foundation that developed the program, defended the
requirements on the basis of the idea that many refugees ‘come from cultures that are not gender
equal and where women are the property of men’, and in these conditions, ‘the biggest danger for
everyone is silence’.68 However, the classes have also been heavily criticized, with opponents arguing
that they perpetuate the harmful stereotype that refugees and immigrants are sexually dangerous – a
stereotype often touted by xenophobes and opponents of immigration and refugee rights to fuel
hostility and justify their desire to exclude outsiders.69 Moreover, participants in the program
describe classes as patronizing, one-sided, and ineffective. For instance, in one class, a participant
objected: ‘So you’re saying we shouldn’t stare at women in short dresses? But equally some
Norwegians look at women who wear traditional hijab and assume they’re ignorant and backward.
We have to learn – but they also have to learn about us too.’70 In the same class, another participant
expressed skepticism about whether the classes could effectively change deeply-rooted values and
Andrew Higgins, ‘Norway Offers Migrants a Lesson in How to Treat Women’, New York Times (Dec 19, 2015).
Jenny Kleeman, Tom Silverstone, and Mustafa Khalili ‘Norway’s Muslim Immigrants Attend Classes on Western
Attitudes to Women’, The Guardian (Aug 1, 2016).
68 Andrew Higgins.
69 Kleeman et al.
70 Ibid.
66
67

118

Chapter IV | Integration

behaviors: ‘You understand our culture wrong and we understand your culture wrong. We need
time. One hour is not enough to discuss everything.’ Moreover, a female participant from Qatar
indicated that even if the classes compelled participants to behave differently around Norwegian
women, treatment of immigrant women would remain unchanged: ‘No eastern man can be changed
by a Norwegian class he goes to every Thursday. For example, an Arab man might approach me and
say, “Why are you dressed like that? It’s wrong. It’s not decent.” Would he dare say the same thing
to a Norwegian woman? No one will change.’71
These responses provide just an initial indication of how deeply challenging it is to promote
a democratic ethos among adults in an effective and morally acceptable manner. On the one hand, if
Carens is right to suggest that a democratic ethos plays an important role in regulating public life,
this lends weight to Isdal’s suggestion that silence is dangerous. On the other hand, comments from
participants in Norway’s social values classes which suggest that they are ineffective, patronizing,
and in violation of the requirement that integration be a two-way process should give policymakers
serious reason to pause. Importantly, participants’ responses also suggest a diagnosis for why the
classes have this effect: because, in practice, the political cannot be neatly separated from the
cultural. This complicates Carens’s claim that states may use coercive measures to promote a
democratic ethos – for it is much less clear that states may permissibly use coercive measures to
influence their members’ culture. As such, guidelines on when it is permissible for states to
coercively discourage or promote certain cultural practices are necessary for determining whether
any particular intervention is permissible.
For guidance navigating these difficult cultural questions, it will be instructive to turn to a
related debate in the multiculturalism literature. In a now-famous article in the Boston Review, Susan
Moller Okin argues that from a feminist perspective, it may be desirable that some cultures either
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become extinct or be encouraged to change – a pair of outcomes which she takes to be in conflict
with the commitments of multiculturalism.72 Even if multiculturalists only require that (overtly)
internally liberal cultures be tolerated, Okin argues, more subtle forms of discrimination may
continue to exist within tolerated cultures.73 Applied to the example of social values classes in
Norway, Okin’s recommendations suggest that if refugees and immigrants did in fact tend to hold
objectionable cultural attitudes towards women, and these classes effectively prompted them to
develop more liberal attitudes – which is, of course, yet to be demonstrated – the Norwegian state’s
practice of mandating attendance for new refugees and migrants would be acceptable.
However, a number critics have offered some compelling objections to Okin’s argument.
Bonnie Honig, for instance, warns that while Okin might be right to be concerned that
multiculturalism could weaken feminists’ recent gains, feminists themselves also need to be wary of
promoting xenophobic attitudes when critiquing multiculturalist policies.74 Acknowledging the twosided nature of this discussion, Honig argues that while some cultures may need to change, feminists
must also be careful to scrutinize their own practices and prejudices – for instance, by making
conscious efforts to listen to a plurality of female voices.75 As if to prove Honig’s point, Azizah Y.
al-Hibri points out that many of Okin’s assumptions about immigrants’ attitudes and cultural
practices are ill-informed – for instance, because they are based on false interpretations of Islam –
and argues that Okin’s suggestion that all women who choose to adopt traditional religions are
opting for an ‘oppressed’ lifestyle is itself patriarchal and condescending.76 Moreover, against Okin’s
suggestion that complete elimination of a culture might be desirable in some cases, Yael Tamir

Susan Moller Okin, Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?, ed. by Joshua Cohen, Matthew Howard, and Martha C.
Nussbaum (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), pp. 22-23.
73 Ibid., p. 22.
74 Bonnie Honig, ‘“My Culture Made Me Do It”’, in Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?, pp. 35-36.
75 Ibid., pp. 38-40.
76 Azizah Y. Al-Hibri, ‘Is Western Patriarchal Feminism Good For Third World/Minority Women?’, in Is Multiculturalism
Bad for Women?, pp. 42, 44-45.
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warns that it is dangerous and marginalizing to view unfamiliar cultures as static, insisting that
change from within is possible for all cultures.77 Finally, Abdullahi An-Na’im insists on the
importance of viewing the tension between feminism and multiculturalism from a broader human
rights perspective, emphasizing that a focus on gender in isolation may have detrimental effects for
other human rights.78
These criticisms of Okin’s argument highlight some important factors states must consider
when developing policies promoting a democratic ethos and challenging illiberal practices within
cultures. Crucially, they suggest that states must not lose sight of the fact that integration is a two-way
process: for state agents tend to be more familiar with the majority culture in their society, and are
often desensitized to the discriminatory elements within that culture. As al-Hibri and An-Na’im
suggest, listening to the voices of cultural minorities and adopting a holistic approach to cultivating a
democratic ethos may enable policymakers to become more sensitive to the fact that illiberal
practices continue to exist in various forms across cultures.
Importantly, though, none of this suggests that policies promoting a democratic ethos can
never be acceptable. As Carens emphasizes, a stable democratic ethos is politically valuable; and
Okin’s critics primarily object to the examples she uses to support her argument – not her
fundamental claim that cultures must work to remove their internally illiberal elements. However,
these criticisms do suggest that states should be very careful when devising and implementing such
policies – particularly for refugees, who do not have the option to return to their home state in order
to practice their culture. Consolidating insights from the participants in Norway’s social values
classes and Okin’s critics, the following is an initial sketch of some guidelines states should follow
when seeking to promote a democratic ethos:

Yael Tamir, ‘Siding With the Underdogs’, in Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?, p. 51.
Abdullahi An-Na’im, ‘Promises We Should All Keep In Common Cause’, in Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?, pp. 6061.
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1. As far as possible, policies promoting a democratic ethos should not single out particular
minority communities. Policymakers should be cognizant of the ways in which long-term
residents and refugees and immigrants alike fall short of the state’s aspired democratic goals,
as well as the harms that can be done when minority groups alone are singled out for falling
short of this standard. Moving beyond a single-issue approach, and designing interventions
which include all members of society, may be effective ways to achieve this outcome.79
2. Because cultural values and behaviors are deep-rooted, short-term attempts to influence
attitudes and behaviors will be ineffective at best, and coercively mandating participation in
such programs – such as by sanctioning welfare payments in the event of non-participation –
is usually unacceptable. As such, where possible, states should use long-term, non-coercive
methods to promote a democratic ethos. Such measures might include inter-group political
exchange and deliberation, or mindful use of public persuasion – that is, rhetoric and
example-setting by political leaders.80
3. Any measures taken to promote a democratic ethos must be dignity- and autonomypreserving for all groups involved. When interventions for one group are designed by
another, there is significant risk that the resulting program will be based on an inaccurate
understanding of the other cultural group and, as a result, stigmatizing, patronizing, and
ineffective. In order to ensure that this does not occur, members from all communities
affected should be included, or at the very least consulted, during the creation of an
intervention.

I leave open the possibility here that in truly emergency situations it may be permissible to target particular groups. For
instance, when violence is used to discriminatory ends, it may be acceptable for states to require those individuals
convicted of committing that violence to be educated.
80 This account of public persuasion comes from Martha Nussbaum, ‘Towards a Globally Sensitive Patriotism’, Dædalus
(2008), p. 83.
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3.4 Cultural Integration
In the previous section, it was established that states may permissibly discourage illiberal or antidemocratic cultural attitudes and practices – though they should be very careful when doing so.
Now, in this section, I will consider whether integration across distinct internally liberal cultures is also
desirable. First, I will explain what is meant by a national or societal culture, and why this form of
culture is sometimes said to be valuable. Then, I will identify the extent to which refugees are
entitled to claim protection and accommodation of their cultural rights against their host state. With
this baseline understanding of refugees’ cultural rights established, I will then turn to the question of
whether cultural integration is morally desirable – and if so, whether states can permissibly promote
this kind of integration.81
3.4.1 Refugees’ Cultural Entitlements
The type of culture that is the subject of discussion in this section is national culture – roughly what
Will Kymlicka refers to as ‘societal culture’, typically possessed by what Avishai Margalit and Joseph
Raz call ‘encompassing groups’.82 This sort of culture covers a wide variety of important aspects of
human activity: occupations, pursuits, and relationships in both the public and private spheres,
including social, educational, religious, recreational, and economic life.83 Such cultures are typically
geographically concentrated, have a historical nature, are based on a shared language, and are
expressed through shared institutions and practices.84 Cultures of this sort are deemed to be valuable
for individuals’ wellbeing because they are not only practiced across a wide range of life options, but

In the discussion that follows, I will sometimes use language which suggests that there is only one culture within the
host state into which refugees might integrate. Of course, this is not true of many contemporary states. However, for the
purposes of this discussion, the reader can assume that the culture in question is the dominant culture within the state or
region in which the refugee is located, which may or may not be the majority national culture of that state. E.g. for
refugees hosted in Quebec, the culture in question would be Quebecois culture, not Anglophone Canadian culture.
82 Kymlicka, p. 76; Margalit and Raz, p. 448.
83 Kymlicka, p. 76; Margalit and Raz, p. 443.
84 Kymlicka, p. 76; Margalit and Raz, p. 445.
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because they also give those options meaning: individuals’ tastes and opportunities are provided by
their culture.85 As Margalit and Raz put this point:
Family relations, all other social relations between people, careers, leisure activities, the arts,
sciences, and other obvious products of "high culture" are the fruits of society. They all
depend for their existence on the sharing of patterns of expectations, on traditions
preserving implicit knowledge of how to do what, of tacit conventions regarding what is part
of this or that enterprise and what is not, what is appropriate and what is not, what is
valuable and what is not. Familiarity with a culture determines the boundaries of the
imaginable. Sharing in a culture, being part of it, determines the limits of the feasible.86
Because culture is the basis for meaningful human action, it is very costly to move to a culturally
dissimilar place. As John Rawls, for instance, writes:
…normally leaving one’s country is a grave step: it involves leaving the society and culture in
which we have been raised, the society and culture whose language we use in speech and
thought to express and understand ourselves, our aims, goals, and values; the society and
culture whose history, customs and conventions we depend on to find our place in the social
world. 87
Out of recognition of the deep value of culture for individuals, as well as the costs associated with
lack of opportunities to practice one’s culture, multiculturalist liberal scholars have compellingly
argued that cultural minorities should be entitled to reasonable accommodations – sometimes
described as ‘group-differentiated rights’ – to ensure that their members are not disadvantaged
compared to members of the majority culture.88 Common examples of these sorts of
accommodations include exceptions to uniform policies to accommodate religious dress, or laws
accommodating cultural and religious minorities in the designation of public holidays. 89
A more controversial question, though, is whether refugees are also collectively entitled to
the resources and self-government powers necessary to re-create their societal culture in their host

Kymlicka, p. 76; Margalit and Raz, p. 448; Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (London: Harvard University Press,
1985), pp. 232-3.
86 Margalit and Raz, pp. 448-449.
87 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 222. See also Margalit and Raz, p. 444,
for another expression of this point.
88 See, for instance, Kymlicka, pp. 108-115.
89 Ibid., pp. 114-115.
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state.90 For both practical and principled reasons, Kymlicka denies that states are obliged to provide
such accommodations to immigrant communities.91 Immigrants have the option to stay in their
original culture, he argues, and as such, they waive their right to live and work in their own culture
when they voluntarily move to their new state. Moreover, just as a matter of practicality, most
existing immigrant groups are too dispersed to exercise self-government.92 However, Kymlicka
acknowledges that refugees are unlike immigrants in the former of these respects: they do not
voluntarily migrate, and they do not have the option to return to their home country to practice their
culture. In fact, refugees sometimes require asylum precisely because they were oppressed for
practicing their culture in their home state. It is surprising, then, that although Kymlicka admits that
refugees are in principle entitled to replicate their culture elsewhere, he concludes that refugee-hosting
states should not be obliged to enable refugees to replicate their culture in their new society.93 While
refugees are entitled to the option to live somewhere that they can fully practice their culture,
Kymlicka argues, the obligation-bearer corresponding to this right is their state of nationality, and
that state is the one who wrongs refugees by depriving them of these conditions. Since there is no
mechanism for identifying which other country should remedy this injustice, and because states
would be less likely to accept refugees if they had such obligations, Kymlicka concludes that the

To be clear: under this proposal, refugee communities would obtain the status of a full national minority, comparable
to the status of francophone Quebecois in Canada. Kymlicka distinguishes between ethnic minorities – primarily
voluntary immigrants and their descendants – who do not possess strong cultural rights; and national minorities – selfgoverning, territorially concentrated cultural groups, such as indigenous peoples – who do possess strong cultural rights
to e.g. self-determination. Kymlicka explicitly acknowledges that refugees are a ‘hard case’, as they do not neatly fit into
either the national minority or the voluntary immigrant category. See pp. 10-26. Also, for a related argument, see Cara
Nine’s discussion of territorial rights for climate-compromised nations. Nine argues that states facing future complete
loss of territory due to climate change should be entitled to new territory elsewhere in order to continue to function as a
state. Migration rights alone would be insufficient, Nine argues, because although individual political rights would be
protected, the community would lose their distinctive self-determination rights. See Cara Nine, ‘Ecological Refugees,
State Borders, and the Lockean Proviso’, Journal of Applied Philosophy 27:4 (2010), pp. 359-375.
91 Kymlicka, pp. 95-96.
92 Ibid., p. 96.
93 Ibid., p. 98.
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‘best refugees can reasonably expect’ is that they receive cultural rights on par with immigrants, and
hope to be returned to their homeland at some point in the future.
Kymlicka’s suggestion that refugee-hosting states may not have obligations to enable
refugees to replicate their culture is both questionable and surprising, given that Kymlicka clearly
recognizes the deep value of culture for individual wellbeing and autonomy. A more plausible
account of refugee cultural rights would suggest that when refugees’ rights to practice their culture
are violated by their home state, the international community’s residual obligation to protect these
rights is activated. On this more plausible view, by failing to create a mechanism for distributing
obligations to fulfil refugees’ cultural rights across states – at least where this is practically possible –
the international community are failing in their obligations to refugees.94 In the meantime, because
the most natural entity to fulfil the cultural rights of any given refugee is their host state, it is also
natural to say that such states have de facto obligations to fulfil refugee cultural rights.95
All this being said, however, while Kymlicka’s suggestion that refugee-hosting states do not
have obligations to enable refugees to replicate their culture is questionable, his claim that requests
for full replication of refugee culture in the host state will rarely arise in practice is plausible. It is true
that in non-ideal contexts in which states are failing to fulfil even their most basic obligations to
admit their fair share of refugees, policymakers and refugee communities may recognize that it is
inadvisable to make these additional claims against refugee-hosting states. Moreover, even if states

Here, I am again appeal to the idea outlined in fn. 70 of Chapter 1 that ‘manifesto rights’ without a clear obligationbearer generate imperfect duties for a collective group, and that problems of imperfect-duty-enforcement are practical in
nature because taking ‘manifesto rights’ seriously requires that these duties be ‘made perfect’ via a mechanism of
distribution. See Onora O’Neill, ‘Transnational Justice’, in David Held (ed.) Political Theory Today (Stanford, California:
Stanford University Press, 1991), pp. 276-304, 286-287; and Kok-Chor Tan, Justice Without Borders (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 51.
95 Of course, there will be some ‘red lines’ here. Cultural practices that violate liberal principles of individual autonomy
and respect for basic rights – like FGM or forced marriage – should not be tolerated. As Kymlicka aptly puts this point,
the liberal principle of tolerance is dependent on the more fundamental principle of autonomy (pp. 152-172). However,
as became apparent in the preceding discussion when identifying and drawing these red lines, policymakers must be
particularly careful to avoid essentializing refugee cultures, or holding refugee cultures to a higher standard than their
own.
94
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were willing to make this option available, it is unclear whether refugee communities – which are
typically small and geographically dispersed – would claim it.96 For both of these reasons, in practice,
questions of cultural replication for refugees will rarely actually arise. Even still, however, it is
important to emphasize that refugees have this very strong entitlement to fully replicate their culture
in their country of asylum. This is a powerful argument against policies with assimilationist
tendencies, and as such, all discussions concerning refugee cultural integration should begin from
recognition of this principle.
3.4.2 Cultural Integration
Having established that refugees have very robust cultural entitlements in their host country, I turn
now to an assessment of the desirability of cultural integration in contexts where full replication of
culture is not requested. David Miller plausibly indicates that this is the most controversial of all the
integration domains.97 As Leti Volpp points out, discussions about cultural integration frequently
begin from a perspective of cultural racism which essentializes cultures and places them in
hierarchies, promoting the assumption that ‘our culture is superior to theirs’.98 As emphasized in the
previous section, it is imperative that these false assumptions be recognized and debunked. Still,
though, the fact that discussions of cultural integration frequently begin from a problematic
perspective need not mean that calls for cultural integration are necessarily problematic. As outlined in
§2, cultural integration occurs by degrees, and while it might be controversial to suggest that
individuals must share a culture, the more moderate claim that mutual cultural understanding is
valuable is significantly more plausible.
Kymlicka, p. 98.
Miller, p. 133.
98 Volpp further suggests that these beliefs are a result of a problematic metanarrative of the self and the other, whereby
the host society is defined as progressive, democratic, civilized and feminist, while immigrants are conceptualized as
backward, barbaric, primitive, and misogynist. See Leti Volpp, ‘Engendering Culture: Citizenship, Identity, and
Belonging’, in Citizenship, Borders, and Human Needs ed. by Rogers M. Smith (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 2011), pp. 177-8. For a further discussion of cultural racism, see Frantz Fanon, Toward the African Revolution, trans.
Haakon Chevalier (New York: Grove Press, 1988), pp. 31-35.
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For instance, for one thing, it is likely that when refugees and culturally dissimilar members
of the host society have an appreciation for the content and value of each other’s culture, this would
increase intergroup trust and understanding, and would help to minimize the prevalence of hostility
towards refugees. Moreover, some of the reasons outlined in §3.2 for the value of social integration
could also suggest that there is something valuable about living in society in which all members
share a societal culture. For instance, just as Miller suggests that social integration is valuable for
social justice, so too does Kymlicka argues that ‘the sort of solidarity essential for a welfare state
requires that citizens have a strong sense of common identity and common membership, so that
they will make sacrifices for each other’.99 Now, at least in the absence of proper empirical evidence,
there is reason to doubt Kymlicka’s claim here that shared societal culture is essential for a
functioning welfare state – but the idea that shared culture could be helpful for this is clearly much
more plausible. However, because individuals have at least pro tanto duties to support the functioning
of redistributive institutions within their state, admitting of this more plausible claim would generate
pro tanto obligations for all members of society – refugees and non-refugees alike – to proactively
seek out opportunities to engage in cultural exchange; and would also suggest that states may
permissibly incentivize refugees and host communities to engage in cultural exchange, for instance,
by financing community cultural exchange events, or giving cultural minorities platforms through
which to share their culture publicly.100
To be clear: although these obligations are grounded in the value of a shared societal culture,
individuals would only have pro tanto obligations to learn about one another’s culture, not to directly
work to develop a shared culture. Given the deep value of culture for individuals, it would be
Kymlicka, p. 77.
It is not objectionable to recognize that refugees may have obligations of this sort. Because these duties derive from
the obligation to contribute to the stability of the democratic society in which you reside, recognizing that refugees have
such duties is simply to recognize their political rights and autonomy. Moreover, it bears emphasizing that the duties in
question are pro tanto. Countervailing reasons – such as risk of discrimination – can outweigh obligations to engage in
cultural exchange.
99
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objectionable to require people to give up their culture and develop a new one. What’s more, such
efforts would likely be ineffective – for genuine solidarity-promoting cultures that individuals truly
value and identify with almost always develop organically. Instead, then, individuals would have only
pro tanto obligations to engage in modest practices of cultural exchange and mutual understanding,
because this would likely yield some of the benefits of trust and solidarity just described, and
because it may expedite the process of cultural integration which tends to occur naturally over time
when immigrant groups arrive in a culturally dissimilar country.101
Given the current state of most refugee-hosting countries, it is likely that most refugees
already fulfil these types of duties within a relatively short time after arriving in their host state – for
knowledge of the culture of the host country is generally practically necessary for navigating life in
their new country. As such, recognizing such duties, if they do exist, will most likely not make the
process of moving to a new country particularly more demanding for refugees. Instead, the
obligations will mostly fall on culturally dissimilar members of the refugee-hosting state to challenge
their prior notions about refugee culture, and to make sincere efforts to understand the rich cultural
values and practices of their new co-residents.
§4 Conclusion
The goal of this chapter was to provide a framework for addressing questions of refugee integration;
to highlight the ways in which the nature of refugee integration is importantly different from the
integration of non-refugee migrants; and to offer some tentative assessments about the moral
desirability of refugee integration in a variety of domains of social life. In §2, I distinguished
integration from the nearby concept of assimilation and inclusion, offered a working definition of

Of course, for the reasons Shelby highlights (as outlined in §3.2), refugees have no obligations to engage in cultural
exchange with individuals who hold discriminatory attitudes towards them, or in contexts where such exchange might
put their culture at risk.
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integration for future discussion, and identified the four key domains of life in which refugee
integration occurs: institutional, social, civic, and cultural. Then, in §3, I turned to the substantive
question of whether integration in the domains identified in §2 is desirable. Though these remarks
were not intended to be entirely conclusive or comprehensive – after all, integration is a deeply
complex, context-sensitive issue – the goal of this section was to highlight key conclusions to orient
a more detailed future discussion. In the end, it was established that there is reason to value
integration in all four domains – with the caveat that integration may not be the appropriate initial
response in contexts where refugees are marginalized, discriminated against, or culturally
misunderstood. In some contexts – such as integration into the welfare system, or an entitlement to
citizenship – integration was deemed important because it is a precondition to the fulfilment of
rights for refugee. In others, integration was found to be valuable due to the role it plays in
generating interpersonal trust and/or solidarity among society’s members, which in turn tends to
support the well-functioning of a democratic state.
Across domains, refugee-specific features of the integration process were also identified. For
instance, it was established that unlike immigrants, refugees are certainly entitled to immediate
integration in the welfare state of their new country in virtue of the fact they have no option to
return to their home state. For similar reasons, refugees have particularly strong rights to citizenship
in their host state after a sufficient period of residence. Moreover, because of the deep value of
culture for individuals, and because refugees cannot practice their culture at home, refugees are
morally entitled to fully replicate their culture in their host state if they have the capacity and desire
to do so.
Ultimately, though, in practice, for desirable kinds of integration between refugees and their
host communities to occur in any domain, it is essential that refugees feel safe in their receiving
communities, and have a sense that their right to live there is relatively stable. As the argument of
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this chapter established, tackling any hostility or discrimination directed at refugees will be a major
part of this. Beyond this, though, another key factor that influences refugees’ ability to move on with
their lives is family unity. Refugee families are often separated during displacement, and when host
states do not adequately support reunification options for refugees on their territory, it can be very
difficult for refugees to adapt to life in their new state – either due to increased caring
responsibilities, because family separation tends to exacerbate mental health problems, or simply
because it is difficult to imagine living somewhere long-term without your family members. This
issue – the normative value of family reunification and the proper scope of family reunification
rights for refugees – will be the topic of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER V: The Right to Family Unification for Refugees
§1 Introduction
The value of family life is recognized in a number of international human rights instruments. The
Universal Declaration for Human Rights affirms that the family, as ‘the natural and fundamental
group unit of society’, has a right to state protection and assistance.1 The signatories of the 1951
Refugee Convention unanimously recommended that governments protect refugee families and
maintain refugee family unity.2 This human right extends to children as well as adults: the
Convention on the Rights of the Child declares that child-sponsored applications for family
reunification should be dealt with by State Parties ‘in a positive, humane and expeditious manner’
and requires that State Parties assist unaccompanied child refugees to reunite with their families.3
In line with these recommendations, even states with otherwise exclusionary immigration
laws generally create exceptions for family-based immigration. Similarly, many refugee-hosting
countries allow refugees’ immediate family to “follow-to-join” them. Scholars have recently turned
their attention to the normative justification for this right to family unification. Perhaps most
significantly, Matthew Lister, Luara Ferracioli, Caleb Yong, and Sarah Song have each offered
accounts of why relationship-based immigration exceptions are appropriate. Their analyses shed
significant light on the reasons why states ought to make immigration exceptions for the family
members of adult citizens and permanent residents. However, they say much less about the rights of
refugees, and particularly the rights of refugee children, to reunite with their families in their country

UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), article 16. This principle is re-affirmed in article
23(1) of the binding ICCPR, and article 10(1) of the ICESCR. See UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (1966), and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966).
2 UNHCR, Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951 and 1967), Final Act of the Conference of
Plenipotentiaries, IV(B).
3 UN General Assembly, Convention on the Rights of the Child, (1989), articles 10 and 22.
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of asylum. A focused discussion on refugee rights is therefore urgently needed – not least because
they are currently more perilous than family reunion rights of non-refugee adults. In this chapter, I
will address this gap in the literature by extending the existing discussion on family unification rights
to refugee adults and children. Ultimately, I will argue that states have stronger duties to reunite
refugees with their families, especially when those refugees are children; that refugee family reunion
rights are sometimes broader than the rights of “ordinary” citizens and permanent residents; and
that refugee family reunion rights should not be subject to financial conditions. Of course, this
argument for a duty to reunite families separated through no fault of the host state will entail that it
is clearly unjust for a state to actively separate refugee families, as immigration personnel are
currently doing at the US-Mexico border.4
The chapter will proceed as follows. In §2, I will outline Lister, Ferracioli, Yong, and Song’s
accounts of what grounds the right to family-based immigration in non-refugee cases. In §3, I will
argue that these considerations also apply for refugees, and that additional features of the refugee
experience suggest that states’ duties to reunite refugee families are stronger and more demanding.
In §4, I will extend the discussion again to refugee children, arguing that the family reunification
rights of refugee children should be an even higher priority due to the crucial role a continuous
family unit plays in a child’s development. §5 concludes the paper and offers some specific
recommendations for policy reform.
As a preliminary matter, I should make clear that the following argument will take two
controversial assumptions for granted. First, I will assume that we live in a world in which states
have the right to control their borders and exercise discretion over immigration policy. I make this

For further assessments of this practice from a human rights and international law perspective, see e.g. Sonja Starr and
Lea Brilmayer, ‘Family Separation as a Violation of International Law’, Berkeley Journal of International Law 21:213 (2003),
pp. 213-287; and Hajar Habbach, Kathryn Hampton and Ranit Mishori, ‘“You Will Never See Your Child Again: The
Persistent Psychological Effects of Family Separation’, Physicians for Human Rights (2020).
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assumption not necessarily because I agree that states have such a right, but rather because we live in
a world where states are assumed to have this right, and this seems unlikely to change any time soon.
In this context, it is practically worthwhile to work within the bounds of this assumption to identify
cases where there are particularly strong reasons to grant exceptions to this discretion.5 Second, as in
the previous chapter, here I will assume that the definition of a refugee defended in Part One of this
dissertation has been implemented, and as such, a clear, morally-salient distinction can be drawn
between refugees and non-refugee migrants. That is, I will assume that non-refugee migrants can live
safely in their country of nationality and have simply chosen to migrate, whereas refugees must
move elsewhere in order to be safe. Again, I make this assumption for the sake of ease of evaluation,
not because I agree that the existing definition of a refugee in international law currently captures
this moral distinction.
§2 Three Arguments for Family Immigration Rights
There are two circumstances in which a non-refugee citizen or permanent resident might need to
apply for family unification. First, a non-refugee who married someone with a different nationality
might apply for family unification because they would like their spouse to join them in their country
of residence. Second, a non-refugee migrant who initially moved alone might apply for their family
members to join them in their new country of residence. In this section, I will outline three accounts
of the normative grounds for the right to family reunion in these cases, each of which contain
insights that will be valuable for developing an account of family reunification rights for refugees
and children in §3 and §4.

Additionally, a framework which assumed that open borders are morally required would render a justification for
family reunion (and, indeed, the right to refuge) superfluous. For an influential defense of open borders, see Joseph
Carens, ‘Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders’, The Review of Politics 49:2 (1987), pp. 251-273.
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2.1 Matthew Lister: Family and Freedom of Association
Matthew Lister has argued that family-based immigration exceptions are justified by the right to
freedom of association.6 The right to form and maintain a family, he argues, is a particularly
important sub-branch of this right because the family is a very intimate association – and the more
intimate the association, the fewer the restrictions a liberal state can justifiably impose upon it.7 For
this reason, even those who believe that states can exclude outsiders because they have association
rights of their own must accept that residents’ rights to associate in more intimate family units
should generally take priority.8 This also enables Lister to explain why states must prioritize family
immigration above immigration for employment purposes, even when this policy is not the most
economically beneficial for the state.9 This is because freedom of association is a fundamental
liberty, so denials of family-based immigration are only justified when necessary to preserve other
basic liberties – not merely for financial gain.
Importantly, for Lister, families are the only type of association sufficiently intimate to
generate a right to immigrate. Of course, individuals have a right to associate in other close
relationships like friendships, and Lister accepts that these intimate associations might generate
weaker rights – for instance, to temporary visitation – where this is necessary for the association to
flourish. However, Lister argues that family associations uniquely generate immigration exceptions
because, unlike other intimate associations, families almost always need to live in close physical
proximity for their members’ lives to be lived ‘in a satisfactory way’.10

Matthew Lister, ‘Immigration, Association, and the Family’, Law and Philosophy 29:6 (2010), p. 721.
Ibid., p. 723.
8 Ibid., pp. 728-729. For freedom of association arguments for states’ right to exclude, see Michael Walzer, Spheres of
Justice (New York: Basic Books, 1983), and Christopher Wellman, ‘Immigration and Freedom of Association’, Ethics
119:1 (2008), pp. 109-141.
9 Lister (2010), p. 726.
10 Ibid., p. 729.
6
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On Lister’s view, states must create family-based immigration exceptions because they must
respect the rights of existing members – which includes both citizens and permanent residents – to
associate in the family.11 This feature of his argument is also important for establishing the priority
of family-based immigration: because it is not the interests of the outsiders who wish to enter that
grounds the exception, prioritizing family-based immigration is justified even though some
individuals applying to enter for other reasons may have stronger claims to entry than those entering
for family reasons. Moreover, Lister holds that the fact that family reunion rights are grounded in
the association rights of existing members has significance for determining which family
relationships should generate an immigration exception. Individuals, Lister argues, must be allowed
to reunite with those family members deemed part of the core family unit according to the ‘common
conception’ of the family in the receiving state.12 In practice, this means that all states should allow
residents to reunite with at least their spouse and minor children, and states with broader cultural
conceptions of the family may be required to allow citizens to reunite with extended family members
too – like grandparents, siblings, or cousins.
Although Lister argues that families should be allowed to reunite across borders, he leaves
space for reunion rights to come with financial conditions. In particular, he argues that because the
right to family unification is owed to existing members of the state, it must be implemented in a way
that all other members could reasonably accept.13 So, if we accept that reciprocity among citizens is
needed for domestic justice, then family-based immigration can be conditional on income if an
unconditional immigration exception would make others in the state materially worse-off. For this
reason, Lister argues that existing policies which make reunification eligibility conditional on the

Lister (2010), pp. 717, 720.
Ibid., p. 742.
13 Ibid., p. 740.
11
12
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citizen’s ability to prove that the incoming family member(s) would not be financially dependent on
the state are permissible.
Overall, Lister’s insight that the right to family reunification can be understood in terms of
the right to freedom of association is helpful. However, his reasons for limiting immigrationexceptions to only family associations are less clear. Recall that, for Lister, families uniquely have this
right because they are especially intimate associations, and because ‘close physical proximity is an
important, even essential aspect’ of association in the family.14 While this latter condition offers a
clear standard for assessment, the former is more vague – what, exactly, makes an association
‘intimate’, and could a non-family relationship could also be intimate in this way? To gain some
insight here, it will be instructive to consider the work of other scholars who endorse alternative
grounds for relationship-based exceptions to immigration rules.
2.2 Which Relationships Count?: Luara Ferracioli on Value and Irreplaceability
Luara Ferracioli has also discussed the justification for family-based immigration exceptions. Unlike
Lister, her goal is not to defend these rights from the bottom up – she agrees with Lister’s
assessment that relationship-based reunification schemes are justified at least partly by freedom of
association.15 Rather, her goal is to identify what makes family relationships distinctively important,
such that liberal partialists can consistently claim that states have duties to create immigration
exceptions for family but not for other close relations.16 Ferracoli is not convinced by Lister’s claim
that widespread agreement about the value of the family in liberal societies is enough to do this
work. Even if it is descriptively true that most ordinary citizens value family relationships, she
argues, normative justification is still needed to show that it would be appropriate for a liberal state –

Lister (2010), pp. 723, 737.
Luara Ferracioli, ‘Family Migration Schemes and Liberal Neutrality’, Journal of Moral Philosophy 13 (2016), p. 555.
16 By ‘liberal partialists’, Ferracioli is referring to ‘those who hold that liberal states have a prima facie right to exclude
while simultaneously endorsing the legitimacy of family reunification schemes’, p. 556.
14
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which must remain neutral among reasonable comprehensive conceptions of the good – to create
immigration exceptions for family relationships alone.17
Ferracioli begins by identifying the features of family relationships that are sufficiently
morally neutral to justify a relationship-based reunification claim against a liberal state. She settles on
three conditions:
1. The relationship, R, must be taken to be valuable by the citizen who participates in it
2. Relationships of type R must be taken to be valuable by the society at large
3. R must be irreplaceable.18
The first of these conditions appeals to the intuitive idea that exceptions to immigration rules should
only be made for relationships that members actually deeply value. After all, we are working under
the assumption that states have a general right to exclude outsiders – disvalued relationships have
insufficient value to override this right. On Ferracioli’s view, a relationship is ‘deeply valued’ by an
individual if it gives meaning to their life – if it forms ‘a significant part of their overall conception of
the good’ – and is such that being deprived of close physical proximity to the valued individual
would force the valuer to compromise on a significant part of their conception of the good.19
The second condition is included to explain why the liberal state should acknowledge the
value of this type of relationship when creating immigration policy, even if doing so would not be
economically optimal. The explanation, she argues, is that relationship-types are politically valuable if
citizens who affirm different conceptions of the good could have objective reasons to recognize
their value, even if they do not pursue this sort of relationship themselves. 20

Ferracioli, p. 558.
Ibid., p. 567.
19 Ibid., pp. 562-3.
20 Ibid., p. 565. Caleb Yong objects that this condition is ‘objectionably illiberal’: either it makes the impractical demand
that all citizens recognize the value of the relationship-type, or, if only majority recognition is required, families will be
held hostage to the ‘tyranny of the majority’. However, it seems to me that Ferracioli’s account survives this criticism –
her point is not that citizens must actually recognize the relationship-type as objectively valuable, but that they must have
objective reasons to recognize the relationship-type as valuable. See Caleb Yong, ‘Caring Relationships and Family
Migration Schemes’, in A. Sager (ed.) The Ethics and Politics of Immigration, (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016), p. 67.
17
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The third condition is included to ensure that it would be appropriate for the valued
relationship in question to override the state’s right to exclude. After all, many relationships that
satisfy Ferracioli’s first two conditions should not, intuitively, be grounds for immigration
exceptions. Consider, for instance, a child’s relationship to their teacher – the child may value the
relationship very much, and other members of the society may be able to recognize the value of a
teacher-child relationship – but intuitively, states should not be required to allow teachers to
immigrate to reunite with their students. According to Ferracioli, we have this intuition because
teacher-student relationships are usually fungible, and immigration exceptions should only be
available for irreplaceable relationships. In particular, Ferracioli argues that when a relationship is
‘irreplaceable’, it will be grounded in the ‘historical-relational properties’ of the parties involved. That
is, a relationship between X and Y is irreplaceable to X if X cares about their relationship with Y at
least partly because of their past experiences with Y, and would continue to care about Y even if Y
were to change significantly as a person.21
Ultimately, Ferracioli argues that the current practice of creating immigration exceptions for
family relationships alone is not justifiable. All of the three conditions above, she claims, could be
satisfied by other close relationships like friendships or creative partnerships. For this reason, liberal
states, which cannot endorse particular comprehensive conceptions of the good, must either create
immigration exceptions for these relationships too, or have no relationship-based immigration
exceptions whatsoever. Contra Lister, she argues that this latter option is permissible because
‘permanent residency in the same country is not necessary for the enjoyment of any special
relationship’.22 She remains neutral about which option the liberal partialist should choose.

21
22

Ferracioli, p. 566.
Ibid., p. 573.
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Ferracioli’s account of the criteria for relationship-based immigration exceptions is helpful
because it opens up the possibility that there could be reunification rights for relationships beyond
the nuclear family. However, her claim that special relationships can persist across borders, and that
liberal states could permissibly remain neutral by granting no immigration-exceptions at all, is less
compelling. At least in practice, many deeply valuable intimate relationships can only be sustained
when all parties live in close physical proximity. This seems especially true of parent-child
relationships, but also of romantic partnerships between adults – for although such relationships will
often temporarily persist across borders, long-distance relationships rarely last without an end to the
separation in sight. For this reason, I agree with Lister’s claim that states must create immigration
exceptions for at least family relationships. Moreover, I also broadly agree with Lister’s response to
Ferracioli’s objection that it would be illiberal for a state to create immigration exceptions for family
relationships alone. Policies, Lister argues, are general by nature, and will inevitably be both overand under-inclusive. For this reason, policies must be informed by typical cases, not unusual ones. 23
This is important, because while some particular friendships or creative partnerships will be valued
very deeply by the participants – so much so that they feel that the relationship is irreplaceable and
would be compromised by physical separation – most individuals do not have relationships of this
sort outside of the family. So although it is possible for, say, a friendship to satisfy Ferracioli’s three
criteria, because such friendships are uncommon, it would not be illiberal for a state to create
immigration exceptions for families but not friends.24 Thus, although Ferracioli’s account of what

Matthew Lister, ‘The Rights of Families and Children at the Border’, in E. Brake and L. Ferguson (eds.) Philosophical
Foundations of Children’s and Family Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), pp. 160-161.
24 Even those who argue that liberal states must not privilege romantic partnerships above non-family caring
relationships acknowledge that there are important differences between these relationship-types – for instance, amorous
partnerships are typically more intense than friendships. This is normatively significant because lower-intensity
relationships are more likely to be capable of persisting across borders. I am, however, open to the idea that if
sufficiently intense non-family relationships were sufficiently common, states may have obligations of justice to create
reunification options for these relationships, to be adjudicated on a case-by-case basis. See e.g. Elizabeth Brake,
Minimizing Marriage (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 95.
23
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makes special relationships sufficiently valuable to ground an immigration exception is enlightening,
her argument for expanding relationship-based immigration exceptions is not compelling.
2.3 Which Relationships Count? Part 2: Sarah Song and Caleb Yong on Care
More recently, Caleb Yong and Sarah Song have offered another account of the justification for
family immigration rights. Both Yong and Song each individually argue that intimate family
relationships are valuable because of their important caregiving nature.25
To identify more precisely the sense in which family relationships might be considered
‘intimate’, both Yong and Song appeal to Stuart White’s analysis of intimate associations, according
to which an association is intimate if it: (1) involves ‘strong and mutual familiarity’ which is typically
the result of regular and intensive in-person contact; and (2) has ‘the pursuit and enjoyment of
intimacy-related goods’ like friendship or love as a primary purpose.26 Ultimately, both Yong and
Song hold that intimate associations of this sort are valuable because they serve a caregiving
function. Following Elizabeth Brake, they each emphasize that valuable intimate family relationships
involve not only material care – provision of food, clothing, housing, etc.; but also attitudinal care –
an affective attitude which includes the aim of promoting the cared-for person’s wellbeing for noninstrumental reasons, generated by a sense of personal attachment to the cared-for person.27 Brake
argues that although material care can be provided by a neutral hired caregiver, attitudinally invested
individuals are usually better suited to this role due to their detailed knowledge of the cared-for
person and investment in their wellbeing.28 Moreover, even in a non-dependent relationship,
attitudinal care is socially valuable because it provides a basis for future material care if a need arises.

Although their arguments are made independently, their accounts of the value of caregiving share many similarities, so
it will be productive to reconstruct them together here.
26 Stuart White, ‘Freedom of Association and the Right to Exclude’, Journal of Political Philosophy 5:4 (1997), p. 390; Yong,
p. 70; and Sarah Song, Immigration and Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), p. 134.
27 Brake, Minimizing Marriage, p. 82. See Yong, ‘Caring Relationships and Family Migration Schemes’, p. 73 and Song,
Immigration and Democracy, pp. 133-134.
28 Brake, p. 174.
25
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Because this caregiving function is what makes family relationships valuable, but family
relationships are only a subset of all intimate caring relationships, both Yong and Song argue that
existing policies granting immigration exceptions to nuclear families alone are unjustifiably limited.
Song, for instance, argues that policies extending immigration exceptions to other intimate
caregiving relationships would be more compatible with the liberal value of individual equality, since
they would treat minorities with different cultural conceptions of the family equally.29
Yong and Song’s care-based analyses of the value of family life are helpful because they offer
another explanation for why immigration exceptions should exist for some relationships and not
others. Like Ferracioli’s account, their approach opens up the possibility that relationship-based
reunification rights could extend beyond the nuclear family – especially for sponsors with broader
cultural conceptions of the family. However, some of Lister’s responses to Ferracioli also apply to
the most radical application of their view, which suggests that immigration exceptions should be
granted to every functionally caring relationship. As Lister points out, there are strong practical
reasons to resist efforts to turn fundamental normative values directly into policy – for instance,
because such polices would be extremely fine-grained, making effective implementation costly and
administratively complex.30 Moreover, the requirements of justice do not demand perfect outcomes
– they only require that institutions be neutrally designed to enforce politically required principles
reasonably accurately. Altogether, this suggests that an immigration policy which treated
relationship-types (such as ‘parent’ or ‘spouse’) as heuristics for identifying when an intimate caring
relationship is likely to be present would satisfy the demands of justice.31 On this approach, all
individuals from cultures where, say, aunt-niece relationships are typically ‘caring’ in Yong and
Song, pp. 145-146.
Matthew Lister, ‘Functionalism, Formalism, and the Family: A comment on Sarah Song’s Immigration and
Democracy’ (unpublished draft), p. 2.
31 Again, though, I am open to the idea that if a sufficiently large portion of the population wish to reunite with their
intimate, functionally caring relations not included under such a policy, states may have obligations to create a backup
mechanism adjudicating applications on a case-by-case basis.
29
30
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Song’s sense should have a right to reunite with their aunts or nieces, even though some particular
aunt-niece relationships would not satisfy Yong and Song’s criteria for a caring relationship.
It might be objected that Yong and Song’s care-based approach to immigration policy would
be objectionably illiberal. Lister, for instance, has argued that it is not the place of the liberal state to
provide benefits exclusively to individuals who endorse the particular value of care.32 However, while
Lister is right to point out that liberal states should not be in the business of promoting particular
comprehensive conceptions of the good, as Samuel Freeman has pointedly emphasized, liberal states
are not required to be completely neutral with respect to the good – for they must promote citizens’
fundamental civil and political interests.33 This is important because Song and Yong endorse a
relatively thin conception of care. As such, it is both empirically questionable whether valuable and
irreplaceable non-caring relationships exist, and also deeply unclear that care (in their sense) is a
comprehensive value as opposed to a political one. Indeed, Elizabeth Brake has compellingly argued
that the crucial role caregiving relationships play in the provision of material care and moral
development means that it is not just consistent with liberal neutrality for a state to support caring
relationships, but is actually required by justice.34 Thus, Lister’s concern that a care-based approach to
immigration policy would be illiberal seems unfounded.
§3 Family Unification Rights for Refugees
In the previous section, I outlined three arguments defending immigration exceptions for the
relations of ordinary citizens and residents. I agree that all three of the factors mentioned – freedom

Lister, (unpublished draft), p. 5. Specifically, Lister writes: ‘However, insofar as we take “caring” to be at least
significantly an emotional term, and not mainly about the provision of assistance, many family relations fail to be
“caring” ones. Traditionally, of course, this was quite common, and there are still significant parts of the globe where
“caring” is, at best, a nice things that might accompany family membership, and not a central aspect of it.’
33 Samuel Freeman, ‘Democracy, Religion, and Public Reason’, unpublished draft for Global Issues in Ethics III: Religion and
Democracy at Australian Catholic University (Rome campus), pp. 5, 10-11.
34 Brake, pp. 171-185.
32
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of association, the value of family relationships, and the importance of care – could provide
normative grounds for family reunion rights, though I don’t intend to take a stance here on whether
every aspect of each position is appropriate in non-refugee cases. Instead, in this section, I will
consider what these arguments can tell us about the family reunification rights of refugees. The
practical implications of this discussion will be outlined in §5.
There are various different paths by which refugees might arrive in their host state. For the
purposes of this chapter, I will focus on cases where refugees arrive in their host country alone,
receive asylum, and then apply for their family to join them. This should be distinguished from cases
where refugees arrive with their family and the entire group apply for asylum together, and cases
where refugee families living in camps or cities apply to be resettled together in a third country. I
restrict my attention to lone asylum-seeking individuals partly because they are most similarly
situated to the immigrant cases discussed in the existing literature, but also because their claims to
family reunion are the most controversial – and so if they have family reunion rights, it is likely that
the same will be true of refugees in other circumstances.35
3.1 Stronger Duties
It is not strictly true that the literature on family reunification has focused solely on the rights of
non-refugees. In a more recent paper, Lister suggests that his account of family reunification for
citizens and permanent residents also applies to refugees. Refugees, he argues, are situated
sufficiently similarly to permanent residents for the purposes of this evaluation – after all, refugees
are owed non-refoulement at the very least, and should also receive some form of durable solution.36
So, since refugees cannot live safely in their country of nationality, and since family ties are very

Note that in resettlement cases and asylum cases where the family arrives as a unit, the host state would be more
directly responsible for separating the family if they refused to host the entire family together. By contrast, in the case I
am concerned with, the refugee is asking the host state for assistance in reuniting the previously separated family unit.
36 Lister (2018), p. 168, n. 57.
35
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important, it would be unreasonable to impose a system of protection that forced refugees to choose
between living without their family or living in danger.37
I agree with Lister’s evaluation here – it would be unjust for host states to deny refugees
access to something as basic as continuation of family life. However, beyond Lister, I hold that there
are important ways in which refugees are differently situated from citizens and residents, and that
these differences suggest that states’ duties to reunite refugee families are stronger, or more urgent.
Perhaps most obviously, refugees are unlike others applying for family reunification in that they have
typically been forced into a situation of family separation. By contrast, in non-refugee cases, families
either chose to separate temporarily, because one individual voluntarily moved to another country
alone before applying for their family to join them; or the family was knowingly formed across
borders, because two individuals with different nationalities entered into a relationship, knowing
from the start that they may face future hurdles to family unity. Of course, I do not mean to suggest
here that the fact that non-refugee families have not been forced apart should undermine their right
to family reunion – as the arguments from §2 demonstrate, the deep value of intimate family
relationships is sufficient to ground a strong right to family unity. Rather, my point is that it is
especially important that refugee families are allowed to reunite, because refugees are seeking to reestablish family unity after involuntary separation caused by unmet human rights. Host states have
duties to fulfill these unmet rights – for similar reasons, they should take reasonable measures to
alleviate ongoing serious harms, like family separation, that resulted from this original harm.
Other, more practical, factors should also incentivize states to allow refugees to reunite with
their family. In the previous chapter it was established that, at least for some domains, it is in the
interests of both refugees and host states that refugees and their host communities integrate with
one another. This is important, because current research suggests that family separation impedes

37

Lister (2018), p. 169.
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refugee integration – for instance, because they struggle to see a future for themselves in their host
state without their family, or because family separation might exacerbate pre-existing mental health
problems related to past persecution.38 This suggests that policies granting refugees’ family
reunification rights are likely to be in the interests of both host states and refugees themselves. 39
More importantly, though, there is a robust principled reason for thinking that states have
stronger duties to reunite refugee families than the families of non-refugees. Recall that, on Lister’s
view, the right to family reunion is primarily grounded in the right of the existing member of the
state to associate with their family, not the rights of the family members who wish to enter. After all,
in a world divided into sovereign states, states do not generally have obligations to fulfil the
association rights of non-members. In the case of refugees, however, there is reason to think that
states should also take the rights of the refugee’s family members who wish to enter into account.
To see why this is the case, recall from the opening of the chapter that although only citizens have
membership-based claims to freedom of association, everyone has a human right to form and maintain
a family. There is good reason to think that the current practice of accepting a human right to family
life is normatively justified. For instance, for Rawls, human rights are ‘necessary conditions in any
system of social cooperation’; and basic needs are needs ‘that must be met if citizens are to be in a
position to take advantage of the rights, liberties, and opportunities of their society’.40 Together,
these definitions suggest that at least the most central basic needs should be protected by human
rights, and that family unity is such a need – since those experiencing family separation will be
severely limited in their ability to take advantage of the rights, liberties and opportunities they are
afforded in society.41
Oxfam and Refugee Council, Safe But Not Settled: the impact of family separation on refugees in the UK (2018), p. 16.
Of course, non-refugee migrants do not generally experience these integration challenges – many states impose
language tests and require proof of financial stability in order to permit immigration in the first instance.
40 John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 38 n. 47, 68, 78-81.
41 By ‘most central’ basic needs, I mean those needs which, if unmet, would tend to put individuals into a very poor
position to take advantage of the rights, liberties, and opportunities of their society.
38
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Once we recognize the human right to maintain family life, we only need to appeal to the
familiar idea that although states bear primary responsibility for fulfilling their members’ human
rights, the international community has a residual obligation to step in when a state fails in its
human-rights-protecting function. Indeed, it is precisely this logic that underpins the system of
protection for refugees – states have duties to host refugees because refugees are people whose
home states have failed to protect their human rights. For the same reason, then, the claims of
refugees’ family members have normative weight for receiving states. When a refugee’s home state
permits conditions that make it impossible for the refugee to continue to live with their family in
their country of nationality, that home state also indirectly violates their family’s human right to
family life – and when this happens, the international community’s residual duty to fulfil this right is
activated. Although this duty is imperfect – that is, it is not assigned to any particular entity – there is
reason to think it should be assigned to the refugee’s host state, because the refugee’s presence on its
territory makes the host state uniquely well-positioned to facilitate family reunification.
Thus, states have especially strong duties to reunite refugee families because they have
obligations not only to fulfil the membership-based association rights of the refugee herself, but also
to protect the human rights of the refugee and her family members. Note that these sorts of
considerations do not apply for non-refugee families whose human rights have not been violated,
because unlike refugees, migrants and citizens are not forced into family separation by the
persecutory behavior of their home state.
3.2 Broader Rights
Because refugees’ membership-based claim to family reunification stems from the fact that they are
situated like ordinary citizens, Lister’s view suggests that refugees are only entitled to reunite with
family members who belong to the ‘common conception’ of the family in the host state. On this
approach, refugees from cultures where extended families are closely involved in one another’s lives,
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but who receive refuge in a state with a more limited conception of the family, would not have a
right to reunite with all those they had previously been close to. Later in this section, I will argue that
these refugees should be allowed to reunite with extended family members. First, though, it will be
helpful to see why Ferracioli, Song and Yong’s accounts – which are more conducive to extending
the right to family-based immigration – suggest that these extended family relationships should
count.
For refugees from cultures where extended family are close, extended family relationships
clearly satisfy all three of Ferracioli’s criteria for a right to a relationship-based immigration
exception. Such relationships are deeply valued by the participants; reasonable citizens in the host
society have objective reasons to recognize the value of the relationship for the refugee – for even
those who do not deeply value their own relationships with extended family could recognize that
they would deeply value these relationships if they had been born in the refugee’s home country; and
such relationships are typically irreplaceable, because they are based on historical-relational
properties of the parties involved. Similarly, these sorts of family relationships would also satisfy
Song and Yong’s conditions for an intimate caregiving relationship. In many cultures, extended
families are bound up in one another’s day-to-day lives, and companionship, love, and support are
among the goals of these close relationships. As such, these families are ‘intimate associations’ in
White’s sense. Moreover, provision of material care will often be an important function of these
extended family units, at least for children and dependent adults – but of course attitudinal care will
also abound among all parties. When these conditions are satisfied, extended families are just as
much intimate caregiving relationships as nuclear families tend to be in cultures with more
conservative conceptions of the family. Altogether, then, the fact that extended family relationships
often satisfy all three of Ferracioli’s criteria for a politically valuable relationship, as well as Song and
Yong’s criteria for an intimate caregiving association, is at least prima facie reason to think host states
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ought to allow refugees who previously were very close to their extended family to reunite with
these family members too.
It might be objected here that at the end of both §2.2 and §2.3 I resisted suggestions that
immigration exceptions should be created for every relationship that could possibly fulfil Ferracioli
or Yong and Song’s criteria for a valuable or intimate caregiving relationship. Following Lister, I
argued that policies need only accommodate relationship-types for which an exception is typically
required. But, the objector might insist, within the culture of the host states in question, it would be
atypical for a resident to value their extended family so deeply. Why, then, should immigration
exceptions be made for a refugee’s extended family, but not for, say, a citizen’s best friend?
My response here is that although policies should be based on typical cases, this does not
mean that policies should be based solely on the interests of the majority culture. As was argued in
the previous chapter, states have obligations to make reasonable accommodations for minority
cultures, and refugees in particular have very strong entitlements to practice, and even replicate, their
culture within their host state. Justice demands that immigration exceptions be sensitive to variations
in cultural conceptions of the family – at least for sufficiently large or well-established minorities,
and for minorities with a strong moral claim to an exception, like refugees who have been forced to
move to another country which may not share their own conception of the family.42 As such, failing
to respect the reasonable cultural differences of refugees when shaping a policy about something as
important as their right to family reunion would be unjustifiably inflexible. Indeed, Lister himself
emphasizes that it is not reasonable to force refugees to choose between living in danger and
abandoning their closest family relations – but when a refugee cares as deeply about her cousins or
siblings as she cares about her spouse and children, it seems equally unreasonable to expect her to

42

I am also inclined to endorse similar exceptions for citizens and permanent residents from certain minority cultures.
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abandon them in order to reach safety.43 Moreover, unlike extending reunification rights to particular
intimate friendships, policies granting reunification rights to refugees’ extended families need not be
excessively administratively burdensome. In many host states, official reports about human rights
conditions in other nations play an important role in the adjudication of asylum applications.
Information about cultural conceptions of the family could be added to these reports, such that host
states would have accurate information about common conceptions of the family – including
conceptions held by minority groups – in refugee-producing states. Family reunification rights could
then be provided to extended families in an entirely formal way: if, for example, relationships with
grandparents were deemed culturally important in Syria, then all Syrian refugees would have a right
to reunite with their grandparents.
As a final note, this argument for granting more expansive family reunion rights to refugees
is also supported by the practical considerations mentioned in the previous section. Research
suggests that separation from extended family may also impede refugee integration.44 Thus, again, it
may be in the interests of both the host state and the refugee to permit refugees to unite with their
extended family.
3.3 No Financial Conditions
Recall from §2.1 that Lister argues that states can permissibly make family unification for nonrefugee applicants conditional on the sponsor’s ability to prove that the incoming family member
would not be financially dependent on the state. Here, I will consider whether states could
permissibly impose similar conditions on refugee family reunion.
Firstly, it should be emphasized that there are reasons to question Lister’s claim that financial
conditions on family reunion are permissible even in the “normal” immigration case. Recall that on
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Oxfam and Refugee Council, p. 19.
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Lister’s view, family-based immigration exceptions are justified by freedom of association, which is a
basic liberty, and basic liberties can only be limited by other basic liberties – not by, for instance,
economic considerations.45 Lister argues that financial conditions on family reunion are acceptable
because reciprocity is necessary for domestic justice, and so family reunion policies must be such
that all citizens could ‘reasonably accept’ them.46 However, while it is possible that a condition-free
family reunion policy could be so extremely financially burdensome as to undermine reciprocity
among citizens and threaten distributive justice, it is not obvious that this would be the case in all
contexts. After all, in the vast majority of states, immigrants make an above-average financial
contribution, so in some circumstances a condition-free right to family reunification may be net
neutral, or even beneficial, for the state. Theoretically too, it is unclear that the argument for
financial conditions on family reunion follows. After all, it seems plausible that reasonable
individuals behind a veil of ignorance would endorse family reunion policies even if they imposed
modest economic burdens on the state, out of recognition of the psychological distress they would
experience if they were separated from their family and lacked the funds needed to reunite.
Altogether, this suggests that financial conditions on family reunification may not be called for even
in the “normal” immigration case.
In the case of refugees, however, it is even clearer still that financial conditions on family
reunion rights would be inappropriate. Once again, it is important to recognize that in some ways
refugees are very differently situated than non-refugee migrants. Most obviously, refugees, unlike
migrants, are receiving humanitarian protection. Host states have duties to accept refugees even
though refugees will usually be financially dependent on the state for at least an initial period of time.
By contrast, migrants often have to prove that they will be financially self-sufficient in order to
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obtain residency rights. This is significant, because the status afforded to refugees’ incoming family
members is dependent on the status of the sponsor. Since it would not be appropriate to place
financial conditions on entry for the original refugee, and since the incoming family members of a
refugee would be entering with derivative refugee status, it would be equally inappropriate to place
financially demanding conditions on entry for a refugee’s family.
Once again, there are practical considerations relevant to this argument. Although it is
certainly not true of all refugees, many refugees do not have substantial financial resources and face
barriers to obtaining employment in their host state – for instance, because they do not speak a
national language. Because of this, if states were to impose financial conditions on refugees’ right to
family reunion, this would significantly delay or even bar access to family reunion for the vast
majority of refugees. Given refugees’ rights to freedom of association, the deep intrinsic value of
family life, and the value of family unity for facilitating refugee integration, there are several reasons
to think that host states should create not just a formal right to refugee family reunification, but one
that will be effectively accessible for the majority of refugees.
*
Thus far, I have argued that refugees, like citizens and migrants, have rights to family reunification.
In fact, I have argued that refugees do not merely have the same claim to family reunion as other
residents, but that states have stronger duties to reunite refugee families, including extended families
in some cases, without imposing financial conditions on this right to reunite. In the next section, I
will extend the analysis one stage further, and discuss the nature of the right to family reunion for
refugee children.
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§4 Family Unification Rights for Refugee Children
Intuitively, children have stronger interests than adults in being physically close to their family.
Despite this, several states that grant family reunion rights to refugee adults do not extend these
rights to refugee children.47 Such states sometimes attempt to justify this decision by claiming that
granting family reunion rights to unaccompanied minors would incentivize families to send their
children ahead alone to secure protection for the rest of the family. This claim would make sense if
children’s requests for asylum were more likely to be granted than the asylum requests of adults, but
there is no reason to think that this is currently the case. In all states, children must undergo the
same rigorous adjudication of status as adults in order to be granted refuge – and in at least some
ways it may be more challenging for a child to file a successful asylum application. Children are more
likely to struggle to engage with the legal system than adults; they may find it harder to accurately
express necessary details about the persecution they fear in their home country; and even the most
eloquent child who fears persecution for reasons of, say, political opinion, may have difficulty
convincing officials that they have a genuine fear of persecution on these grounds. 48
All this suggests that these concerns about system “abuse” are unsubstantiated. More
importantly, though, even if these concerns were well-founded, the harms of system “abuse” would
need to be weighed against the harms done to genuine refugee children denied family reunification
rights to determine whether this denial was permissible. In what follows, I will argue that there are
good reasons to think that refugee children have particularly strong moral rights to family reunion,
which suggests that such denial would not be permissible. In fact, I will argue that the family reunion
rights of refugee children are even stronger than the family reunion rights of refugee adults – which,

At the time of writing, this policy is held in the UK, the USA, and Canada.
Matthew Lister and Eilidh Beaton, ‘Refugees and Family Unification’, unpublished draft, forthcoming in Johanna
Gördemann, Andreas Niederberger, and Uchenna Okeja (eds.) Handbook of Migration Ethics (Dordrecht: Springer).
47
48

153

Chapter V | Family Reunification

I argued in the previous section, are themselves more urgent than the family reunion rights of nonrefugees.
4.1 The Distinctive Value of Family for Children
As outlined in §2.1, Ferracioli holds the view (which, I argued, is mistaken) that family relationships
can persist across borders, and as such, a liberal state could permissibly eliminate family-based
immigration exceptions if it did not wish to extend immigration exceptions to other valuable
relationships. Interestingly, however, Ferracioli concedes that even if family reunion options were
ruled out for adults, the liberal partialist need not be so ‘radical’ as to call for the removal of familybased immigration rights for children.49 Children, Ferracioli argues, have a strong interest in being
cared for by someone they are already attached to, and liberal states already acknowledge this – for
instance, by providing eligible parents with additional welfare for childcare support.50 She argues that
similar considerations justify family reunification rights for unaccompanied children.
To see why Ferracioli allows for this exception, it will be helpful be clearer about why
children have particularly strong interests in being with their families. To support her own argument
here, Ferracioli cites some recent work on the value of family life for children – including Harry
Brighouse and Adam Swift’s recent book, in which they argue that children have a right to a parent
due to a combination of their wellbeing interests and their interests in becoming autonomous
adults.51 Brighouse and Swift explain that children must develop deeply intimate relationships with
their caregiver(s) in order for their needs to be met reliably. For instance, if a child is to develop
effective emotional regulation during infancy, their caregiver(s) must be highly receptive to their

Ferracioli, p. 573.
Ibid., p. 573.
51 Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift, Family Values: The Ethics of Parent-Child Relationships (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2014), pp. 57-85. Children require a parent to fulfil their wellbeing interests because they lack the information and
emotional/rational capacities necessary to be good judges of their own wellbeing (p. 62), and require a parent to develop
autonomy because intimate loving attachment is necessary for the development of capacities partially constitutive of
autonomy, like emotional regulation and empathy (pp. 71-73).
49
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nonverbal signals and emotional responses. Otherwise, the infant may receive inconsistent responses
from their caregiver, limiting their ability to develop a regulatory strategy and increasing the
likelihood of mental disorders later in life.52 Intimate relationships are important for older children
too – for instance, because it is conducive to a child’s development for them to identify with their
authority figure(s), and this is most likely to occur when an intimate caring relationship is present.53
Brighouse and Swift’s analysis of the importance of an intimate relationship between a caregiver and
a child suggests that caregivers are not replaceable – or at the very least, not easily replaceable – and
provides strong reason to think that continuity of parental ties is important, and perhaps necessary,
for a child to develop successfully.
In a similar vein, S. Matthew Liao has recently argued that children have a human right to be
loved.54 Liao supports his argument with both theory and scientific studies which show that failing
to receive love as a child is seriously harmful and can have repercussions well into adulthood.
Various theoretical accounts, for instance, have suggested that being loved as a child is important for
the development of trust, a positive self-conception, the ability to pursue deep personal relationships
with others, and motivation to accept discipline – all of which are critical to becoming a welladjusted adult. Consider, for instance, a positive self-conception. This is important, because children
need a positive self-conception to have confidence in their future actions, which in turn motivates
them to try new activities and learn basic skills.55 Scientific studies, too, suggest that being loved as a
child is developmentally important. One classic study of institutionalized children deprived of a
regular adult caregiver found that these children were more likely to become ill, struggle with

Brighouse and Swift., p. 72.
Ibid., p. 73.
54 S. Matthew Liao, ‘The Right of Children to Be Loved’, The Journal of Political Philosophy 14:4 (2006), pp. 420-440; and S.
Matthew Liao, The Right to Be Loved (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).
55 Liao (2015), p. 80.
52
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learning, fail to gain weight, experience depression, and even die in infancy.56 More recent research
supports these findings. For instance, laboratory studies have found that infant monkeys raised
without a parent are more likely to have hampered cognitive, social, and emotional development,
and that the harms done doing childhood may not be reversible later in life.57 Clearly, then, being
loved as a child is deeply important, and since human rights are tools that protect interests which are
of primary importance to a good life, Liao argues that children have a right to be loved. This love, he
argues, can most naturally be fulfilled by some sort of parent figure, because continuity of caretaker
is a necessary condition for being loved.58
These accounts from Liao and Brighouse and Swift lend significant weight to the idea that
child refugees have very strong interests in the preservation of family unity.59 Importantly, these are
interests that children uniquely have. Liao, for instance, argues that adults most likely do not have a
right to be loved, because love is good for adults when obtained through their autonomous efforts –
whereas children, on the other hand, require unconditional love.60 Moreover, Brighouse and Swift’s
account highlights the essential role intimate parent-child relationships play in enabling children to
develop the capacities and skills needed for a successful and autonomous adulthood. Of course,
adults, unlike children, do not have urgent interests in developing autonomy.
If all this is right, then refugee children have strong development-based interests in family
unity that do not apply to refugee adults, and this grounds their right to family reunification. What’s
more, though, if the reasons justifying family unity for refugee adults also apply to minors, then

Réne Spitz and K. M. Wolf, ‘Anaclitic depression: an inquiry into the genesis of psychiatric conditions in early
childhood’, The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 2 (1946), 313-42; Liao (2015), p. 88.
57 Liao (2015), pp. 93-94.
58 Liao (2006), p. 436.
59 Yong cites similar material to defend his claim that children (unlike independent adults) have a human right not to
have their intimate caregiving relationships disrupted. Contra Yong, I agree with Song that adults and children alike have
a human right to maintain their intimate caregiving family relationships – I only mean to suggest that it is especially urgent
that children’s human right to family life is respected. See Yong, pp. 73-74.
60 Liao (2015), pp. 99-100.
56
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unaccompanied refugee children have even stronger family reunion rights than refugee adults. In the
next section, I will argue that this is the case.
4.2 Freedom of Association Rights for Children
Recall that, according to Lister, the basic right that justifies family-based immigration exceptions for
non-refugee adults is the right to freedom of association. Problematically, it is not immediately
obvious that children have this right.
Some scholars deny that children are capable of having moral rights at all. This view is
particularly common among those who hold that rights are conceptually linked to the exercise of
agential capacities, who claim that the purpose of rights – understood as moral entitlements that
individuals can choose to claim or waive – is to preserve autonomous agency.61 However, Colin
MacLeod has pointed out that these sorts of views have deeply counterintuitive implications. They
suggest, for instance, that children do not have moral rights against torture.62 MacLeod
acknowledges that defenders of these views try to minimize the force of this problem by conceding
that although children’s interests do not amount to rights, they do amount to something like an
‘enforceable moral entitlement’. However, MacLeod compellingly argues that this concession takes
much of the sting out of the objection that children do not have rights – for an ‘enforceable moral
entitlement’ is sufficiently right-like for practical purposes.63
A more plausible objection, then, would claim that although children have some moral rights
(or right-like entitlements), they do not have the particular right to freedom of association. After all,
freedom of association is often portrayed as a deeply political right to exercise agency by acting on
one’s conscience. So even if it is relatively uncontroversial that children have rights against harms

Colin M. MacLeod, ‘Are Children’s Rights Important?’, in Philosophical Foundations of Children’s and Family Law, ed. by
Elizabeth Brake and Lucinda Ferguson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), p. 200.
62 Ibid., p. 201.
63 Ibid., p. 201.
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like torture – that is, rights that protect their welfare – it is much less clear that children have
political rights, precisely because they have yet to develop full autonomy. It is generally deemed
permissible to deny children full autonomy in many areas of life – in fact, Brighouse and Swift argue
that paternalistic treatment is sometimes necessary to fully respect a child’s interests, because adult
supervision can play an important role in protecting children’s welfare and cultivation of
autonomy.64 Why, then, should we think that children have a right to freedom of association?
For one thing, the view that children have no political rights whatsoever is increasingly old
fashioned. The right to freedom of association for children is already recognized under the CRC, the
most widely ratified human rights treaty in history.65 Similarly, the Child Rights International
Network explain that free association is important for children’s development because it is a
precondition to being able to build friendships, form views about the world, and be an active
participant in society.66 This idea that freedom of association is valuable for development is also
endorsed in the philosophical literature. Lister, for instance, argues that association in the family
helps individuals develop a sense of justice, because interactions within the family – perhaps more so
than within any other association – help us ‘learn to temper our wants and desires, to consider the
good of others, and to interact in mutually beneficial ways’.67 Here, Lister appeals to Rawls’s claim
that the family is politically important because it plays a crucial role in producing new generations of
citizens needed to sustain a society. Because of this, Rawls argues, an important role of the family is
to ensure children’s ‘moral education and development into the wider culture’.68 Clearly, then,
freedom of association is not just valuable in itself, but also valuable for moral development. As
such, it seems especially important to ensure that young people are able to associate freely.
Brighouse and Swift, p. 70.
UN General Assembly (1989).
66 Child Rights International Network, ‘Civil Rights: Freedom of Association and Children’s Rights’.
67 Lister, ‘Immigration, Association, and the Family’, pp. 722-3.
68 John Rawls, ‘The Idea of Public Reason Revisited’, in Collected Papers ed. by Samuel Freeman (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2001), p. 596.
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So, it seems likely that unaccompanied child refugees, like adults, have a claim to family
reunification grounded in their right to freedom of association. There are at least strong instrumental
reasons to recognize that children have rights to associate freely, because this practice is valuable for
developing the moral powers. Thus, because children have association-based rights to family
reunion, and have urgent development- and welfare-based interests in the preservation of family
unity, refugee children’s family reunion rights are stronger than the family reunification rights of
adults.
4.3 The Intrinsic Value of a Happy Childhood
One final consideration is relevant here. Thus far, I have argued that family reunion rights are
especially valuable for children because children not only have freedom of association rights like
adults, but also have developmental interests in the preservation of the loving family unit. What
neither of these arguments capture, however, is that there is also intrinsic value in having a happy
childhood.69 Brighouse and Swift explicitly acknowledge this, arguing that children have an interest
in the ‘freedom, support, and environmental conditions’ conducive to enjoying their childhood,
because childhood is valuable in its own right.70 They also suggest that there are certain goods that
are valuable only in childhood – like being carefree, and having significantly reduced responsibilities;
and other goods that are more accessible in childhood – like being able to experience ‘spontaneous
joy’.71
This is important, because refugee children have often already had experiences which
impede their ability to enjoy the special goods associated with childhood. In this way, they have
experienced a double harm: not only have their human rights been threatened, but these experiences

Note that this claim is consistent with a wide range of cultural conceptions of what a happy childhood consists of, and
does not deny that bearing age-appropriate responsibilities may be part of a happy childhood.
70 Brighouse and Swift, p. 64.
71 Ibid., pp. 65, 69.
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have limited their ability to enjoy their childhood – experiences they may never be able to replicate
as adults. If, after undergoing these harms, the child’s host state then refuses to allow them to
reunite with their family members – who, for the reasons outlined in the previous two sections, are
very important for children’s wellbeing – they effectively perpetuate this harm of depriving the child
of the joys of childhood. This is contrary to the function of the host state, which should be to, as far
as possible, remedy the harms inflicted by a refugee’s state of nationality and ensure that these harms
do not persist. Thus, host states fail to adequately fulfil their purpose when they deny family reunion
rights to unaccompanied minors.
§5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have argued that refugees and refugee children should have a right to family
reunion. What’s more, I argued that states have stronger duties to reunite refugee families, especially
families with children, compared to non-refugee families, and that states may sometimes have duties
to grant refugees broader and less-conditional rights to family reunion than ordinary residents and
citizens. These findings suggest that many wealthy refugee-hosting states have urgent duties to make
significant changes to their immigration policies. For one thing, states often have caps on the
number of migrants and resettlement refugees they are willing to admit in a given year, and in some
states (particularly the US) the family members of citizens are first in line for these places. As a
result, the family members of citizens often “crowd out” immigrants applying for other reasons.
However, if the argument from this chapter is right, family reunion applications from refugees –
especially unaccompanied refugee minors – should be prioritized above family reunification
applications from residents and citizens, because only refugee families have a human rights claim to
family reunification.
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Other policy changes that are urgently needed fall directly out of the arguments made in this
paper. States that grant refugees only conditional rights to family reunification must remove financial
barriers that prevent refugees from accessing this right. Refugee-hosting states with conservative
cultural conceptions of the family should allow refugees from cultures with more expansive
conceptions of the family to reunite with their extended family members. And finally, and perhaps
most importantly, all states must extend the right to family reunion to unaccompanied minor
refugees. Family unity is an especially fundamental and urgent need for young people, and early
family separation can seriously impede an individual’s ability to flourish later in life. As such, host
states that do not allow child refugees to reunite with their families do these children a serious
wrong.
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CONCLUSION
We live in a world in which levels of forced displacement are continually reaching record highs and
showing no signs of slowing down. In this context, it is imperative that the international community
of states come together to create the necessary institutional protections for refugees. Declarations,
conventions, and covenants affirming commitments to respect, protect, and fulfill human rights and
restore dignity to displaced value have little value so long as they leave protection gaps, or go
unfulfilled.
In this dissertation I have offered an account of the proper scope of the right to refuge in
international law, as well as an outline of what is owed to refugees upon receipt of asylum.
According to the arguments of the preceding chapters, many more people are entitled to refugee
status than international law currently recognizes, and refugee-hosting states have obligations to do
much more to foster institutions and social conditions that make refugees within their borders feel
safe, respected, and able to move on with their lives. The ways in which the international community
currently fall short of the standards defended in the preceding pages are abundant. Internally
displaced persons with no recourse to their home government are left without an entity to protect
their human rights. Asylum applications from individuals fleeing generalized conflict and violence
are routinely denied. Refugees hosted in affluent “liberal” states are forced to take demeaning social
values classes, while enduring xenophobic discrimination from members of their “tolerant” new
community. These same states deprive refugee children of their right to stable development, by
imposing restrictive family reunification policies that force children to choose between their physical
safety and being with their parents.
This dissertation has offered a thorough explanation for why these states of affairs are
unacceptable. Whatever the underlying justification for them might be, states have strong – and, in
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many cases, legally-binding – obligations to respect, protect, and fulfill human rights. It is widely
accepted that human rights constitute a fundamental global standard, and as such, a system of
international protection which leaves avoidable protection gaps is unjustifiable. For this reason, the
refugee regime – which is just one component of this system – must extend the right to refuge to
everyone who requires it for human rights fulfillment, regardless of location. Beyond this, though,
refugee-hosting states also have important obligations to ensure that the protection provided upon
receipt of asylum is adequate. Effective political membership in a functioning state is valuable not
only because it is a means to human rights fulfillment, but also in itself. Since many of the world’s
refugees are in protracted displacement situations, and return to their home state within a reasonable
period of time is often not an option, states must take their obligations to provide durable solutions
and facilitate the integration of refugees seriously. Restoring the unity of refugee families will be an
essential component of this, given the deep value of the family for both political and personal
reasons.
Our current political situation falls short of these standards. There is nothing to do but move
forward. Policymakers and legislators must make good faith efforts to implement policies that are
realistic stepping-stones towards a more just state of affairs, and refugees must hold leadership
positions in institutions making these reforms. Individuals whose human rights are secure must take
positive steps to act in solidarity with refugees in pursuit of these just policy outcomes. Philosophy
has the tools to identify principles that we should aspire to. It is up to people to take action to put
these principles into practice.
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